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As the subtitle of the two volumes of Beyond Media Borders: Intermedial 
Relations among Multimodal Media makes clear, these reflections on 
media have the mission to begin where medium-specificity or, what I call 
slightly irreverently, medium-essentialism ends. The media under discus-
sion here, considered from a great variety of perspectives, are all ‘multi-
modal’, set in more than one semiotic mode. The most readily 
understandable example we have rehearsed for so long would be, of 
course, cinema or television, the study of which in monodisciplinary 
departments seems to take for granted that they are media, whereas the 
inevitable combination of words and images, colour, sound, narrativity 
and technological effects clearly demonstrates that no single disciplinary 
framework will do. As I am also a maker of films and video, I feel I am in 
a good place to say this. But as the essays in these volumes make clear, 
practically all media deploy more than one modality.
The point is not so much, however, that ‘multi-’ aspect, although that, 
too, is important, since it advocates an anti-purist view of the media 
products—Lars Elleström’s term for ‘texts’ and ‘images’, ‘sounds’ and 
‘words’, and what have you, that it is the Humanities’ mission to study. 
What catches my eye is primarily that word ‘relations’, in combination 
with the preposition ‘inter-’, which is particularly dear to me, as I have 
explained more times than I care to remember. Briefly, ‘inter-’ stands for, 
or is, relation, rather than accumulation. It is to be distinguished in crucial 
ways from that currently over-used preposition ‘trans-’, which denotes a 
passage through, without impact from, another domain. With his consis-
tent interest in media as intermedial and his prolific publication record, 
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many edited volumes, and as director of the Linnaeus University Centre 
for Intermedial and Multimodal Studies (IMS), Elleström has become a 
primary authority in that domain that is best characterized as one that 
doesn’t fit any of the traditional disciplinary concepts, yet is probably the 
largest, most frequently practised mode of communication among humans, 
indispensable for human life. Elleström’s ongoing focus on—his intellec-
tual loyalty to—the idea of the semiotic, a concept and field that on its own 
already indicates the need for the ‘beyond’ in the books’ main title, dem-
onstrates a resistance to ephemeral academic fashion and a consistency of 
thought without dogmatism which I consider characteristic of the semi-
otic perspective. Briefly again, a semiotic perspective asks how we make 
meaning. The interest of these volumes lies in the importance of commu-
nication in general, without which no human society is possible.
Media, as the editor explains, are always-already ‘inter-’, as the century- 
old debates about inter-arts clearly demonstrates. The preposition is a 
bridge, and the articles brought together here explore what the bridge 
bridges. This requires reflection on the concept of media itself. One can-
not understand intermediality without a sense of what a medium is; even 
if, as such, in its purity, it doesn’t exist. With exemplary clarity, Elleström 
begins his substantial opening and synthesizing article with five tendencies 
he finds damaging for intellectual achievement in (inter)media studies. 
Anyone interested in this field of study will recognize these tendencies and 
agree with the editor’s critique of them. But then, the challenge is how to 
remedy these problems. This is where Elleström earns his authority: he 
proceeds to announce how these tendencies will be countered, or over-
come, in the present volumes. If only all academics would take the time 
and bother to lay out what they are up against and then redress it: aca-
demic bliss would ensue. In other words, this is real progress in the collec-
tive thinking of cultural analysis. Felicitously refraining from short 
definitions, he embeds the relevant concepts in what he calls a ‘model’, 
but what those of us with a mild case of ‘model-phobia’—the fear of a 
certain scientistic demand of rigour before all else—may also see as a theo-
retical frame. Felicitously, he calls his activity ‘circumscribing’ rather than 
defining. His approach alone, then, already demonstrates in the first pages 
of his long introductory text an academic position that integrates instead 
of separating creativity and rigour and thus not only helps us understand 
the general principles of communication but, through detailed analysis, 
makes us ‘communicationally intelligent’, if I may follow discursively the 
example of psychoanalyst Christopher Bollas who, in his 1992 book Being 
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a Character, sensitizes us to the complexities and thereby, clarity, of how 
people are able, and by the media products, enabled, to communicate 
effectively, with nuance.
There is not a term or concept here that is not both circumscribed and 
relativized and put to convincing use. The length of the introductory essay 
is, in this sense, simply a demonstration of generosity. For example, the 
central concept of ‘transfer’ that we can hardly do without when talking 
about communication is neither defined in a simplistic way, as a postal 
service that goes in one direction only, nor theorized into incomprehensi-
bility. The idea of transferring means that a message goes from a sender to 
a receiver; we were told in the early days of semiotic theory. Of course, in 
order to discuss communication, we must consider the idea that a message 
is indeed transferred from a sender to a receiver; without it, we are floun-
dering. In this, Elleström is realistic; he doesn’t reinvent the wheel. Yet, 
the implicit (but not explicit) notion that the content of a message, as well 
as its form, go wholesale from sender to receiver, as endorsed in traditional 
semiotic theory, is clearly untenable. For, the sender’s message, with the 
sender always already ‘in’ communication, will always be influenced, or 
coloured, by what the sender expects, and has reasons to expect, the 
receiver will wish, grasp, appreciate.
What do we do, then? Instead of casually rejecting the idea, concept or 
notion, Elleström and his colleagues in these volumes recalibrate and 
nuance what we consider a message to be, with the help of the relationality 
that the preposition ‘inter-’ implies. This makes the sender-message- 
receiver process an interaction, mutually responsive, hence, communica-
tive in the true sense. The change from ‘sender’ to ‘producer’ intimates 
that the former sender has made something. The former ‘receiver’ has 
shed her passivity by becoming a ‘perceiver’, a term that adds the activity 
performed at the other end of the process. And when the term ‘meaning’ 
is hurt by a long history of rigid semantics, as is the case of many of the 
concepts we use as if they were just ordinary words, they come up with 
alternatives, but not without bringing these in ‘discussion’ with the sim-
pler but problematic predecessors. The need for a concept that cannot be 
reduced to dictionary definitions compels the authors, guided by the 
experienced and ingenious editor, to come up with richer terms that are 
able to encompass all those nuances that were always a bit bothersome and 
that we liked to discard or ignore. Thus, ‘cognitive import’ cannot be 
reduced to ‘meaning’, and neither can it be confined to language. That 
would make the substitution of a well-known term by a new one pointless. 
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Instead, the new term necessarily includes the embodied aspect of com-
munication. This eliminates the mind-body dichotomy to which we are so 
tenaciously attached; not because we believe in it, but because, until these 
volumes, we had no alternative vision.
The word ‘dichotomy’, here, is perhaps the most central opponent in 
these volumes’ discourse. And as with ‘inter-’ as implying relationality, I 
feel very close and committed to an approach that does not take binary 
opposition as its ‘normal’, standard mode of thinking. And once we are 
willing to give up on dichotomies such as mind/body, it becomes possible 
to complicate all those dichotomies that structure what we have taken for 
granted and should let go in order to recognize the richness of mental 
life—mental in a way that does not discard the body but endorses it, along 
with materiality, as integrally participating in the thinking that communi-
cation stimulates, helps along and substantiates. Both the partners in com-
munication, who can be singular and, at the same time, plural, and the site 
of communication, are necessarily material or bound to materiality. 
Moreover, the sense-based nature of communication makes the abstract 
ideas surrounding communication theory, not only untenable, but futile, 
meaningless. Getting rid of, or at the very least, bracketing, binary opposi-
tion as a way of thinking is for me the primary merit of the approach pre-
sented here.
So, the first thing these books achieve is to complicate things, in order 
to get rid of cliché simplicity, and then, right after that, to clarify those 
complicated ideas, concepts and the models that encompass them. This is 
perhaps the most important merit of these volumes. They complicate what 
we thought we knew and clarify what we thought is difficult. With that 
move as their starting point, the enormous variety of topics of the chapters 
become, thanks to the many cross-references from one article to another, 
a polyphony. Rather than a cacophony of loud divergent voices, this 
polyphony constitutes a symphony that, as a whole, maps the enormously 
large field of the indispensable communication that is human culture, 
without pedantically demanding that every reader be an expert in all those 
fields. I don’t think anyone can master all the areas presented and exam-
ined in the contributions, but the taste of it we get makes us at the very 
least genuinely interested. This is not a dictionary or an encyclopaedia but 
a beautifully crafted patchwork of thoughts.
The conceptual travels are stimulating, never off-putting, because they 
are completely without the plodding idiosyncrasies one so often encoun-
ters when new concepts are proposed. And devoid of the polemical 
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discussions with other terminologies, well explained and labelled mean-
ingfully, the conceptual network towards which these books move fills 
itself as we read along and thus ends up offering a ground for cultural 
analysis that I am eager to put my feet on. Solid, reliable and, still, excit-
ing. What more would we wish from in-depth academic work? This collec-
tive, collaborative work is based on a deep understanding of what scholarly 
work should be: an act of communication between producers and perceiv-
ers, as the view presented here would have it, one that makes its readers 
feel involved. This is the only way they can learn something new.
University of Amsterdam  
Amsterdam, The Netherlands 
Mieke Bal
xi
In 2010, Palgrave Macmillan published a volume entitled Media Borders, 
Multimodality and Intermediality, which I had the pleasure to edit. It 
included my own rather extensive introductory article, ‘The Modalities of 
Media: A Model for Understanding Intermedial Relations’, which has 
since then attracted some attention in intermediality studies. It is my most 
quoted publication, and scholars and students still use the book and my 
introductory article in research and education. For my own part, I apply 
the core concepts of ‘The Modalities of Media’ as a basis for all my 
research, including in the two Palgrave Pivot books Media Transformation 
(2014) and Transmedial Narration (2019). Over the last decade, how-
ever, I have also deepened, developed and slightly modified the original 
ideas because I think some of them were formulated prematurely. I have 
also noted that people sometimes misunderstand certain parts of the arti-
cle because of my somewhat inadequate and occasionally confusing ways 
of explaining some of the concepts. Therefore, I decided to rewrite ‘The 
Modalities of Media: A Model for Understanding Intermedial Relations’.
However, the reworking became more substantial than I had expected, 
resulting in a text that is not only modified and updated but also signifi-
cantly expanded, incorporating ideas that I have presented in other publi-
cations during the last decade. Therefore, I have called it ‘The Modalities 
of Media II: An Expanded Model for Understanding Intermedial 
Relations’. The new version more clearly frames mediality and intermedi-
ality in the context of inter-human communication and defines the central 
concept of media product as the intermediate entity that makes communi-
cation among human minds possible. It retains, but slightly modifies and 
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expounds, the central idea of characterizing media products in terms of 
four media modalities, four kinds of media traits. For instance, the discus-
sions now include not only virtual (represented) time and space but also 
virtual (represented) materialities and sensory perceptions. Providing a 
fuller picture of representing and represented media traits, as well as add-
ing discussions of cross-modal cognitive capacities of the human mind, 
makes it possible to offer a much-developed understanding of the con-
cepts of media types and media borders and what it means to cross media 
borders. As a result, the new article hopefully better explains the intricacies 
of media integration and media transformation. Overall, most of the con-
cepts have been fine-tuned, leading to a more consistent and developed 
framework. However, attentive readers will note that I have not men-
tioned a few ideas that I briefly discussed in the original article. This does 
not necessarily mean that I have abandoned them; rather, I have decided 
to develop them further in other publications instead of trying to squeeze 
even more into an already extensive article. Nevertheless, ‘The Modalities 
of Media II’ is supposed to replace rather than complement the original 
article.
This means that the two-volume Beyond Media Borders: Intermedial 
Relations among Multimodal Media is effectively a completely new publi-
cation. All of its other contributions are entirely novel compared to Media 
Borders, Multimodality and Intermediality (2010) and are written by 
authors that (with only one exception) are not the same as those in the 
earlier book. The main idea of the new publication is not only to launch 
an updated version of ‘The Modalities of Media’ but also to present it 
together with a collection of fresh articles written by scholars from a broad 
variety of subject areas, united by their references to the concepts originat-
ing from ‘The Modalities of Media’.
Besides being highly original pieces of scholarship in themselves, the 
accompanying articles practically illustrate, exemplify and clarify how the 
concepts developed in ‘The Modalities of Media II’ can be used for 
methodical investigation, explanation and interpretation of media traits 
and media interrelations in a broad selection of old and new media types. 
To provide space for analysis of such a wide range of dissimilar media 
types, without reducing the complexity of the arguments, two volumes are 
required. Their title, Beyond Media Borders: Intermedial Relations among 
Multimodal Media, reflects the underlying idea that all media types are 
more or less multimodal and that comparing media types requires that 
these multimodal traits being analysed and compared in various ways. As 
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different basic media types have diverging but also partly overlapping 
modes (for instance, several dissimilar media types have visuality or tempo-
rality in common), and because humans have cognitive capacities to partly 
overbridge modal differences (between, for instance, space and time or 
vision and hearing), media borders are not definite; in that sense, one 
must move ‘beyond’ media borders.
Overall, the two volumes form a collection with strong internal coher-
ence and abundant cross-references among its contributions (not only to 
‘The Modalities of Media II’). Simultaneously, they cover and intercon-
nect a comprehensive range of very different media types that scholars 
have traditionally investigated through more limited, media-specific con-
cepts. Hence, the two volumes should preferably be read together as a 
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Although all of the contributions can be read as separate articles, the two 
volumes of Beyond Media Borders form a whole. Because the contributions 
are written in concert and include some dialogues, reading the publication 
in its entirety adds substantial value. Part I in Volume 1, ‘The Model’, 
contains the extensive theoretical framework presented in ‘The Modalities 
of Media II: An Expanded Model for Understanding Intermedial rela-
tions’. Part II in Volume 2, ‘The Model Applied’, offers a brief summary 
and some elaborations that end the two volumes. Between these two 
opening and closing parts, one finds Part II in Volume 1, ‘Media 
Integration’, and Part I in Volume 2, ‘Media Transformation’, which con-
tain the majority of contributions. As explained in ‘The Modalities of 
Media II’, media integration and media transformation are not absolute 
properties of media and their interrelations, but rather analytical perspec-
tives. Hence, the division of articles into two parts only reflects dominant 
analytical viewpoints in the various contributions; a closer look at them 
reveals that they all, to some extent, apply an integrational as well as a 
transformational perspective.
This is the first volume of Beyond Media Borders. The complete table of 
contents for both volumes is as follows:
about the book
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1.1  What Is the Problem?
All human beings use media, whether in the form of gestures, speech, 
news programmes, websites, music, advertisements or traffic signs. The 
collaboration of all these media is essential for living, learning and sharing 
experiences. Understanding mediality is one of the keys to understanding 
meaning-making in human interaction, whether directly through the 
capacities of our bodies or with the aid of traditional or modern external 
devices.
Media can be understood as communicative tools constituted by inter-
related features. All media are multimodal and intermedial in the sense 
that they are composed of multiple basic features and can be thoroughly 
understood only in relation to other types of media with which they share 
basic features. We do not have standard communication on one hand and 
multimodal and intermedial communication on the other. Therefore, 
basic research in multimodality and intermediality is vital for further prog-
ress in understanding mediality—the use of communicative media—in 
general. Intermediality is an analytical angle that can be used successfully 
for unravelling some of the complexities of all kinds of communication.
Scholars have been debating the interrelations of the arts for centuries. 
Now, in the age of mass media, electronic media and digital media, the 
focus of the argumentation has been broadened to the interrelations 
among media types in general. One important move has been to acknowl-
edge fully the materiality of the arts: like other media, they depend on 
mediating substances. For this reason, the arts should not be isolated as 
something ethereal, but rather seen as aesthetically developed forms of 
media. Still, several of the issues discussed within the old interart paradigm 
are also highly relevant to multimodal and intermedial studies. One such 
classical locus of the interart debate concerns the relation between the arts 
of time and the arts of space. In the eighteenth century, Gotthold Ephraim 
Lessing famously argued in Laocoön that there are, or rather should be, 
clear differences between poetry and painting (1984 [1766]). Lessing’s 
core question of what implications spatiotemporal differences have for 
media remains acutely relevant today.
I believe it is equally important to highlight media differences and 
media similarities when trying to get a grip on multimodality and interme-
diality. If we have earlier seen a bent towards emphasising differences, 
recent decades have shown a tendency to deconstruct media dissimilari-
ties, not least through the writings of W.  J. T.  Mitchell (1986), who 
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criticised ideologically grounded attempts to find clear boundaries between 
media types and particularly art forms. Other scholars, like Shlomith 
Rimmon-Kenan, have emphasised that media differences come in grades: 
‘It seems to me that (1) most of the distinctions between media will turn 
out to be matters of degree rather than of absolute presence or absence of 
qualities; and (2) what is a constraint in one medium may be only a pos-
sibility in another’ (Rimmon-Kenan 1989: 161). I feel that this is a pro-
ductive view that still needs to be developed methodically. I find it as 
unsatisfying to continue talking about ‘writing’, ‘film’, ‘performance’, 
‘music’ and ‘television’ as if they were like different people who can be 
married and divorced as to find repose in a belief that all media are always 
fundamentally blended in a hermaphroditical way.
In brief, one might say that the crucial ‘inter’ part of intermediality is a 
bridge, but what does it bridge over? If all media were fundamentally dif-
ferent, it would be hard to find any interrelations at all; if they were fun-
damentally similar, it would be equally hard to find something that is not 
already interrelated. However, media are both different and similar, and 
intermediality must be understood as a bridge between media differences 
that is founded on media similarities. The primary aim of this article is to 
shed light on precisely these differences and similarities in order to better 
understand intermedial relations.
I identify five tendencies in exploration of mediality, including what is 
known as multimodality and intermediality studies, which I find problem-
atic. Although these tendencies were stronger a decade ago when I pub-
lished the initial version of ‘The Modalities of Media’ (Elleström 2010), 
and several scholars have proposed ways to tackle them, they still exist.
 1. Research is carried out without proper explanations of the concept of 
medium. Just as multimodality studies are often conducted without 
accurate definitions of mode, intermediality tends to be discussed 
without clear conceptions of the medium. I argue that if the concept 
of medium is not properly defined, one cannot expect to compre-
hend mediality and intermediality, which makes it difficult to inte-
grate medium with mode and other related concepts. This is not 
only a terminological problem; on the contrary, it concerns the for-
mation of conceptual frameworks capable of operating over large 
areas of communication.
 2. Only two media types at a time are compared. Following the tradi-
tions of interart studies, intermedial work has a strong tendency to 
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compare no more than two media types at a time. Countless publi-
cations have focussed on word and image, word and music, film and 
literature, film and computer games, visual art and poetry and other 
constellations including two or perhaps three media types. While 
such studies are legitimate and may offer great insights, they usually 
delimit the field of vision in such ways that the outcomes are not 
helpful for analysing other forms of media interrelations. This results 
in a multitude of incompatible terms and concepts that blur the 
essential core features of media in general.
 3. Media in general are studied through concepts developed for language 
analysis. Twentieth-century research in the humanities has been 
strongly affected by the language-centred semiotics of Ferdinand de 
Saussure (2011 [1916]). Although Saussure has been seminal for 
understanding language better, his ideas have also, to some extent, 
harmed the conceptualisation of communication in general. This is 
because his concepts lack the capacity to explain anything other than 
the conventional aspects of signification, which Saussure explored in 
terms of arbitrariness of signs. This excludes core features of several 
media types. The strong bias in a lot of Western research towards 
trying to understand all kinds of communication in terms of lan-
guage has been counterproductive, overall, and is still a major threat 
to a cross-disciplinary understanding of media properties. This is 
true even for the significant amount of research that clearly focuses 
on non-verbal aspects (multimodality research in the tradition of 
Kress and van Leeuwen 2001), although the field is currently mov-
ing towards a less language-centred approach (Bateman et al. 2017).
 4. Misleading dichotomies structure the arguments. Although advanced 
terminology and theoretical sophistication are not lacking, many 
researchers still use largely undefined and deeply ambiguous lay-
man’s terms, such as ‘text’ and ‘image’, to describe the nature of 
media. Although such terms are indispensable for everyday use, and 
valuable for preliminary scholarly categorisations, they refer to noto-
riously vague concepts, which causes misunderstanding and confu-
sion to become standard features of academic discussions. Attempts 
to create systematic and comprehensive methodologies and theo-
retical frameworks fail because the most basic concepts are not 
clearly delimited. For instance, the terms ‘text’ and ‘image’ may 
refer to media with fundamentally different material, spatiotemporal 
and sensorial features. Consequently, efforts to understand the 
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 relationship between so-called texts and images are doomed to fail, 
leaving us with nebulous and insufficient ideas of ‘mixtures’ of text 
and image unless more fine-grained explanations are made. Similarly, 
the ‘verbal’ vs. ‘visual’ media dichotomy is inadequate. Although it 
may be practical for upholding rough differences between some 
media types, it is actually confusing and counterproductive when 
trying to understand media similarities and differences in a deeper 
way. Because being visual is a sensorial trait and being verbal is a 
semiotic trait, it is pointless to oppose the two. Some media are ver-
bal, others are not; some media are visual, others are not; and some 
media are both verbal and visual.
 5. Media traits are not distinguished from media perception and signifi-
cation. Another recurring problem is the failure to distinguish 
between inherent media traits and the perception of those traits. 
This is understandable since it is, in practice, impossible to separate 
the two. Nevertheless, it is crucial to discriminate theoretically 
between the modes of existence of media and the perception of 
these modes in order to apprehend media differences and similari-
ties. Although this is doubtless a slippery business, it is important to 
acknowledge that, for instance, the quality of time in a movie, 
understood as a mode of existence, is not the same as the time 
required to perceive a still photograph. Furthermore, time can be 
said to be present in many forms in the same medium. A still photo-
graph, which does not have time as a mode of existence, can never-
theless represent temporal events. If one avoids taking notice of 
these intricacies, one is left with a featureless mass of only seemingly 
identical media that cannot be compared properly.
The goal of this article is to suggest solutions to these problems through 
the following means:
 1. A methodical elaboration of the concept of medium
 2. A systematic development of concepts that are applicable to all 
media types
 3. A multifaceted understanding of communication that is not 
anchored in linguistic concepts
 4. A fine-grained manner of conceptualising the multitude of media 
traits beyond standard formulae
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 5. A nuanced investigation of the relations among basic media traits, 
perception and signification
I hope that fulfilling this objective will make it possible to understand bet-
ter what media borders are and how they can be crossed, how one can 
comprehend the concept of multimodality in relation to intermediality, 
what it means to combine and integrate different media and how it is pos-
sible for different media types to communicate similar things.
My suggested conceptual solutions are not the only ones available. 
However, to keep my lines of argument as clear as possible, I refrain from 
engaging in excessive critique of other positions. Furthermore, my ambi-
tion is not to propose anything like a complete model for analysing com-
munication; instead, the objective is to scrutinise precisely intermedial 
relations. Understanding such interrelations may be vital for various forms 
of investigations, and, depending on the aims and goals of those investiga-
tions, the concepts and principles that I propose here must be comple-
mented with other research tools.
The term ‘medium’ is widely employed, and it would be pointless to try 
to find a straightforward definition that covers all the various notions that 
lurk behind the different uses of the word. Dissimilar notions of medium 
and mediality are at work within different fields of research, and there is 
no reason to interfere with these notions as long as they fulfil their specific 
tasks. Instead, I will circumscribe a concept that is applicable to the issue 
of human communication. However, a brief definition of medium would 
only capture fragments of the whole conceptual web and could be coun-
terproductive. Instead, I will try to form a model (which actually consti-
tutes a conglomerate of several models) that preserves the term ‘medium’ 
and still qualifies its use in relation to the different aspects of the concep-
tual web of mediality. Thus, the concept of medium can be divided into 
several deeply entangled concepts in order to cover the many interrelated 
aspects of mediality.
The core of this differentiation consists of setting apart four media 
modalities that may be helpful for analysing media products. A media 
product is a single physical entity or phenomenon that enables inter- 
human communication. Media products can be analysed in terms of four 
types of traits: material, spatiotemporal, sensorial and semiotic traits. I call 
these categories of traits media modalities. During the last decades, the 
notion of multimodality has gained ground (Kress and van Leeuwen 2001; 
Bateman 2008; Kress 2010; Seizov and Wildfeuer 2017), stemming from 
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social semiotics, education, linguistics and communication studies. 
Although my notion of media modalities is inspired by this research tradi-
tion, it differs significantly in ways that will become evident. Likewise, I 
am strongly influenced by the research field of intermediality, which has its 
historical roots in aesthetics, philosophy, semiotics, comparative literature, 
media studies and interart studies (for details, see Clüver 2007, 2019; 
Rajewsky 2008). These research traditions have been decisive for how I 
have come to circumscribe the various aspects of mediality.
As my arguments unfold, I will distinguish among media products, 
technical media of display and media types (basic media types and qualified 
media types). Basic and qualified media types are categories of media 
products, whereas technical media of display are the physical entities 
needed to realise media products and hence media types. Consequently, 
the term ‘medium’, when used without specifications, generally refers to 
all of these media aspects.
Thus, various media aspects are not groups of media. Instead, they are 
complementary, interwoven, theoretical aspects of what constitutes medi-
ality. Accordingly, the wide concept of medium that I will present in this 
article comprises several intimately related yet divergent notions that I will 
distinguish terminologically. I believe that multimodality and intermedial-
ity cannot be fully understood without grasping the fundamental condi-
tions of every single media product, and these conditions constitute a 
complex network of both physical qualities of media and various cognitive 
and interpretive operations performed by the media perceivers. For my 
purpose, media definitions that deal only with the physical aspects of 
mediality are too narrow, as are media definitions that only emphasise the 
social construction of communication. Instead, I will emphasise the criti-
cal meeting of the physical, the perceptual, the cognitive and the social.
1.2  What are medIa Products 
and communIcatIng mInds?
1.2.1  A Medium-Centred Model of Communication
The starting point of this investigation of media interrelations consists of 
an examination of the concept of media product, which is the core of all 
further elaborations in this study. To delineate the concept of a media 
product properly and thoroughly, it is necessary to have a developed 
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model of human communication that is devised for highlighting precisely 
the notion of medium (Elleström 2018a, b, c). Although I have designed 
my model to scrutinise primarily human communication, it is at least 
partly applicable to communication among other animals as well. It con-
sists of what I take to be the smallest and fewest possible entities of com-
munication and their essential interrelations. If one of these entities or 
interrelations is removed, communication is no longer at hand; thus, the 
model is irreducible. I submit that three indispensable and interconnected 
entities can be discerned:
 1. Something being transferred
 2. Two separate places between which the transfer occurs
 3. An intermediate stage that makes the transfer possible
These three entities of communication have been circumscribed in various 
ways in established and influential communication models. In the follow-
ing, I refer to some of these classical models (from linguistics, media and 
communication studies and cultural studies) to anchor my concepts in 
well-known communication paradigms and make clear the many ways in 
which I depart from the standard concepts. Although it is debatable, I 
have kept the traditional concept of transfer because I think it is part and 
parcel of the concept of communication. While the term ‘transfer’ may 
have misleading associations with material things being moved around, 
one can hardly avoid the deep experiential similarity between sharing and 
transferring material and mental entities—as in human communication. 
These issues will be continuously scrutinised in the ensuing discussions.
Roman Jakobson used the term ‘message’ to capture the first entity, 
‘something being transferred’, but did not delineate the notion underly-
ing his term (Jakobson 1960). Wilbur Schramm vacillated between two 
incompatible arguments: that there is no such thing as an entity being 
transferred, and that the transferred entity is a ‘message’—not ideas or 
thoughts (Schramm 1971). Stuart Hall was also rather vague when he 
implied that ‘meaning’ is transferred in communication. Instead of clearly 
stating that communication is about transferring meaning, he emphasised 
that ‘meaning structures 1’ and ‘meaning structures 2’ may differ; there 
are degrees of ‘symmetry’ and degrees of ‘understanding’ and ‘misunder-
standing’ (Hall 1980: 131). In other words, if there is transfer of meaning 
in communication, this involves transformation of meaning. This conten-
tion is certainly feasible.
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While the second entity, ‘two separate places between which the trans-
fer occurs’, arguably consists of two units, they can only be outlined in 
relation to each other. Jakobson’s terms were ‘addresser’ and ‘addressee’, 
but Schramm preferred ‘communicator’ and ‘receiver’. Finally, Hall 
avoided outlining the two separate places between which the transfer 
occurs as persons; in fact, he avoided pointing to such places at all. 
However, his notion that ‘meaning structures’ are to some extent trans-
ferred implies that such meaning structures indeed need to be located at 
places that are capable of holding ‘meaning’—which must be understood 
as the minds of human beings, given that human communication is 
at stake.
The third entity, ‘an intermediate stage that makes the transfer possi-
ble’, has also been conceptualised differently. Jakobson’s ‘contact’ notably 
incorporates both a material and a mental aspect; it was described as ‘a 
physical channel and psychological connection between the addresser and 
the addressee’ (1960: 353). Schramm used the term message to represent 
not only the transferred entity, but also the intermediate stage of commu-
nication (he seems to understand the message as something that is both 
‘transferred’ and ‘transferred through’). Importantly, however, Schramm 
described the transmitting message not only as a material entity—such as 
‘a letter’—but also as ‘a collection of signs’, thus indicating the capacity of 
the material to produce mental significance through signs (1971: 15). 
Hall also emphasised the semiotic nature of the intermediate stage of com-
munication. His term for this entity was ‘meaningful’ discourse; however, 
his terminology is generally rather incoherent, resulting in uncertainty 
about the more precise nature of the intermediate stage.
Regarding the first entity of communication, ‘something being trans-
ferred’, there is certainly a point in Schramm’s notion that no ideas or 
thoughts are transferred in communication. As Hall indicated, transfer of 
meaning is likely to entail a change of meaning; this modification may be 
only slight or more radical. Nevertheless, I claim that communication 
models cannot do without the notion of something being transferred. If 
there is no correlation at all between input and output, there is simply no 
communication, given the foundational idea that to communicate is ‘to 
share’; thus, a concept of communication without the notion of some-
thing being transferred is nonsensical. However problematic it may be, the 
notion of something being transferred must be retained and painstakingly 
scrutinised, instead of being avoided. To begin with, I think it is clear that 
one cannot confine the transferred units or features to distinct and 
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consciously intended conceptions, and perhaps not even to ‘ideas’ as 
Schramm understands them.
My suggestion is to use the term ‘cognitive import’ to refer to those 
mental configurations that are the output and input of communication 
(thus, ‘import’ should not be understood here in contrast to ‘export’). 
The notion that I want to suggest using this term is clearly closely related 
to notions captured by terms such as ‘meaning’, ‘significance’ and ‘ideas’, 
although the term ‘cognitive import’ is perhaps less burdened with certain 
notions that a term such as ‘meaning’ seems to have difficulty ridding itself 
of. Meaning is often understood as a rather rigid concept of verbal, firm, 
definable or even logical sense. Instead, cognitive import should be under-
stood as a broad notion that also includes vague, fragmentary, undevel-
oped, intuitive, ambiguous, non-conceptual and pragmatically oriented 
meaning that is relevant to a wide range of media types and communica-
tive situations. It is imperative to emphasise that although cognitive import 
is always a result of mind-work, cognition is embodied and not always 
possible to articulate using language; hence, according to my proposed 
model, communication cannot be reduced to simply communication of 
verbal or verbalisable significance.
The second entity, ‘two separate places between which the transfer 
occurs’, is usually construed as two persons. However, this straightfor-
ward notion is not precise enough for my purposes. Because it is impera-
tive to be able to connect mind and body to different entities of the 
communication model, it is also essential to avoid crude notions such as 
that of Jakobson’s addresser–addressee and Schramm’s communicator–
receiver. These notions give the impression that the transfer necessarily 
occurs between two persons consisting of minds and bodies and with a 
third, separate, intermediate object in the middle, so to speak, an interme-
diate object in the form of a ‘message’ that is essentially disconnected from 
the communicating persons. It is better to follow Hall’s implicit idea that 
communication occurs between sites that are capable of holding ‘mean-
ing’. Warren Weaver’s description of communication as something that 
occurs between ‘one mind’ and ‘another’ is simple and to the point 
(Weaver 1998 [1949]).
My suggestion is to use the terms ‘producer’s mind’ and ‘perceiver’s 
mind’ to refer to the mental places in which cognitive import appears. 
First, there are certain mental configurations in the producer’s mind, and 
then, following the communicative transfer, there are mental configura-
tions in the perceiver’s mind that are at least remotely similar to those in 
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the producer’s mind. The term ‘mind’ should generally be understood as 
denoting (human) consciousness that originates in the brain and is par-
ticularly manifested in perception, emotion, thought, reasoning, will, 
judgment, memory and imagination. The term ‘mental’ refers to every-
thing relating to the mind. The term ‘cognition’ should be understood as 
representing those mental processes that are involved in gaining knowl-
edge and comprehension, including, among other higher-level functions 
of the brain, thinking, remembering, problem-solving, planning and judg-
ing. However, even though the mind and its cognition are founded on 
cerebral processes, mental activities are in no way separated from the rest 
of the body. On the contrary, I subscribe to the idea that the mind is pro-
foundly embodied—formed by experiences of corporeality (Johnson 1987).
Most of the researchers that I refer to here have recognised, either 
explicitly or implicitly, that the third entity, ‘an intermediate stage that 
makes the transfer possible’, is in some way material. As stated succinctly 
in a more recent publication, any act of communication ‘is made possible 
by some form of concrete reification of the message, which, at its most 
elementary level, must abide by physical laws to exist and take shape’ 
(Bolchini and Lu 2013: 398). Furthermore, Schramm and Hall clearly 
discussed the intermediate stage in terms of signs. In line with this, I sug-
gest that the intermediate entity connecting two minds with each other is 
always in some way material, understood broadly as consisting of physical 
entities or phenomena, although it clearly cannot be conceptualised only 
in terms of materiality. As it connects two minds in terms of a transfer of 
cognitive import, it must be understood as materiality having the capacity 
to trigger certain mental responses.
My suggestion is to use the term ‘media product’ to refer to the inter-
mediate stage that enables the transfer of cognitive import from a pro-
ducer’s to a perceiver’s mind (what Irina O.  Rajewsky called ‘medial 
configuration’ (2010)). As the bodies of these two minds may well be used 
as instruments for the transfer of cognitive import, they have potential to 
attain the function of media products. I propose that a media product may 
be realised by either non-bodily or bodily matter (including matter ema-
nating directly from a body), or a combination of the two. This means that 
the producer’s mind may, for instance, use either non-bodily matter (say, 
paper) or her own body and its immediate extensions (moving arms and 
sound produced by the vocal cords) to realise media products such as 
printed texts, gestures and speech. Furthermore, the perceiver’s body may 
be used to accomplish media products; for instance, the producer may 
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realise a painting on the perceiver’s skin or push her gently to communi-
cate the desire that she move a little. Additionally, other bodies, such as 
the bodies of actors, may be used as media products.
In contrast to influential scholars such as Marshall McLuhan, who con-
ceptualised media as the ‘extensions of man’ in general (McLuhan 1994 
[1964]), I define media products as ‘extensions of mind’ in the context of 
inter-human communication. Thereby, I avoid the classical distinction in 
communication studies between mediated and interpersonal communica-
tion—communication that needs and communication that supposedly 
does not need mediation. This distinction has been criticised because of 
practical difficulties in upholding it (see Rice 2017). I avoid it also because 
of the theoretical and more profound obstacle of thinking about interper-
sonal communication as not being mediated (it would be absurd to con-
sider interpersonal communication independent of media capacities and 
media limitations). The only thing that justifies such a distinction is that 
so-called interpersonal communication is entirely dependent on specific 
(but not fundamentally different) forms of media products, namely, those 
that rely on the producer and perceiver’s human bodies and their immedi-
ate extensions instead of external devices.
1.2.2  Media Products
Given that being a media product must be understood as a function rather 
than an essential property, virtually any material existence can be used as 
one, including not only solid objects but also all kinds of physical phenom-
ena that can be perceived by the human senses. In addition to those forms 
of media products that are more commonly categorised as such (like writ-
ten texts, songs, scientific diagrams, warning cries and road signs), there is 
an endless row of forms of physical objects, phenomena and actions that 
can function as media products, given that they are perceived in situations 
and surroundings that encourage interpretation in terms of communica-
tion. These include nudges, blinks, coughs, meals, ceremonies, decora-
tions, clothes, hairstyles and make-up. In addition, dogs, wine bottles and 
cars of certain makes, sorts and designs may well function as media prod-
ucts to communicate the embracing of certain values or simply wealth, for 
instance. Within the framework of a trial, surveillance camera footage and 
spoken word testimony from witnesses both function as media products, 
as do fingerprints, DNA samples and bloodstains presented by the prose-
cutor—because they are drawn into a communicative situation.
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Because the function of being a media product is initially triggered by 
the producer’s mind, media products can be said to be produced by the 
producer’s mind. As I define these concepts, producing a media product 
does not necessarily mean fabricating it materially. Fingerprints presented 
in a criminal trial are evidently produced by the prosecutor not in the sense 
that she materially fabricates them, but in the sense that she gives them a 
communicative function by placing them in the context of the trial.
It may also be the case that someone uses an ‘old’ media product, pro-
duced by someone else, to communicate. For instance, one could play a 
recorded love song, written and sung by others, to communicate love to 
someone special on a certain occasion. In this way, the recorded song, 
which already has the function of a media product, is appropriated, so to 
speak, and given a more specific and partly new communicative function. 
Like the fingerprints (disregarding other differences), the recorded love 
song is not fabricated by the (new) producer’s mind, but rather exposed 
and given a (new) communicative function.
Given this conceptualisation, it is pointless to try to distinguish between 
physical existences that are and that are not actual media products. Instead, 
it is important to have a clear notion of the properties of physical exis-
tences that confer the function of media products on them. Clearly, these 
properties, which I will investigate in the following, are in no way self- 
evidently present. Perceiving something as a media product is a question 
of being attentive to certain kinds of phenomena in the world. As humans 
have been able to communicate with each other for thousands and thou-
sands of years, this attention is partly passed on by heredity, but it is also 
deeply formed by cultural factors and the experience of navigating within 
one’s present surroundings. Knowledge of musical performance tradi-
tions, for example, leads to specific attention to certain details while others 
may be ignored; thus, accidental noises and random gestures may be sifted 
out as irrelevant for the musical communication and not part of the media 
product. Practical experience of the environment normally makes us pay 
attention to what happens on the screen of a television set rather than to 
its backside. However, if the television set is used in an artistic installation, 
or if a repair person tries to explain why it does not work by way of point-
ing to certain gadgets, it may be the backside that should be selected for 
attention in order to achieve the function of a media product.
Thus, media products are cultural entities that depend on social praxis; 
media products and their basic characteristics are (more or less) delimited 
units formed by (often shared) selective attention on sensorially 
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perceptible areas of communication that are believed to be relevant for 
achieving communication in a certain context. This means that there is no 
such thing as a media product ‘as such’. I argue that not even a written 
text is a media product in itself; it is only when its function of transferring 
cognitive import among minds is realised that it can be conceptualised as 
a media product. The archaeologist who inspects the marks on a bone and 
believes that they are caused by accidental scraping is not involved in com-
munication. If the archaeologist believes that the marks are some sort of 
letters in an unknown language, she may be engaged in elementary com-
munication to the extent that she understands a communicative intent. If 
the marks are eventually deciphered, communication that is more complex 
may result. If the deciphering actually turns out to be mistaken, the belief 
that communication occurred is an illusion. Of course, border cases like 
these could also be exemplified by everyday interaction among people 
who may or may not be mistaken about the significance of all kinds of 
movements, glances and sounds.
McLuhan suggestively argued that not only the spoken word, the pho-
tograph, comics, the typewriter and television are media, but also money, 
wheels and axes (1994 [1964]: 24). In relation to that, I argue that 
whereas nothing is a media product as such, virtually everything can attain 
the function of a media product. In that sense, money, wheels and axes 
may also function as media products, although they do not actually do so 
as regularly as spoken words and photographs.
1.2.3  Elaborating the Communication Model
I will now display my communication model in the form of a visual dia-
gram (Fig. 1.1) and explain some of its implications. Construing this dia-
gram from left to right, the act of communication starts with certain 




cognitive import in the producer’s mind. Consciously or unconsciously, 
the producer forms a media product, which may be taken in by some per-
ceiver. Thus, the media product makes possible a transfer of cognitive 
import from the producer’s mind to the perceiver’s mind. This is certainly 
not a transfer in the strong sense that the cognitive import as such passes 
through the media product (which lacks consciousness), but in the sense 
that there is, ultimately, cognitive import in the perceiver’s mind that 
bears some resemblance to the cognitive import in the producer’s mind.
The visual diagram contains the three entities of communication cir-
cumscribed above:
 1. Something being transferred: cognitive import
 2. Two separate places between which the transfer occurs: producer’s 
mind and perceiver’s mind
 3. An intermediate stage that makes the transfer possible: media product
Additionally, the visual diagram displays four essential interrelations 
among these entities:
 1. An act of production ‘between’ the producer’s mind and 
media product
 2. An act of perception ‘between’ the media product and the per-
ceiver’s mind
 3. Cognitive import ‘inside’ the producer’s mind and the per-
ceiver’s mind
 4. A transfer of cognitive import ‘through’ the media product
I will now elaborate on these interrelations, especially the fourth one. I 
submit that the notion of media product, and the question of how cogni-
tive import may be transferred through a media product, is essential for 
understanding communication.
The first interrelation, ‘an act of production “between” the producer’s 
mind and media product’, is always initiated by the producer’s mind and 
always, to begin with, effectuated by the producer’s body. Sometimes, this 
primary bodily act will immediately result in a media product. For instance, 
when one person begins talking to another person who is standing beside 
her, the speech emanating from the vocal cords constitute a media product 
that reaches the perceiver directly. At other times, the primary bodily act 
is linked to subsequent stages of production, and the primary bodily act 
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can be connected to a broad range of actions and procedures before a 
media product comes to be present for a perceiver. For instance, talking 
through a telephone often requires manual handling of the telephone in 
addition to the activation of the user’s vocal cords, and always requires 
constructed, technological devices that are suitable to transmit the initial 
speech to another place, in which the actual media product is consti-
tuted—that is, the speech that can be heard by the perceiver. Similarly, a 
child drawing a picture for her father who is sitting at the same kitchen 
table only has to perform, in principle, one primary bodily act in order to 
create a media product that is immediately available for the perceiver. 
However, if the father is in another place, additional stages of actions and 
procedures must be added: the drawing may be posted and physically relo-
cated, or scanned and emailed, after which it appears in a slightly trans-
formed way as a media product that is realised by a computer screen. 
Thus, the act of production may be simple and direct, as well as complex 
and indirect. It may also include stages of storage.
There is an abundance of devices for the production and storage of 
media products. Although involved in mediality, and often called media of 
production and media of storage, I prefer not to call them media, in order 
to keep the terminology clear. Thus, cameras are technical devices of pro-
duction (with the capacity to register light chemically or physically) that 
can be said to be attached, more or less distantly, to technical devices of 
display with various properties, such as silver-plated sheet copper, photo-
graphic paper or a screen (a computer screen or a display on the camera 
itself). Book pages are technical devices of storage and technical devices 
for the display of visual sensory configurations. In contrast, because they 
quickly disappear, sound waves generated by vocal cords do not store sen-
sory configurations but only display them.
The second interrelation, ‘an act of perception “between” the media 
product and the perceiver’s mind’, is always initiated by the perceiver’s 
sense organs and always, to some extent, followed by and entangled with 
interpretation. Interpretation should be understood as all kinds of mental 
activities that somehow make sense of the sensory input; these activities 
may be both conscious and unconscious and are no doubt already present 
in a basic way when the sense impressions are initially processed. Thus, 
compared to the potentially extensive act of production, the act of percep-
tion is brief and quickly channelled into interpretation, which of course 
occurs in the perceiver’s mind. Nevertheless, the type, quality and form of 
sensory input provided by the media product, and actually taken in by the 
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perceiver’s sense organs, are crucial for the interpretation formed by the 
perceiver’s mind.
For the moment, I will only comment briefly upon the third interrela-
tion among the entities of communication, ‘cognitive import “inside” the 
producer’s mind and the perceiver’s mind’. One cannot state, without 
intricate implications, that there is a certain amount of confinable cogni-
tive import inside a mind, and it is undoubtedly difficult to judge the 
actual extent of similarity between the two amounts of cognitive import in 
the two minds. Deciding this in a more precise way is probably beyond the 
reach of known scientific research methods. However, I find the notion 
that the transferred cognitive import is only one part of the producer’s and 
the perceiver’s minds unproblematic. The cognitive import is ‘inside’ the 
minds, in the sense that it is closely interconnected with a multitude of 
other cognitive entities and processes and, ultimately, with the total sum 
of mental activities in general that surrounds it.
The fourth interrelation, ‘a transfer of cognitive import “through” the 
media product’, is central for my arguments. Until now, I have only 
described the media product simply as the entity of communication that 
enables a transfer of cognitive import from a producer’s mind to a per-
ceiver’s mind—a material entity that has the capacity of triggering mental 
response. However, to give a somewhat more detailed account of this 
notion, the very capacity itself must be scrutinised.
Of course, the transfer of cognitive import is only partly comparable to 
other transfers—such as the transfer of goods between two cities by train. 
The cognitive import transfer is not a material transfer but a mental trans-
fer aided by materiality. In one respect it can be compared to teleporta-
tion, which is the transfer of energy or matter between two points without 
traversing the intermediate space: the cognitive import is indeed trans-
ferred between two points (two minds), and, contrary to the transfer of 
goods, it does not traverse the intermediate space. Nevertheless, as the 
transfer depends on the media product, it is reasonable to say that the 
cognitive import goes ‘through’ the media product. Actually, the media 
product is neither a neutral object of material transfer, like a freight car, 
nor an intermediate space without effect, as in teleportation; it constitutes 
a crucial stage of transition, not only transmission. As Beate Schirrmacher 
suggested to me in personal communication, the transfer of cognitive 
import ‘through’ the media product might alternatively be described as ‘a 
chain or interactions’ involving producer’s mind, media product, perceiv-
er’s mind and everything in between.
1 THE MODALITIES OF MEDIA II: AN EXPANDED MODEL… 
20
Explaining this in some detail requires attention to the whole spectrum, 
from the material to the mental. My angle for coping with this challenge 
is to suggest that all media products can be analysed in terms of four kinds 
of basic traits. As already noted, I call these categories media modalities 
(Elleström 2010). I will describe these modalities briefly to prepare the 
ground for further elaboration of the communication model and then 
come back to them in a lengthier discussion later in the article.
The first three modalities are the material modality, the spatiotemporal 
modality and the sensorial modality. Media products are all material in the 
sense that they may be, for instance, solid or non-solid, or organic or inor-
ganic, and comparable traits like these belong to the material modality. All 
media products also have spatiotemporal traits, which means that such 
products that do not have at least either spatial or temporal extension are 
inconceivable; hence, the spatiotemporal modality consists of comparable 
media traits such as temporality, stasis and spatiality. Furthermore, media 
products must reach the mind through at least one sense. Hence, sensory 
perception is the common denominator of the media traits belonging to 
the sensorial modality—media products may be visual, auditory and tactile 
and so forth.
Of course, these kinds of traits are not unknown to communication 
researchers. For instance, Hall discussed the two sensory channels of tele-
vision (1980), David K. Berlo highlighted all five external senses (1960), 
and Schramm at least briefly mentioned that ‘a message has dimensions in 
time or space’ (1971: 32). However, a thorough understanding of the 
conditions for communication requires systematic attention to all modali-
ties. It is clear that cognitive import of any sort cannot be freely commu-
nicated by any kinds of material, spatiotemporal and sensorial traits. For 
instance—to use some blatant examples—complex assertions cannot easily 
be transferred through the sense of smell, and it is more difficult to effec-
tively transfer detailed series of visual events though a static media product 
than through a temporal media product.
The fourth modality is the semiotic modality. Whereas the semiotic 
traits of a media product are less palpable than the material, spatiotempo-
ral and sensorial traits, and in fact are entirely derived from them, they are 
equally essential for realising communication. The sensory configurations 
of a media product do not transfer any cognitive import until the per-
ceiver’s mind comprehends them as signs. In other words, the perceived 
sensory configurations are meaningless until one understands them as rep-
resenting something through unconscious or conscious interpretation. 
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This is to say that all objects and phenomena that act as media products 
have semiotic traits, by definition. By far the most successful effort to 
define the basic ways in which to create meaning in terms of signs has been 
Charles Sanders Peirce’s foundational trichotomy icon, index and symbol.
Understanding this trichotomy requires us to comprehend an even 
more foundational semiotic trichotomy: the three sign constituents. In 
brief, Peirce held that signs, often called representamens, stand for objects—
this relationship results in interpretants in the perceiver’s mind: ‘A sign, or 
representamen, is something which stands to somebody for something in 
some respect or capacity’. This means that the representamen stands for an 
object in some respects and thus ‘creates in the mind of that person’ an 
interpretant (Peirce 1932: CP2.228 [c.1897]). This entails that signs are 
not pre-existing static items, but rather dynamical functions established by 
relational constituents that exist only in interaction with each other. 
Signification is a mental process, although both representamens and 
objects may be connected to external elements or phenomena; however, 
the interpretant is entirely in the mind. I would argue that my notion of 
cognitive import created in the perceiver’s mind in communication is a 
vital example of Peirce’s notion of interpretants resulting from 
signification.
Hence, a media product can be understood as an assemblage of repre-
sentamens that, due to their material, spatiotemporal and sensorial traits, 
together with contextual factors, represent certain objects (that are avail-
able to the perceiver), thus creating interpretants (cognitive import) in the 
perceiver’s mind.
Peirce defined his three central sign types based on some fundamental 
cognitive abilities that make representamen–object relationships possible. 
Icons stand for (represent) their objects based on similarity, indices do so 
based on contiguity, and symbols rely on habits or conventions (1932: 
CP2.247–249 [c.1903]; Elleström 2014a: 98–113). I take iconicity, 
indexicality and symbolicity to be the main media traits within the semi-
otic modality, which is to say that no communication occurs unless cogni-
tive import is created through at least one of the three sign types. Iconicity, 
indexicality and symbolicity are simply indispensable for semiosis, and they 
work because of our capacity to perceive similarities and contiguity and to 
form habits.
I use the term ‘semiosis’ here to denote the widest and least strict 
notion of sign activity and sign use, where signs are always to be under-
stood as results of interpretation—not inherent qualities of objects or 
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phenomena. ‘Semiosis’ is a catch-all term for everything that involves 
signs, which may be applied when there is no need for precision. Peirce 
himself only used the term sporadically, without ever giving it a prominent 
or particularly specific place in his vocabulary (something close to a defini-
tion can be found in 1934: CP5.484 [c.1907]). Briefly, I take signification 
to be the process of meaning creation. While signification is always a men-
tal process, it may also include material aspects; for instance, the mind may 
perceive physical qualities through media products. Representation should 
be understood more specifically as representamens triggering the presence 
of objects in the mind; thus, representation is a core part of signification.
Again, processes of signification are not unknown in communication 
research. Among the scholars quoted in this article, Schramm clearly 
related to some basic semiotic features. For instance, he accurately noted 
that ‘it is just as meaningful to say that B [the receiver] acts on the signs 
[the message], as that they act on B’ (1971: 22). Indeed, the mind of the 
perceiver is very active in construing the signs of the media product. In 
addition, Hall spoke in terms of semiotics, albeit with a distinct linguistic 
bias. Peirce’s semiotic framework is fruitful because it incorporates sign 
types that work far outside of the linguistic domain, dominated by sym-
bolicity in the form of verbal language.
Furthermore, I wish to emphasise the notion that a semiotic perspec-
tive must be combined with a material perspective. Communication is 
equally dependent on the material, spatiotemporal, sensorial and semiotic 
modalities. What one takes to be represented objects called forth by rep-
resentamens (objects such as persons, things, events, actions, feelings, 
ideas, desires, conditions and narratives) are results of both the basic fea-
tures of the media product as such (the mediated material, spatiotemporal 
and sensorial traits) and of cognitive activity, connected to surrounding 
factors, resulting in representation. While signification is ultimately about 
mind-work, in the case of communication this mind-work is fundamen-
tally dependent on the physical appearance of the media product—
although some representation is clearly more closely tied to the appearance 
of the medium, whereas other is more a result of interpretation, and hence 
the context of the perceiving mind.
As with material, spatiotemporal and sensorial traits, the semiotic traits 
of a media product offer certain possibilities and set some restrictions. 
Obviously, cognitive import of any sort cannot be freely created based on 
just any sign type. For instance, the iconic signs of music can represent 
complex feelings and motional structures that are largely inaccessible to 
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the symbolic signs of written text; conversely, written symbolic signs can 
represent arguments, and the appearance of visual objects, with much 
greater accuracy than auditory icons. Flagrant examples like these are only 
the tip of the iceberg in terms of the (in)capacities of signs based on simi-
larity, contiguity and habits or conventions, respectively. Therefore, the 
semiotic traits of the medium make possible—but also delimit—the com-
municative transfer of cognitive import through a media product.
In line with this proposal, it is appropriate to bring the notion of noise 
into the discussion. Many researchers engaged in communication of mean-
ing have picked up Claude E. Shannon’s (1948) idea that signal distur-
bances in communication can be conceptualised as noise. The basic 
phenomenon of disruptions that occur on the way from the producer’s 
mind to the perceiver’s is clearly relevant to the transfer of cognitive 
import. For instance, Schramm noted that noise is ‘anything in the chan-
nel other than what the communicator puts there’ (1955: 138). As an 
example, speech can be disturbed by other sounds, and a motion picture 
can be disrupted because of material decay or censorship. Noise in this 
sense occurs both in the act of production and in the act of perception. My 
visual model of communication (Fig. 1.1) shows this noise as disruptions 
in the arrow representing transfer of cognitive import—both before and 
after the transfer through the media product—reflecting the unsatisfactory 
conditions of production and perception.
The problem with the notion of noise when applied to communication 
of meaning, or cognitive import, is that it might imply that the complete 
absence of noise would bring about complete transfer of cognitive import, 
as in the case of technical transmission of computable data, which is clearly 
not the case. The technological notion of noise is simply not sufficient to 
understand communication of cognitive import. According to Hall, ‘dis-
tortions’ or ‘misunderstandings’ are also due to, among other things, ‘the 
asymmetry between the codes of “source” and “receiver” at the moment 
of transformation into and out of the discursive form’ (1980: 131).
This contention is definitely a step in the right direction in terms of 
offering a more complex notion of possible disruptions in the communica-
tion of cognitive import. However, it does not provide a more complete 
view of restraining factors in the transfer of cognitive import. It is also 
important to emphasise that creators of media products generally do not 
have access to, or do not master, more than a few media types. Consequently, 
they are often unable to form media products that have the capacity to 
create cognitive import in the perceiver’s mind that is similar to the 
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cognitive import in their own mind. Therefore, I argue that important 
restraining factors of communication are found in the material, spatiotem-
poral, sensorial and semiotic traits of the media products.
Many exceedingly complex factors are clearly involved when the per-
ceiver’s mind forms cognitive import. Furthermore, as Mary Simonson 
has accurately noted, media products are sometimes ‘envisioned and cre-
ated precisely so that they will likely not transmit meanings and ideas in a 
straightforward way’ (2020: 4). My proposed model highlights one par-
ticular cluster of crucial factors: media products have partly similar and 
partly dissimilar material, spatiotemporal, sensorial and even semiotic 
traits, and the combination of traits to a large extent—although certainly 
not completely—determines what kinds of cognitive import can be trans-
ferred from the producer’s mind to the perceiver’s mind. Songs, emails, 
photographs, gestures, films and advertisements differ in various ways 
concerning their material, spatiotemporal, sensorial and semiotic traits and 
hence can only transfer the same sort of cognitive import to a limited 
extent. Figure 1.1 shows this communicative restriction as disruptions in 
the arrow representing transfer of cognitive import as it passes through 
the media product.
1.2.4  Communicating Minds
Outlining only the fewest possible entities of communication and their 
essential interrelations, my suggested model of communication (Fig. 1.1) 
is irreducible but certainly expandable. I have already fleshed it out by sug-
gesting various ways of conceptualising the notion of media product in 
some detail. I will now also sketch a more multifaceted comprehension of 
communicating minds: the minds of the producer and the perceiver and 
their interrelations.
The minimal level of complexity consists of simply one mind producing 
a single media product of which another perceiving mind makes sense. 
This, I believe, is the core of human communication. In actual communi-
cative situations, however, the perceiver’s mind is often also a producer’s 
mind. Based on the cognitive import generated by an initial media prod-
uct, the perceiver becomes a producer in terms of creating another media 
product (of the same or another kind) that reaches an additional perceiv-
er’s mind, thereby forming new cognitive import that is more or less simi-
lar to that in earlier producers’ minds. Hence, a communicative chain is 
formed. When the communicative chain involves the initial producer and 
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perceiver constantly changing roles and forming new media products (of 
the same or another kind), we have two-way communication. The cre-
ation of new media products in two-way communication is often concep-
tualised as feedback that may result in the creation of cognitive import that 
is either only slightly or significantly developed. Communicative chains 
that are uni- and bidirectional may be combined in a multitude of ways.
Furthermore, media products are often produced or perceived by sev-
eral minds. For instance, a motion picture is normally both produced and 
perceived by more than one mind. While the minds of scriptwriters, direc-
tors, actors and many others combine to create the motion picture, the 
audience consists of a multitude of perceiving minds. In contrast, a ple-
nary talk is, as a rule, produced by one mind but perceived by many. An 
unsuccessful theatre performance may be produced by many minds but 
perceived (from an off-stage position) by only one.
Another level of complexity consists of the case when perceivers take in 
their own media product. Although I would not say that pure thinking is 
communication (as suggested by Berlo [1960: 31]), perception of one’s 
own media product created earlier may mean that the mind tries to con-
strue cognitive import on the basis of the media product rather than on 
the memory of what one had in mind on the occasion of production. In 
this case, a transfer of cognitive import actually occurs through a media 
product from one mind to another, in the sense that the mind, when per-
ceiving the media product, is in a different state than it is during produc-
tion. The effort of writing a scholarly text is a good example of this sort of 
internal communication: communication sometimes fails when one can-
not understand the words one has written just the day before.
Of course, one can also combine this level of complexity with others, as 
in the case of interactive video games. Such games are normally con-
structed and designed by several minds, but the point here is that the 
actual media products (the many realised sensory configurations that are 
mediated by screens and sounding loudspeakers each time the game is 
being played) are also created by the players. Accordingly, we have a kind 
of communication involving several producing minds that have created 
certain frames for interaction and resulting consequences (when designing 
the game), one or several producing minds that create the actual media 
product in their interaction with the evolving media product (when play-
ing the game) and one or several perceiving minds that are actually the 
same as those minds that interact with and hence produce the media prod-
uct: the specific realisation of the possibilities of the video game. Naturally, 
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additional minds that are not co-producers (i.e. an audience) may also 
perceive this media product.
The notion of the producer’s mind and perceiver’s mind may well be 
simple but it is certainly not reductive. On the contrary, it offers a solid 
basis for analysing all kinds of communicative complexities. While the 
examples above do not exhaust the intricacies, they may hint at the many 
complicated ways in which producers and perceivers’ minds may be posi-
tioned in various communicative circumstances.
In addition to developing the basic notion of transfer of cognitive 
import between two separate minds, I will now also elaborate on the notion 
of cognitive import in the producer’s and especially the perceiver’s mind. 
As the irreducible model of communication only states that cognitive 
import is transferred between minds, it is appropriate to suggest not only 
a way of understanding how it is formed by basic media traits (which was 
done in the section on media modalities), but also a way of comprehend-
ing how it is moulded by surrounding factors. In addition to its innate 
basic capacity to perceive and interpret mediated qualities, the mind is 
inclined to form cognitive import based on acquired knowledge, experi-
ences, beliefs, expectations, preferences and values—preconceptions that 
are largely shaped by culture, society, geography, history and various com-
munities in the mind’s surroundings. This concept is immensely impor-
tant for the outcome of communication. The perceiver’s mind acts upon 
the perceived media product on the basis of both its hardwired cognitive 
capacities and its attained predispositions. Evidently, the cognitive import 
that was stored in the mind before the media product was perceived has a 
significant effect—to varying degrees—on the new cognitive import 
formed by communication.
This widely recognised fact has been extensively theorised in various 
ways. Jakobson discussed it in terms of ‘a context [that is] seizable by the 
addressee, and either verbal or capable of being verbalized’ (1960: 353). 
While context is important for all kinds of communication, I think it is a 
mistake—even for a restricted focus on verbal communication—to say that 
the context must be verbalisable in order for it to be relevant. Hall dis-
tinctly emphasised the ‘social relations of the communication process as a 
whole’ and the ‘frameworks of knowledge’ (1980: 129–130) and dis-
cussed them in detail. The research area of hermeneutics has minutely 
scrutinised these and other issues that are central to the formation of 
meaning in a broad context.
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Here I will only suggest a complementary semiotic way of circumscrib-
ing how surrounding factors form cognitive import in communication. 
Although the focus is on the perceiver’s mind, the suggested basic princi-
ples are also relevant for the formation of cognitive import in the pro-
ducer’s mind.
I have already established that the representamens that initiate semiosis 
in communication come from sensory perception of media products. One 
perceives configurations of sound, vision, touch and so forth that are cre-
ated or brought out by someone and understood to signify something; 
they make objects (in the Peircean sense) present to the perceiver’s mind 
and result in interpretants based on the representamen–object relation. 
These interpretants, and interpretants resulting from further chains of 
semiosis, constitute the cognitive import being transferred in communica-
tion. The objects emerge from earlier perceptions, sensations and notions 
that are stored in the perceiver’s mind, either in long-term or short-term 
memory that may also cover ongoing communication. ‘Earlier’ could be a 
century before or a fraction of a second before.
In semiotic terms, the stored mental entities may be direct perceptions 
from outside of communication, interpretants from semiosis outside of 
communication, interpretants from semiosis in earlier communication or 
interpretants from semiosis in ongoing communication. This is to say that 
objects of semiosis always require ‘collateral experience’ (Peirce 1958: 
CP8.177–185 [1909]; cf. Bergman 2009) that may derive both from 
within and without ongoing communication. In other words, collateral 
experience may be formed by semiosis inside the spatiotemporal frame of 
the communicative act or stem from other earlier involvements with the 
world, including former communication as well as direct experience of the 
surrounding existence.
In line with this twofold origin of collateral experience, I distinguish 
between two utterly entwined but dissimilar areas in the mind of the per-
ceiver of media products: the intracommunicational and the extracommu-
nicational domains. This distinction emphasises a difference between the 
formation of cognitive import in ongoing communication and what pre-
cedes and surrounds it (related but divergent distinctions in cognitive psy-
chology have been proposed by Brewer [1987: 187]). I also find it 
appropriate to make a corresponding distinction between intracommuni-
cational and extracommunicational objects, both of which are formed by 
collateral experience from their respective domains.
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The extracommunicational domain should be understood as the back-
ground area in the mind of the perceiver of media products. It comprises 
everything with which the perceiver is already familiar. As it is a mental 
domain, it does not consist of the world as such but rather of what the 
perceiver believes and knows through perception and semiosis. The per-
ceiver’s stored experiences not only consist of raw perceptions, such as 
foundational sensations of being a body that physically interacts with a 
spatiotemporal surrounding, but also of perceptions that have been con-
templated and processed by the mind through semiosis. This involves esti-
mations and evaluations of encounters with people, societies and cultures 
that are consciously or unconsciously accepted, put in doubt or rejected. 
It involves shared experiences and ideas, cultural norms and common 
beliefs, but also more individual understandings, impressions and values—
all of which are well known to be crucial factors for the outcome of 
communication.
The extracommunicational domain includes experiences of what one 
presumes to be more objective states of affairs (dogs, universities, music 
and statistical relations), what one presumes to be more subjective states 
of affairs (states of mind related to individual experiences) and everything 
in between. Thus, it is actually formed in one’s mind not only through 
semiosis and immediate external perception but also through interocep-
tion, proprioception and mental introspection. Hence, the extracommu-
nicational/intracommunicational domain distinction is different from 
exterior/interior to the mind, world/individual, material/mental and 
objective/subjective.
Vital parts of the extracommunicational domain are constituted by per-
ception and interpretation of media products. Therefore, former commu-
nication is very much part of what precedes and surrounds ongoing 
communication. Together, non-communicative and communicative prior 
experiences form ‘a horizon of possibilities’, to borrow an expression from 
Marie-Laure Ryan (1984: 127). The extracommunicational domain is the 
reservoir from which entities are selected to form new constellations of 
objects in the intracommunicational domain.
In contrast to the extracommunicational domain, the intracommunica-
tional domain is the foreground area in the mind of the perceiver of media 
products. It is formed by one’s perception and interpretation of the media 
products that are present in the ongoing act of communication. It is based 
on both extracommunicational objects, emanating from the extracommu-
nicational domain, and intracommunicational objects, arising in the 
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intracommunicational domain, that together result in interpretants mak-
ing up a salient cognitive import in the perceiver’s mind. However, the 
intracommunicational domain is largely mapped upon the extracommuni-
cational domain. Rehashing Ryan’s ‘principle of minimal departure’ 
(1980: 406), I argue that one construes the intracommunicational domain 
as being the closest possible to the extracommunicational domain and 
allows for deviations only when they cannot be avoided. In other words, 
familiar ideas and experiences are not questioned until it is necessary 
to do so.
As the intracommunicational domain is formed by communicative 
semiosis, it can be called a virtual sphere. The virtual should not be under-
stood in opposition to the actual, but as something that has the potential 
to have real connections to the extracommunicational—to be truthful 
(Elleström 2018b). Therefore, I define the virtual as a mental sphere, cre-
ated by communicative semiosis and consisting of cognitive import formed 
by represented objects.
A virtual sphere can consist of anything from a brief thought triggered 
by a few spoken words, a gesture or a quick glance at an advertisement, to 
a scientific theory or a complex narrative formed by hours of reading 
books or watching television (Elleström 2019). Ultimately, everything 
that is possible to think may be part of a virtual sphere.
Depending on the degree of attention to the media products, the bor-
ders of a virtual sphere do not necessarily have to be clearly defined. As 
communication is rarely flawless, a virtual sphere may be exceedingly 
incomplete or even fragmentary. It may also comprise what one appre-
hends as clashing ideas or inconsistent notions. As virtual spheres result 
from communication, they are, by definition, shareable among minds to 
some extent.
The coexistence of intracommunicational and extracommunicational 
objects results in a possible double view on virtual spheres. From one 
point of view, they form self-ruled spheres with a certain degree of experi-
enced autonomy; from another point of view, they are always exceedingly 
dependent on the extracommunicational domain. The crucial point is that 
intracommunicational objects cannot be created ex nihilo; they are com-
pletely derived from extracommunicational objects. This is because one 
cannot grasp anything in communication without the resource of extra-
communicational objects. Even the most fanciful narratives require 
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recognisable objects in order to make sense (cf. Bergman 2009: 261). To 
be more precise: intracommunicational objects are always in some way 
parts, combinations or blends of extracommunicational objects. To be 
even more exact, intracommunicational objects are parts, combinations or 
blends of interpretants resulting from representation of extracommunica-
tional objects.
It is possible to represent, say, griffins (which, to the best of our knowl-
edge, exist only in virtual spheres) because of one’s acquaintance with 
extracommunicational material objects such as lions and eagles that one 
can easily combine. A virtual sphere may even include notions such as a 
round square, consisting of two mutually exclusive extracommunicational 
objects that together form an odd intracommunicational object. Literary 
characters such as Lily Briscoe in Virginia Woolf’s novel To the Lighthouse 
are composite intracommunicational objects consisting of extracommuni-
cational material and mental objects that stem from the world as one 
knows it. You cannot imagine Lily Briscoe unless you are familiar with 
notions such as walking, talking and eating; what it means to refer to per-
sons with certain names; what women and men, adults and children are; 
what it means to love and to be bored; and what artistic creation is. In 
addition, more purely mental extracommunicational objects can be modi-
fied or united into new mental intracommunicational objects. Objects 
such as familiar emotions can be combined into novel intracommunica-
tional objects consisting of, say, conflicts between or blends of emotions 
that one perceives as unique although one is already acquainted with the 
components.
The question then arises: if all intracommunicational objects are ulti-
mately derived from extracommunicational objects, why do we often 
experience virtual spheres as having a certain degree of autonomy? This is 
because we may perceive them, in part or in whole, as new gestalts that 
disrupt the connection to the extracommunicational domain. This hap-
pens when we do not immediately recognise the new composites of extra-
communicational objects. The reason why they are not being re-cognised 
is that they have not earlier been cognised in the particular constellation in 
which they appear in the virtual sphere. Several such disruptions lead to 
greater perceived intracommunicational domain autonomy. Even though 
intracommunicational objects are entirely dependent on extracommunica-




Having described the interrelations between the intracommunicational 
and the extracommunicational domains in some detail, I will now present 
an overview with the aid of a visual diagram (Fig. 1.2). Whereas the intra-
communicational domain simply consists of one virtual sphere, the extra-
communicational domain consists of two rather different elements: on the 
one hand, other virtual spheres, and, on the other hand, what I propose to 
call the perceived actual sphere. This means that, from the point of view of 
a virtual sphere, there are three more or less distinct spheres: the virtual 
sphere itself, other virtual spheres and the perceived actual sphere.
The perceived actual sphere consists of extracommunicational, immedi-
ate and presented material and mental objects beyond the realm of commu-
nication that the perceiving mind is acquainted with. ‘Perceived’ shall be 
understood in a broad sense to include exteroception, interoception and 
proprioception, joined by mental introspection and semiosis based on per-
ception of the actual sphere. ‘Immediate and presented’ shall be under-
stood in contrast to communication: the perceived actual sphere does not 
Fig. 1.2 Virtual sphere, other virtual spheres and perceived actual sphere 
(Elleström 2018b: 432)
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consist of mediated representations formed by media products brought 
out by minds and their extensions, but is immediately present to us. Note 
that immediately present does not mean that the perceived actual sphere is 
independent of the mediating mental mechanisms that connect sensation 
to perception or the complicated mediating functions that connect per-
ception to the external world.
The other virtual spheres consist of extracommunicational, already 
mediated and represented material and mental objects that the perceiving 
mind is acquainted with. As virtual spheres are thoroughly semiotic, these 
objects are always made out of former interpretants. The other virtual 
spheres result from communication and comprise mediated representa-
tions formed by media products brought out by minds and their extensions.
Hence, the virtual sphere consists of extracommunicational, immediate 
and presented material and mental objects from the perceived actual sphere 
+ extracommunicational, already mediated and represented material and 
mental objects from other virtual spheres + intracommunicational, medi-
ated and represented material and mental objects that emerge within the 
virtual sphere.
Together, the intra- and extracommunicational domains constitute the 
world as one knows it, which corresponds to what Siegfried J.  Schmidt 
called actuality, ‘our world of experience’; ‘we have to postulate a strict 
separation between reality, which is cognitively inaccessible but has to be 
presupposed as existing at least for logical reasons, and actuality, which is 
constructed by the real brain’ (Schmidt 1994: 499). Hence, everything 
outside of these domains—the unknown—corresponds to what Schmidt 
referred to as the cognitively inaccessible reality.
Like all schematic representations, this model is intended to provide an 
overview of an intricate state of affairs. Nevertheless, it not only points to 
mental areas that are fundamentally different in certain respects, but also 
reveals their complex interrelations. Thus, one must emphasise that every 
virtual sphere, from the point of view of that sphere, is intracommunica-
tional, and is therefore composed of objects that are derived from itself (to 
the extent that parts, combinations and blends of extracommunicational 
objects may be understood as distinct), as well as from other virtual spheres 
and the perceived actual sphere. This comprises a mise-en-abyme: intra-
communicational virtual spheres are formed by perceived actual spheres 
and by other extracommunicational virtual spheres that are, in turn, 
formed by perceived actual spheres and by other extracommunicational 
virtual spheres ad infinitum.
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Adding the diagram in Fig. 1.2 to the diagram in Fig. 1.1 might give a 
sense of how one may expand the irreducible model of communication in 
terms of a more complex understanding of the transferred cognitive 
import. In brief, the totality of the intracommunicational and extracom-
municational domains in Fig. 1.2 (the outer circle) is equivalent to the 
whole perceiver’s mind in Fig. 1.1 (the outer circle). The intracommuni-
cational domain, comprising the virtual sphere in Fig. 1.2 (the inner cir-
cle), consists of the cognitive import in the perceiver’s mind according to 
Fig. 1.1 (the inner circle). This virtual sphere is not only formed by the 
perception and interpretation of the specific traits of the media products 
that are present in the ongoing act of communication, as emphasised in 
Fig. 1.1. It is simultaneously based on a combination of extracommunica-
tional and intracommunicational objects that, together, result in interpre-
tants making up salient cognitive import in the perceiver’s mind, as 
demonstrated in Fig.  1.2. In other words, the cognitive import in the 
perceiver’s mind, bringing about a virtual sphere, is formed by both ongo-
ing experience of the particular traits of the media product and the general 
collateral experiences of all sorts in the perceiver’s mind.
The extent to which cognitive import may be shared among the pro-
ducer’s and perceiver’s mind is undoubtedly partly determined by how 
much the extracommunicational domain of the perceiver’s mind overlaps 
with the extracommunicational domain of the producer’s mind (under-
stood as the background area in the mind of the producer of media prod-
ucts). This conclusion corresponds well with established views on the 
importance of shared experiences and knowledge for successful 
communication.
1.3  What Is a technIcal medIum of dIsPlay?
1.3.1  Media Products and Technical Media of Display
At this stage of the account, it is necessary to introduce a delicate but 
sometimes vital distinction between media products and technical media of 
display. I have stated that media products are physical entities or processes 
that are necessary for communication because they interconnect minds. 
More precisely, I should also emphasise that being a media product is a 
function that requires some sort of perceptible physical phenomenon to 
come into existence. I call these physical items or phenomena technical 
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media of display (cf. Jürgen E. Müller’s distinction between ‘technical 
conditions’ and ‘media products’ [1996: 23]).
I choose the term ‘technical’ to attach to one of the meanings of the 
Greek word téchne ̄: practical skill and the methods employed in producing 
something. Accordingly, technical media of display should be understood 
as entities that realise media products; they distribute sensory configura-
tions with a communicative function. Terms such as ‘technical media of 
distribution’, ‘dissemination’ or ‘presentation’ would all be accurate. The 
cumbersome term ‘technical media of display of sensory configurations’ is 
perhaps the most precise one for my purpose.
I define a technical medium of display as any object, physical phenom-
enon or body that mediates sensory configurations in the context of com-
munication; it realises and displays the entities that we construe as media 
products. Technical media of display are those perceptible physical items 
and processes that, when used in a communicative context, acquire the 
function of media products. Strictly speaking, this means that when the 
same physical items and processes are not used in a communicative con-
text, they are not technical media of display.
My definition of the notion of technical medium of display is narrower 
than that of ‘physical media’ circumscribed, for instance, by Claus Clüver 
(2007: 30). Devices used for the realisation of media products, but not 
tools used only for the production or storage of media products, are tech-
nical media of display. The brush and the typewriter are tools for produc-
tion that are normally separated from the material manifestations of media 
products and are, as such, not normally technical media of display accord-
ing to my definition, although they count as physical media in Clüver’s 
sense (2007). For the same reason, a computer hard disk—a device for 
storage—is not routinely a technical medium in the sense that I emphasise 
here. The video camera is partly a tool for production and partly a device 
for the realisation of media products (if it includes a screen for film dis-
play), so it can be habitually seen as a technical medium of display. A gui-
tar, which can produce and realise musical sound simultaneously, also 
often works as a technical medium of display if one considers its immediate 
extensions in the form of sound waves. Some physical existences, such as 
ink on paper, may both store and display sensory configurations and thus 
work as technical media if present in communicative situations. Such 
pieces of paper can mediate sensory figurations that we understand to be, 
say, written words, whereas a pen, which can only produce and not display 
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written words, is not, in its role as producer of writing, a technical medium 
of display.
Technical media of display clearly exist in diverse forms. I have already 
suggested that media products can be realised by either bodily or non- 
bodily matter. From the perspective of the producer’s mind, being situ-
ated in a human body, this means that there are external technical media 
(extra-bodily materialities such as clay, screens, ink on paper, sound waves 
from loudspeakers or just about anything chosen from the surroundings, 
including other bodies) and there are internal technical media (the pro-
ducer’s body in its entirety, parts of it or physical phenomena emanating 
directly from it, such as a voice). All forms of external and internal techni-
cal media of display can be combined with each other in countless ways.
Regarding external technical media of display, any perceptible physical-
ity can be used in the function of a media product. A stone and a tree 
branch lying on the ground are only a stone and a branch. However, if 
someone picks them up and uses them to intimidate somebody else (to 
communicate threat) or to manufacture sculptures (to communicate 
something aesthetic), they become technical media of display—physical 
entities with a communicative function, the function of being media 
products.
Harold A. Innis (1950) emphasised the importance of technical media 
such as stone, clay, papyrus and paper for the historical development of 
communication—more specifically writing—and society at large. More 
modern technical media of display include electronic screens and sound 
waves produced by loudspeakers. Thus, very different kinds of physical 
entities may act as external technical media of display and realise media 
products. They may simply be at hand in the environment of the produc-
er’s mind and body (like directing a waiter’s attention to an empty glass to 
communicate the desire to be given a new drink) or they may be more or 
less crafted with a communicative purpose (like using a piece of paper to 
display the words ‘one more beer, please’). They may also be internal and 
consist of corporeal actions and immediate extensions of the body (like a 
movement of hand and arm imitating the act of drinking or a voice saying 
‘one more beer, please’).
These examples do not in any way exhaust the many possible modes of 
existence for technical media. For instance, one may note that items that 
are manufactured for producing media products, not displaying them, 
may actually be used as technical media of display in certain circumstances. 
A pen, which is not a technical medium of display in its role as a producer 
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of writing, may become a technical medium of display if, say, it is placed in 
a shop window in order to indexically communicate the notion that pens 
are for sale in the shop.
The distinction between a media product and the technical medium of 
display is clearly theoretical rather than a distinction between two different 
kinds of material entities. On the contrary, the physical technical medium 
is a prerequisite for the existence of a media product, and, in a communi-
cative situation, the perceiver identifies only one level of presence: the 
perceived sensory configurations emanating from some physical existence. 
However, the distinction is needed in order to demonstrate the differ-
ence—and mutual interdependence—between, for example, what one 
construes as a piece of music (a media product) and the sound waves ema-
nating from a music audio system (a technical medium of display). 
Confronted with the famous question in William Butler Yeats’s poem 
‘Among School Children’—‘How can we know the dancer from the 
dance?’—the distinction allows us to give two different but fully compat-
ible answers. On one hand, the dancer and the dance are inseparable in the 
sense that they are the same material entity occupying physical space and 
time. On the other hand, they are two different things. Whereas the dancer 
is a body acting as a technical medium of display, the dance is a function 
of the material body—a media product.
Although this distinction is sometimes hard to grasp, it often aligns well 
with everyday parlance and thinking. Allow me to illustrate this further. 
Some technical media of display, such as audio systems, are well fitted to 
be reused many times. This is also the case for a technical medium such as 
a television set (which actually consists of two kinds of technical media of 
display: a screen that emits photons and loudspeakers that set the air into 
pulsation) that may realise several different media products (many televi-
sion programs). A communicating human body may be conceptualised in 
a similar fashion. When moved in certain ways and in certain circum-
stances, the body mediates certain sensory configurations and realises 
what one understands as gestures (media products). As long as the mem-
ory of these gestures is kept in the producer’s mind, similar gestures can 
be performed by the same technical medium of display—the body—thus 
creating a large amount of equivalent media products. Of course, the same 
body may also be used for realising a multitude of different media prod-
ucts. Conversely, many types of technical media of display can realise a 
media product such as a television programme; not only television sets but 
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also, for instance, laptop computers, which also consist of a screen and 
loudspeakers.
On the other hand, because of their physical qualities, some technical 
media of display tend to be used only once or a few times. A marble block 
being cut to a certain form mediates certain sensory configurations and 
realises a sculpture and can usually be reused only a limited number of 
times. As the block not only displays but also stores the sculpture, the 
reuse of the technical medium of display implies the destruction of the 
initial media product.
However, common language does not always provide words to prop-
erly describe the distinction between technical media of display and media 
products. This is because of the boundless and dynamic nature of human 
communication: for reasons of mental economy, only the most common 
and salient media products are categorised and given names. An example 
can be given through the communicative acts performed by the thirsty 
person discussed above. The movement of the person’s hand and arm is 
used as a technical medium with which to realise what is commonly known 
as a gesture, a kind of media product. The paper is used as a technical 
medium for realising a media product that may be called, for instance, a 
written note. The raised empty glass, however, resists being described in 
ordinary language; one may say that ‘glass’ or ‘a glass’ is used as a technical 
medium, but what kind of a media product does it realise? This is not 
clear. Nevertheless, the media product is there, whether there is a proper 
term to denote it or not.
All these observations call for some discussion regarding duplication of 
media products. According to my definition, the concept of media prod-
uct implies that every single display through a technical medium consti-
tutes a specific media product. This display may last for a very short time 
(a cry of warning, for instance), for a very long time (such as a rock paint-
ing) or anything in between. In any case, the display of such media prod-
ucts can be repeated in various ways. Several cries of warning can be heard, 
several rock paintings can be seen, and some of these are very similar. In 
some cases, the similarity between media products is so detailed that it is 
more than reasonable to think that they are ‘the same’. When I watch the 
movie Fantasia, I believe that it is the same movie that I saw some years 
ago, having the same title and being identical in virtually all details, 
although it was then displayed on the screen in a movie theatre and not on 
the screen of my television set.
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However, the two realisations of Fantasia are not the same media prod-
uct. On a theoretical level, it is important to be able to acknowledge that 
every display of a media product is unique, even though several media 
products may be extremely similar indeed—like the thousands of copies of 
operating instructions for a certain kind of toaster. On a pragmatic level, 
however, it is efficient to operate with the notion of sameness. Life outside 
the domain of scholarly writing would become very difficult to handle if 
we did not recognise that different people, at different times, located at 
different places, may actually watch ‘the same television program’, such as 
a specific episode of Monty Python’s Flying Circus. However, people actu-
ally perceive different media products that are generally virtually undistin-
guishable but slightly different when it comes to qualities such as the size 
and resolution of the moving images and the quality of the sound—differ-
ences that may or may not affect how cognitive import is construed.
Under theoretical pressure, the ‘sameness’ of different actual displays 
becomes diffuse and problematic. Are my toaster operating instructions, 
covered in coffee stains and almost illegible, the same media product as 
your unblemished copy? As they can hardly communicate the same cogni-
tive import (understanding how to handle the toaster), I would say not. If 
I argued that two unstained copies of the operating instructions are the 
same, the obscure question arises: how many stains or torn pages are 
required to render them different? In the end, the question of sameness 
becomes a somewhat metaphysical question. Therefore, strictly speaking, 
different media products may only be the same in the respect that they are 
very similar. Although different media products are never ontologically 
the same, they may be thought of as being ‘the same’ in many other 
important respects. One could perhaps say that very similar media prod-
ucts are variations of an abstract but recognisable communicational com-
position that may be reproduced more or less efficiently.
1.3.2  Mediation and Representation
As postulated above, media products are the entities through which cogni-
tive import is transferred among minds in communication. Such products 
require technical media of display in order to be realised. Different forms 
of technical media of display have different capacities to mediate sensory 
configurations and make them present to the perceivers’ minds, which has 
consequences for the outcome of communication. The perception of 
media products is also deeply entangled with cognitive operations, 
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resulting from the encounter with the sensory configurations. These per-
ceptual and cognitive functions can be broadly described as interpretation, 
and more specifically analysed in terms of signification.
As this complex process of transfer of cognitive import from a produc-
er’s mind to a perceiver’s mind involves both material and mental aspects, 
I find it helpful to distinguish between two profoundly interrelated but 
nevertheless discernible basic facets of the communicative process: media-
tion and representation. Mediation is the display of sensory configurations 
by the technical medium (and hence also by the media product) that are 
perceived by human sense receptors in a communicative situation. It is a 
presemiotic phenomenon that should be understood as the physical realisa-
tion of entities with material, spatiotemporal and sensorial qualities—and 
semiotic potential. For instance, one may hear a sound. Representation is 
a semiotic phenomenon that should be understood as the core of significa-
tion, which I delimit to how humans create cognitive import in commu-
nication. When a perceiver’s mind forms sense of the mediated sensory 
configurations, sign functions are activated and representation is at work. 
For instance, the heard sound may be interpreted as a voice uttering mean-
ingful words.
To say that a media product represents something is to say that it trig-
gers a certain type of interpretation. This interpretation may be more or 
less hardwired in the media product and the manner in which a person 
perceives it with her or his senses, but it never exists independently of the 
cognitive activity in the perceiver’s mind. When something represents, it 
calls forth something else; the representing entity makes something else—
the represented—present in the mind. In terms of Charles Sanders Peirce’s 
foundational notions, this means that a sign or representamen stands for an 
object. Peirce’s third sign constituent, the interpretant, can be understood 
as the mental result of the representamen–object relation (see, for instance, 
1932: CP2.228 [c. 1897]). As stated earlier, one may further understand 
my notion of cognitive import created in the perceiver’s mind in commu-
nication as an example of Peirce’s notion of interpretant—and of course, 
the concept of interpretation has everything to do with the semiotic idea 
of interpretants in signification.
Representation, the very essence of semiosis, occurs constantly in our 
minds when we think without having to be prompted by sensory percep-
tions. However, it is also triggered by external stimuli; in this context, 
focusing on external stimuli resulting from mediation is appropriate. Thus, 
although representation also occurs in pure thinking and in the perception 
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of things and phenomena that are not part of mediation, I delimit the 
account of representation to the creation of cognitive import based on 
mediated sensory configurations—stimuli picked up by our sense recep-
tors in communicative situations. My contention is that all media products 
represent in various ways as soon as sense is attributed to them; or, in 
other words, when they are attributed sense, they become media products. 
Hence, one can understand media products as assemblages of representa-
mens that, due to their mediated material, spatiotemporal and sensorial 
traits—and because of collateral experience in the intra- and extracommu-
nicational domains—represent certain objects, thus creating interpretants 
(cognitive import) in the perceiver’s mind. It is through representation, 
and more broadly signification, that virtual spheres are created in the per-
ceiver’s mind. Hence, according to my terminology, the idea of non- 
representative media products is self-contradictory.
My current emphasis is on the notion that basic encounters with media 
have both a presemiotic and a semiotic side. Whereas the concept of medi-
ation highlights the material realisation of the media product, made pos-
sible by a technical medium of display, the concept of representation 
highlights the semiotic conception of the medium. Although mediation 
and representation are clearly entangled in complex ways, it is vital to 
uphold a theoretical distinction between them. This theoretical distinction 
is helpful in analysing complex communicative relations and processes. In 
practice, however, mediation and representation are deeply interrelated. 
Every representation is based on the distinctiveness of a specific media-
tion. Furthermore, some types of mediation facilitate certain types of rep-
resentation and render other types of representation impossible; different 
kinds of mediation have different kinds of semiotic potential. As an obvi-
ous example, vibrating air emerging from the vocal cords and lips that is 
perceived as sound but not words is well suited for the iconic representa-
tion of bird song, whereas such sounds cannot possibly form a detailed, 
three-dimensional iconic representation of a cathedral. However, distinc-
tive differences among mediations are frequently more subtle and less eas-
ily spotted without close and systematic examination.
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1.4  What are medIa modalItIes, modalIty modes 
and multImodalIty?
1.4.1  Multimodality and Intermediality
To facilitate such systematic examination of mediality, I will now expand 
on what I have already introduced as the four modalities of media. This 
requires a brief discussion of the two research fields of multimodality and 
intermediality. Although they focus on similar issues, cross-references 
between these two interrelated research fields are rare. Nevertheless, 
Mikko Lehtonen combined the notions of intermediality and multimodal-
ity two decades ago when, in an article in a journal of media and commu-
nication studies, he accurately stated, ‘multimodality always characterises 
one medium at a time. Intermediality, again, is about the relationships 
between multimodal media’ (Lehtonen 2001: 75; cf. also the rewarding 
discussions in Fornäs 2002). Although Lehtonen used the concepts in dif-
ferent and not very developed ways, compared to the framework that I 
have sought to elaborate here, I subscribe to the basic idea that interme-
diality is about the relationship between media having a multitude of vital 
traits, or modes.
Nevertheless, it is not evident how this notion should be operation-
alised. The term ‘medium’ simply means ‘middle’, ‘interspace’ and so 
forth, and the term can justifiably be used in an abundance of different 
ways. The term ‘modality’ is related to ‘mode’, and these terms are also, 
for good reason, widely employed in different fields. A ‘mode’ is a way to 
be or to do things. Just like ‘medium’, the term ‘mode’ can, has and 
should be used to stand for different notions in diverse contexts. Therefore, 
certain ways of using terms such as ‘modality’ and ‘mode’ must not neces-
sarily compete or be in conflict with very different ways of using them. 
However, in trying to form a terminologically and conceptually coherent 
research branch, it is essential to interrelate terms as well as concepts in 
lucid ways.
In the context of media studies and linguistics, ‘multimodality’ some-
times refers to the combination of, say, text, image and sound, and some-
times to the combination of sense faculties (the auditory, the visual, the 
tactile and so forth). Thus, multimodality has been defined as ‘the use of 
two or more of the five senses for the exchange of information’ (Granström 
et al. 2002: 1). The idea that multimodality is the combination of several 
human (primarily external) senses is also widespread in research areas such 
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as medicine, psychology and cognitive science. However, the field of mul-
timodality itself uses less clear-cut definitions. Gunther Kress and Theo 
van Leeuwen (2001) understood a mode or modality as any semiotic 
resource, in a broad sense, that produces meaning in a social context: the 
verbal, the visual, language, text, image, music, sound, gesture, narrative, 
colour, design, taste, speech, touch, plastic and so on. While this approach 
to multimodality has some pragmatic advantages, it produces a rather 
indistinct set of modes that are hard to compare and correlate since they 
overlap in many ways (Kress and van Leeuwen 2001: vii, 3, 20, 22, 25, 28, 
67, 80; Kress and van Leeuwen 2006: 46, 113, 177, 214). Despite recent 
suggestions for systematic analysis of multimodality (Bateman et al. 2017), 
the fundamental notion of multimodality remains circumscribed rather 
haphazardly by researchers attaching to the Kress and van Leeuwen tradi-
tion. However, Kress’s book Multimodality (2010) circumscribed the 
notion of mode more firmly within a frame of social semiotics (Chap. 5, 
‘Mode’), and the selection of what might constitute modes is narrower 
than in earlier publications. On the other hand, Kress emphasised the dis-
tinctiveness of modes such as images and writing.
By emphasising the distinctiveness of modes, Kress’s notion of multi-
modality comes close to the view that media types are inherently different. 
Earlier efforts to describe relations among different media generally 
started with precisely the same conceptual units that we also find in multi-
modal research—image, music, text, film, language (verbal media) and 
visuality (visual media)—presuming that it is appropriate to compare these 
entities. The indistinctness of such comparisons is confusing if one treats 
the compared units as fundamentally different media with little or nothing 
in common.
In contrast to such views, Mieke Bal has convincingly demonstrated 
that ‘word’ and ‘image’ are interrelated and integrated in complex ways 
(1991). W. J. T. Mitchell is another scholar who has successfully criticised 
this mode of thinking by importantly pointing to the way in which media 
types (more specifically art forms) that are generally seen as opposites 
actually share various traits (1986). However, Mitchell’s use of traditional 
dichotomies such as text vs. image and verbal vs. pictorial makes it difficult 
to grasp the nature of the similarities of media. Meanwhile, most other 
scholars working with similar issues have continued to operate with the 
dichotomy of verbal vs. visual media types. This is problematic because of 
what I would describe as the modal incommensurability of the two 
notions: whereas the verbal is a variation of the symbolic, in Peirce’s sense, 
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and hence a semiotic property, the visual belongs to the domain of sense 
perception. Hence, the two notions belong to different categories of 
media traits, different modalities, and are not fit to form a dichotomy—
just as there is little point in contrasting blue cars with fast cars.
As long as such obscurities continue, it remains unclear how to under-
stand notions such as multimodal and intermedial and how they are 
related. Generally, ambiguities remain even in the most qualified scholarly 
publications (see, for instance, Moser 2007a, b). The fuzziness of con-
cepts termed ‘media’ and ‘mode’ also remains in a central research area 
such as communication studies (as demonstrated in Parks 2017).
It is no wonder, then, that the discourses on media and modalities tend 
to be either separated or mixed up. Why bother to combine, or to keep 
apart, notions that seem to be fuzzy in rather similar ways? There are many 
media types, which might be the same as saying that there are many modes 
of communication. In ordinary situations, a language use that simply 
equates ‘media’, ‘modalities’ and ‘modes’ is unproblematic. However, I 
think it is a good idea to separate the meanings of ‘medium’, ‘modality’ 
and mode’ to make it possible to differentiate between intermediality and 
multimodality in such a way that Lehtonen proposed—namely, to see 
intermediality as ‘the relationships between multimodal media’ (2001: 75).
To the best of my knowledge, there is nothing in the etymology of the 
words ‘medium’, ‘modality’ and ‘mode’, or in their established uses, that 
clearly determines how they should be interrelated. Therefore, I see it as 
my task to raise a theoretical construction and propose how to use these 
central terms in relation to each other.
My starting point is the idea that media are both similar and different 
and that media cannot be compared without clarifying which aspects are 
relevant to the comparison and how these aspects can relate to each other. 
Therefore, I propose a model that starts not with the units of established 
media forms, or with efforts to distinguish between specific types of inter-
medial relations between these recognised media, but with the basic cate-
gories of features, qualities and aspects of all media. As already explained 
briefly, I propose to think in terms of media modalities—types of media 
traits. The modalities are the indispensable cornerstones of all forms of 
media, integrating physicality, perception and cognition. Separately, these 
modalities constitute complex fields of research and are not related to the 
established media types in any definitive way. However, they are crucial in 
efforts to describe the character of every single media product. They are 
all familiar for research, even though their interactions have not been 
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accounted for systematically. As stated earlier, I call them the material 
modality, the spatiotemporal modality, the sensorial modality and the 
semiotic modality, and they are found on a scale ranging from the material 
to the mental. The first three modalities are presemiotic and concern 
mediation. The semiotic modality concerns representation or, more 
broadly, signification: how the mediated sensory configurations come to 
signify cognitive import in the perceiver’s mind and form a virtual sphere.
Scholars constantly describe and define media based on one or more of 
these modalities. However, this is not always sufficient, because all media 
are necessarily realised in the form of all four modalities. Therefore, I 
argue that all four of them should be considered. In this respect, there is a 
fundamental difference between my approach and the systematic, often 
hierarchic but simplistic classifications and divisions of the arts, the aes-
thetic media types, which were put forward from the eighteenth century 
and well into the twentieth century (see Munro 1967: 157–208). 
Nevertheless, the roots of thinking in terms of media modalities go way 
back in time. An important early thinker who saw things clearly was Moses 
Mendelssohn, who built a typology with the aid of distinctions such as 
‘natural’ versus ‘arbitrary’ signs, ‘the sense of hearing’ versus ‘the sense of 
sight’ and signs that are represented ‘successively’ versus ‘alongside one 
another’ (1997 [1757]: 177–179). The typology is sketchy but instructive 
since Mendelssohn clearly realised that the borders of the arts ‘often blur 
into one another’ (1997 [1757]: 181).
Much later, the systematic thinking of the linguist Roman Jakobson 
came close to the idea of media modalities. He discussed and interrelated 
the five external senses, spatiality and temporality, as well as Peirce’s sign 
trichotomy icon, index and symbol (1971a, b, c). Jakobson also made 
important but undeveloped efforts to put this in the context of ‘commu-
nication systems’, albeit with language as the undisputed centre and mea-
sure (1971c). This linguistic bias implies that Jakobson thought of 
communication at large as ‘systems’, which I believe gives a warped pic-
ture of the wealth of communication that occurs without the boundaries 
of systems. Another reason for his failure to achieve a nuanced overview 
over communication is the common tendency to reason in terms of false 
dichotomies. A question such as ‘What is the essential difference between 
spatial and auditory signs?’ (1971b: 340), contrasting a spatiotemporal 




Similar tilted starting points are detectable in Jiří Veltruský’s compari-
son of artistic media forms (1981). In Veltruský’s account, it remains 
unclear what the ‘material’ of an art form is. According to the author, 
materials can be divided into the ‘auditory and visual’; the material of 
music is said to be ‘tones’ and the material of literature is said to be ‘lan-
guage’. Furthermore, the material of literature is supposed to oscillate 
‘between materiality and immateriality’ (1981: 110). Although this cate-
gorisation is representative, it is not at all illuminating. The category of 
material is untenable since it includes media traits that cannot be treated 
as equals: tones, language and even the immaterial. Tones must be seen as 
related primarily to the sensorial modality, whereas language must be 
understood in semiotic terms; however, spoken language actually also 
consists of some sorts of tones. What the immaterial material is, I do 
not know.
Mitchell came closer than Veltruský to the idea of media modalities. In 
one publication, he discussed ‘four basic ways in which we theoretically 
differentiate texts from images’. Three of these ways are ‘perceptual mode 
(eye versus ear)’, ‘conceptual mode (space versus time)’ and ‘semiotic 
medium (natural versus conventional signs)’ (1987: 3). Although limited 
to a comparison of texts and images, this description contains three of the 
media modalities in their embryonic forms. Moving from text and image 
to the more specific media types poetry and painting, Mitchell also argued 
that ‘there is no essential difference between poetry and painting, no dif-
ference, that is, given for all time by the inherent natures of the media, the 
objects they represent, or the laws of the human mind’ (1987: 2–3). 
Although it is important not to exaggerate the differences between media, 
I would say that it is fully possible ‘to give a theoretical account of these 
differences’ (1987: 2), essential or not, which Mitchell doubted.
Later interesting discussions of these issues, including actual efforts to 
systematise several of those media traits that I categorise in modalities, are 
found in publications by Helen C. Purchase (1999) and Eli Rozik (2010). 
However, although constantly recurring, the material, spatiotemporal, the 
sensorial and the semiotic types of media traits tend to be fused and mixed 
up in fundamental ways. Perhaps the most common mistake in these dis-
cussions is to confuse the notions of visual and iconic: whereas the visual 
is about using a specific sense faculty (whether this is connected to iconic, 
indexical or symbolic signs), the iconic is semiosis based on similarity 
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(whether this similarity can be seen, heard, felt or otherwise sensed) (see 
Elleström 2016).
1.4.2  Media Modalities and Modes
In 2010, I published the first version of this article: ‘The Modalities of 
Media: A Model for Understanding Intermedial Relations’ (Elleström 
2010). In that piece, I introduced a distinction between two levels to 
facilitate and sharpen methodical descriptions and analyses of media prod-
ucts. On one hand, there are the types of traits that are common for all 
media products, without exception; on the other hand, there are the spe-
cific traits of particular media products or types of media products. To 
make the distinction transparent, I call the former modalities and the latter 
modes. In brief, then, media modalities are categories of basic media traits, 
and media modality modes (or simply media modes or modality modes) are 
basic media traits.
I have argued that there are four media modalities, four types of basic 
media modes. For something to acquire the function of a media product, 
it must be material in some way, understood as a physical matter or phe-
nomenon. Such a physical existence must be present in space and/or time 
for it to exist; it needs to have some sort of spatiotemporal extension. It 
must also be perceptible to at least one of our senses, which is to say that 
a media product has to be sensorial. Finally, it must create meaning through 
signs; it must be semiotic. This adds up to the material, spatiotemporal, 
sensorial and semiotic modalities. It follows from the definition of a media 
product as the intermediate entity that enables the transfer of cognitive 
import from a producer’s to a perceiver’s mind, where a virtual sphere is 
created, that no media products or media types can exist unless they have 
at least one mode of each modality.
The modalities should be understood as categories of related media 
modes that are basic in the sense that all media products have traits belong-
ing to all four modalities. All media products appear as specific combina-
tions of particular modes of the four media modalities. A certain media 
product must be realised through at least one material mode (as, say, a 
solid or non-solid object), at least one spatiotemporal mode (as three- 
dimensionally spatial and/or temporal), at least one sensorial mode (as 
visual, auditory or audiovisual) and at least one semiotic mode (as mainly 
iconic, indexical or symbolic). Hence, the four media modalities form an 
indispensable skeleton upon which all media products are built.
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By ‘modalities’, I thus mean the four necessary categories of media 
traits ranging from the material to the mental, and by ‘modes’ I mean the 
specific media traits categorised in modalities. I do not define entities such 
as ‘text’, ‘music’, ‘gesture’ or ‘image’ as modalities or modes; in the fol-
lowing section of this article, I will instead explain them in terms of 
media types.
As emphasised, three of the four modalities are presemiotic, which 
means that they cover media modes that are involved in signification—the 
creation of cognitive import in the perceiver’s mind—although they are 
not semiotic qualities in themselves. Thus, the material, spatiotemporal 
and sensorial modalities are not asemiotic; they are presemiotic, meaning 
that the modes that they cover are bound to become part of the semiotic 
as soon as communication is established. The presemiotic media modes 
concern the fundamentals of mediation, which is to say that they are nec-
essary conditions for any media product to be realised in the outer world 
by a technical medium of display, and hence for any communication to be 
brought about. All four modalities obviously depend strongly on each 
other—just as the modes may be entangled with each other in several 
ways, depending on the character of the media product.
With the aid of this theoretical framework, basic media differences and 
media similarities can be pinpointed. Crucial divergences and fundamental 
parallels can be highlighted among all conceivable sorts of media—exist-
ing and yet to be devised—which provides a firm ground for understand-
ing, describing and interpreting the most elementary media interrelations. 
Of course, I can only hint here at the complexity of the innumerable inter-
relations that can be derived from the four modalities and their modes.
The material modality is a category of material media modes. All media 
products are material, or more broadly physical, which makes them per-
ceptible and hence accessible to the perceiver’s mind in various ways. 
However, distinctions can be made among material properties in ways that 
may overlap. I discern at least two vital ways of distinguishing material 
modes. As described in physics, there are different states of matter, four of 
which are relevant for everyday life: a media product may be solid or in the 
form of liquid, gas or plasma. As examples, consider a solid road sign made 
of painted metal, liquid water used in an art installation, gas in the form of 
vibrating air (sound waves) produced by vocal cords and plasma in a televi-
sion screen or other device for communicative display. Another way of 
distinguishing material modes is to separate organic and inorganic matter. 
For instance, whereas an outstretched arm with a pointing finger is an 
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organic media product, a tailor’s dummy is an inorganic media product. 
This is a biological rather than physical distinction, although the two are 
equally relevant for everyday life.
The spatiotemporal modality is a category of spatiotemporal media 
modes. As they consist of physical matter, all media products have spatio-
temporal properties and can therefore be grasped by human minds. 
Following well-established models in physics, the three spatial dimensions 
and the temporal dimension can be considered as a unit. Thus, space and 
time form a four-dimensional spatiotemporal entity consisting of width, 
height, depth and time. Although all media products actually exist in such 
a four-dimensional world, the relevant properties of media products—
those properties that because of selective attention perform the function 
of a media product—may be more restricted. I argue that media products 
must have at least one and may have up to four spatiotemporal modes.
However, these modes cannot be freely combined: to perceive space 
with the senses, at least two spatial dimensions are required. This means 
that the only conceivable monomodal spatiotemporality would be exclu-
sively temporal media products. Speech or song emanating from a single 
point might be considered as instances of media products that are only 
temporal, although I think it is reasonable to state that even such media 
products have some rudimentary spatial qualities. Tracing media modes is 
seldom a question of definitely affirming or dismissing them. Nevertheless, 
it is important to discern differences. Thus, temporality, a mode of the 
spatiotemporal modality, is an aspect of songs, speeches, gestures and 
dance, but not of stills and most sculptures. Whereas a photograph has 
only two dimensions (width and height), a sculpture has three spatial 
dimensions (width, height and depth). A dance and a mobile sculpture 
have four dimensions (width, height, depth and time). Dance perfor-
mances and political speeches have a beginning, an extension and an end 
situated in the dimension of time, while a photograph, as long as it exists, 
simply exists. If you close your eyes or block your ears in the middle of a 
performance or a speech, you miss something and cannot grasp the spatio-
temporal form in its entirety. If you close your eyes while looking at a 
photograph, you miss nothing and the spatial form remains intact. In 
these respects, there are distinct and relevant spatiotemporal differences 
among media products and media types, even though the presence or 
absence of certain modes may sometimes be disputed.
All media products, like all objects and phenomena, are necessarily per-
ceived in time and space before they create cognitive import in the 
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perceiver’s mind. Semiosis is also a spatiotemporal phenomenon. However, 
because media products are constituted only by parts of the physical sur-
roundings that are chosen for selective attention in acquiring a communi-
cative function, this does not rule out the actual media differences. Also, 
some media types, such as visual, verbal (symbolic) signs on a flat but static 
surface (such as printed texts), are conventionally decoded in a fixed 
sequence, which makes them second-order temporal, so to speak: sequen-
tial but not actually temporal, because the physical matter of the media 
products does not change in time.
The sensorial modality is a category of sensorial media modes. All media 
products have sensorial properties in the sense that their materiality, some-
how existing in time and space, must be perceived by one or more of our 
senses to reach the mind and trigger semiosis. Media products simply do 
not exist unless they are grasped by the senses. We usually think about the 
five external sense faculties of humans, which I here describe as the five 
main modes of the sensorial modality: seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting and 
smelling. The visible is a mode of signboards, gestures, films, websites and 
tattoos. The audible is a mode of instrumental music, recited poetry, films, 
radio weather forecasts and the shouting of salespeople in the street. 
Communication can also be accomplished by how the surface of a gift 
feels, how a meal tastes or how a flower smells.
Still, there are other human senses, described in terms such as intero-
ception (sensing the internal state of the body) and proprioception (sens-
ing body position and self-movement), and these senses may be relevant 
for human communication and vital for the perception of media products, 
especially when the human body itself is used as a media product. Someone 
who physically makes someone else lose her balance by pushing her may 
communicate threat, which is perceived by sight and touch but also by the 
perceiver’s proprioception—the perceiver’s body constituting the media 
product.
The semiotic modality is a category of semiotic media modes. While the 
material, spatiotemporal and sensorial modalities form the framework for 
explaining the presemiotic processes of mediation, the semiotic modality 
is the frame for understanding representation. All media products are 
semiotic because if the sensory configurations with material, spatiotempo-
ral and sensorial properties do not represent anything, they have no com-
municative function, which means that there is no media product and no 
virtual sphere in the perceiver’s mind. Hence, all objects and phenomena 
that act as media products have semiotic traits, by definition.
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Whereas the semiotic traits of media products are less palpable than the 
presemiotic ones and are in fact largely derived from them—because dif-
ferent kinds of mediation have different kinds of semiotic potential—they 
are equally essential for realising communication. The mediated sensory 
configurations of a media product do not transfer any cognitive import 
until the perceiver’s mind comprehends them as signs. In other words, the 
sensations are meaningless until they are understood to represent some-
thing through unconscious or conscious interpretation.
Although the sensory configurations have no meaning in themselves, 
the process of interpretation begins in the act of perception. Conception 
does not come after perception; rather, all our perceptions are results of 
the endeavours of an interpreting, meaning-seeking mind. The moment 
we become aware of a visual sensation, for instance, the sensation is already 
meaningful at a basic level because meaning-making already starts in the 
unconscious apprehension and arrangement of what is perceived by the 
sense receptors. Meaning-making continues in the more or less conscious 
acts of creating sensible patterns in the intracommunicational domain and 
relevant connections to the extracommunicational domain.
These observations are not valid only for the perception of media prod-
ucts. The world at large is meaningless in itself; its significance is the result 
of interpreting minds—perceiving and conceiving subjects situated in 
social circumstances—attributing import to states of affairs, actions, occur-
rences, natural objects and artefacts. Following Peirce, meaning can be 
described as the result of sign functions, and although there are no signs 
until some interpreter has attributed significance to something, it is pos-
sible to distinguish between different sorts of signs.
Earlier, it was common to distinguish between conventional signs and 
natural signs. Peirce’s most important trichotomy—icon, index and sym-
bol—attaches to this division even though it avoids the slightly misleading 
idea that some signs exist ‘in nature’. It is far beyond the scope of this 
study to account for all of Peirce’s complex semiotic ideas, so I simply state 
that I follow his specific idea that signs result from mental activity based 
on, as I would have it, certain cognitive capacities.
As noted, Peirce defined the three sign types in terms of the representa-
men–object relationship. Icons stand for (represent) their objects on the 
ground of similarity, indices do so on the ground of contiguity, often 
described as ‘real connections’, and symbols operate on the ground of less 
durable habits or stronger conventions (see, for instance, 1932: 
CP2.303–304 [1902], CP2.247–249 [c.1903]; Elleström 2014a: 
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98–113). I regard perceiving similarity and contiguity and forming habits 
as fundamental cognitive abilities. I also take iconicity, indexicality and 
symbolicity to be the three main semiotic media modes; no communica-
tion can occur unless cognitive import is created in the perceiver’s mind 
through at least one of the three sign types—icons, indices and symbols.
This sign division is also echoed in research branches that do not engage 
in semiotics. During the twentieth century, it was common to distinguish 
between different but complementary ways of thinking. Some cognitive 
functions have been said to be mainly directed by ‘pictorial representa-
tions’, whereas others have been understood to mainly rely on ‘proposi-
tional representations’. The pictorial is more concrete and related to 
perceiving similarity and contiguity, while the propositional is more 
abstract and related to forming habits. Brain research has shown that the 
two ways of thinking can largely be located in the two cerebral hemi-
spheres. Cognitive science involves an almost universal dichotomy—cog-
nition based on similarity and cognition based on rules—although there 
are different opinions regarding their interrelations and dominance 
(Sloman and Rips 1998).
I suggest three terms to denote the processes of iconic, indexical and 
symbolic representation. Although these terms are widely used for differ-
ent purposes in diverse contexts, they fit the rationale of this study. Hence, 
I propose calling iconic representation depiction, referring to indexical 
representation as deiction, and denoting the process of symbolic represen-
tation with the term description. The manner in which I use these three 
terms makes their significance both broader and narrower than in many 
other contexts; I annex them only to be able to efficiently distinguish ver-
bally among the three main types of signification.
Depiction, deiction and description are not mutually exclusive; as 
modes of the other modalities, they are often (perhaps even always) com-
bined to create multimodal media, that is, media that are both visual and 
auditory, spatial and temporal, iconic and indexical and so forth. According 
to Peirce, who stressed that the determinate aspects of all signs are ‘in the 
mind’ of the interpreter, the three modes of signification are always mixed, 
but often one of them can be said to dominate (1932: CP2.228 [c.1897]). 
In most written, verbal texts, the symbolic sign functions of the letters and 
words dominate the signification process. In instrumental music and all 
kinds of visual still images (such as drawings, figures, tables and photo-
graphs), iconic signs generally dominate, although photographs also have 
an important indexical character. Depictions in music and visual still 
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images differ, of course, since the musical representamens are auditory and 
perhaps mainly represent motions, emotions, bodily experiences and cog-
nitive structures, while the visual representamens of still images can effort-
lessly represent a broad range of objects from many areas. Nevertheless, all 
of these iconic sign functions are based on similarity. I am well aware of 
the lack of consensus when it comes to the question of musical meaning, 
but my point is that no matter how one defines the semiotic character of a 
media type, it must include semiotic particularities that are sometimes at 
least partly media-specific. Music and visual still images simply do not 
communicate in the same way.
As I have already stressed, a semiotic perspective must be combined 
with a presemiotic perspective. Communication is equally dependent on 
the presemiotic media modalities and the semiotic modality. Represented 
objects called forth by representamens are results of both the basic fea-
tures of the media product as such and of semiotic activity situated in a 
social context. While signification is ultimately about mind-work, in the 
case of communication this mind-work is dependent on the physical 
appearance of the media product. However, some representation is clearly 
more closely tied to the appearance of the medium, whereas other repre-
sentation is more a result of interpretation, and hence the setting of the 
perceiver’s mind.
Thus, the spatiotemporal, the sensorial, the material and the semiotic 
modes together form the specific character of all media products, and gen-
erally also media types as they are circumscribed at certain periods. 
Traditional sculpture is three-dimensional, solid and non-temporal. It is 
primarily perceived visually, but it also has tactile qualities that can be 
understood as part of its defining qualities. Generally, the iconic sign func-
tion dominates. An animated movie, as we understand this media type 
today, with its moving images and evolving sounds, is temporal. It is medi-
ated by a flat surface with visual qualities combined with sound waves. The 
images are primarily iconic, and they lack the specific indexical character of 
images produced by ordinary movie cameras. The sound generally consists 
of voices, sound effects and music: the musical sounds, but often also 
much of the voice qualities, are very much iconic, while the parts of the 
voices that one can discern as language are mainly interpreted as habitual 
signs. Printed advertisements, as they are normally understood, have a 
solid, two-dimensional, non-temporal materiality and are perceived by the 
eye. Most of them gain their meaning through verbal symbols combined 
with iconicity in the visual form of their elements, including the verbal 
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symbols. Printed advertisements that contain readable words are sequen-
tial but not temporal as such, although the conventions of language make 
it necessary to read the letters and words in a certain order to make sense. 
As already emphasised, the presemiotic and semiotic modes of a media 
product offer certain possibilities and set some restrictions: any kind of 
cognitive import cannot be freely created based on just any media type.
The concept of media modalities that I have outlined here roughly sup-
ports ideas about media always containing other media (McLuhan 1994 
[1964]: 8, 305) and media always being mixed media: ‘the very notion of 
a medium and of mediation already entails some mixture of sensory, per-
ceptual and semiotic elements’ (Mitchell 2005: 257, 260; cf. Mitchell 
1994: 95, 2005: 215, 350). However, the concept of media modalities 
also accounts, in some detail, for how media are differently entangled in 
each other, and in which respects media may not be contained by or mixed 
with other media: different media necessarily share the four basic modali-
ties, but they have the modes of the modalities only partly or not at all in 
common. There are media similarities and media dissimilarities and media 
are mixed, or multimodal, in dissimilar ways.
All media are multimodal in that they must have at least one mode from 
each modality. Most media are also multimodal in the sense that they have 
several modes from the same modality: they may be materially multimodal, 
having both solid and liquid modes, for instance. They may be spatiotem-
porally multimodal, being both two-dimensionally spatial and temporal, 
for example. They may be sensorially multimodal, being dependent on 
being both seen and heard. They may be semiotically multimodal, for 
instance, by forming cognitive import through icons and indices as well as 
symbols. Because signification requires at least some degree of activity of 
all three sign types, all media are probably semiotically multimodal. Some 
media, such as computer games and theatre, are multimodal on the level 
of all four modalities.
The four media modalities are categories of basic media traits. However, 
the traits that they cover, the various modes, are not isolated, self- sufficient 
traits. Therefore, the proposed model offers no simple, mechanical way of 
checking off the modality modes, one after another, but it instead suggests 
a method of minutely investigating the features of various media and ways 
of analysing and interrelating them. This is a more detailed and specific 
way of outlining media multimodality compared to multimodality under-
stood as the combinations of socially constructed entities such as writing, 
music and gesture. However, the model of media modalities does not in 
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any way exclude the social aspect of communication, which I have already 
accounted for in the discussions of how communicating minds are formed, 
and which will return in the following section on media types.
1.5  What are medIa tyPes?
1.5.1  Basic and Qualified Media Types
Having outlined the concepts of media modalities, modality modes and 
multimodality, I can now suggest a way of thinking about media types. 
Reasoning in terms of types can involve several pitfalls. Nevertheless, it is 
virtually impossible to navigate in one’s material and mental surrounding 
without categorising objects and phenomena; otherwise, everything 
would be difficult to grasp and to explain. Categorisation brings about 
borders—or at least border zones—and borders should always be dis-
puted. The area of communication is no exception: it is unavoidable to 
categorise media into types, and it is not evident how these categorisations 
should be made.
What, then, does one categorise in communication? I suggest that a 
central element for categorisation in this broad area is the media product, 
understood here as a single entity in contrast to types of media. Whereas 
media products are individual communicative entities, media types are 
clusters of media products. In everyday discourse, and in this article (unless 
otherwise specified), the term ‘medium’ may refer to an individual media 
product as well as a media type. More specifically, ‘a talk’ and ‘a photo-
graph’ refer to specific media products, and ‘talk’ and ‘photography’ refer 
to types of media.
Despite the complex nature of media products, it is fully possible to 
categorise them in various ways. A discussion of media categorisation 
requires that proper attention be paid to the basic qualities of media prod-
ucts, understood as physical intermediate entities that enable transfer of 
cognitive import between at least two minds, resulting in a virtual sphere 
in the perceiver’s mind. This involves qualities that must be understood as 
being situated within the range from the purely material to the purely 
mental. I have already described these traits that involve physical proper-
ties as well as cognitive processes in terms of media modalities.
In the end, each media product is unique. However, thinking species 
such as humans feel the need to categorise things in order to navigate the 
world and communicate efficiently. This leads to the categorisation of 
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media products, and, as is often the case with classification in general, our 
media categories are usually quite fluid. Nonetheless, thinking in terms of 
media modalities is helpful for understanding media differences and simi-
larities and hence for understanding how media can be categorised. This is 
not the whole story, though. Some categorisations are more solid and 
stable than others are because they depend on partly dissimilar factors. 
There are simply different types of media categories.
That is why I find it helpful to work with the two complementary 
notions of basic media types and qualified media types—two types of media 
types. People sometimes pay attention to the most basic features of media 
products and classify them according to their most salient material, spatio-
temporal, sensorial and semiotic properties. For instance, people some-
times think in terms of still images (most often understood as tangible, 
flat, static, visual and iconic media products). This is what I call a basic 
medium (a basic type of media product), and it is relatively solid because 
of its perennial fundamental traits. Basic media types are categories of 
media products grounded on basic media modality modes.
However, when such a basic classification is not enough to capture 
more specific media properties, we qualify the definition of the media type 
that we are after and add criteria that lie beyond the basic media modali-
ties. We also include all kinds of aspects about how we produce, situate, 
use and evaluate media products in the world. We tend to talk about a 
media type as something that has certain functions or that we use in a 
certain way at a certain time and in a certain cultural and social context. 
Qualified media types are simply categories of media products grounded 
not only on basic media modality modes but further qualified.
For instance, we may want to delimit the focus to still images that are 
handmade by very young people—children’s drawings. This is what I call 
a qualified medium (a qualified type of media product), and it is more 
indefinitive than the basic medium of a still image, simply because the 
added specific criteria are vaguer than those captured by the media modal-
ities. It may be difficult to agree upon what a handmade drawing actually 
is: Should drawings made on computers or scribble on the wall be included? 
When does a child actually become a young adult? The notion of child-
hood varies significantly among cultures and changes over time, not to 
mention the individual differences in maturity. Therefore, the limits of 
qualified media are bound to be ambivalent, debated and changed much 
more than the limits of basic media are.
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Because processes of categorisation are multifaceted, serve different 
purposes and often involve vague terminology, the distinction between 
basic media types and qualified media types is not always clearly distin-
guishable in actual media classifications. Also, because the modes of the 
modalities are not always easily isolated entities, there is no definite set of 
basic media types. There is also an abundance of basic media that we have 
no terms for at all, which makes explaining and discussing them a cumber-
some exercise. In fact, everyday language only covers a few rudimentary 
media types. Here I think of the terms ‘text’ and ‘image’ that, in various 
terminological constellations, come close to standing for several related 
basic media types.
If ‘text’ is defined as any media type primarily based on (verbal) sym-
bols, it becomes possible to discern variations such as ‘auditory text’ (con-
sisting of sound waves in air or possibly water or some other gas or liquid 
that are heard in a temporal flow), ‘tactile text’ (consisting of solid, three- 
dimensional signs on a surface that does not evolve in time) and various 
forms of ‘visual text’ (consisting of, say, non-organic or organic materials 
in two or three spatial dimensions that are either temporal or not). 
Likewise, if ‘image’ is defined as any media type primarily based on icons, 
it is possible to differentiate between basic media types such as ‘auditory 
image’ (consisting of sound waves that are heard in a temporal flow and 
resulting not primarily in verbal symbols but in icons), ‘tactile image’ 
(consisting of solid, three-dimensional signs on a surface that does not 
evolve in time) and several forms of ‘visual image’ like ‘visual still image’ 
(non-temporal) and ‘visual moving image’ (temporal) in various material 
appearances.
Because of the almost infinite possible modal combinations, we must 
accept that some basic modal groupings are commonly distinguishable at 
a certain time and in a certain culture, and that the future may hold new 
habits and technical solutions that make novel basic media types relevant. 
For example, imagine a basic media type consisting of organic materiality 
in the form of a liquid that is perceived as both a spatial extension and a 
temporal flow, which can be both seen and felt and which produces mainly 
iconic meaning. Assuming that a technical medium of display capable of 
realising media products with such traits was invented and grew popular, 
we might expect an increasing need for a term to represent such a basic 
media type.
Categorising media products in basic media types is about categorising 
what are considered the relevant features of all perceived sensory 
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configurations and how they trigger semiosis. We have observed that 
something becomes a media product because it attains a communicative 
function in mediating between several minds, but not all traits of the 
mediating physical entity or process are involved in the communicative 
function. The selective attention of the perceiver’s mind, which is often 
formed by social praxis, decides what material, spatiotemporal and senso-
rial qualities of certain parts of the physical entity or process become 
involved in signification, resulting in a virtual sphere. When we perceive a 
standard book page, we usually ignore its slightly three-dimensional fea-
tures and think of it as a flat surface; we also look at it in certain ways 
rather than try to taste it or listen to it.
Hence, basic media types—such as inorganic, flat, static, visual texts—
are really categorisations of salient traits that enable communication in 
certain ways, not simply of objectively existing traits of physical items or 
occurrences. This becomes apparent especially considering the semiotic 
modality. Although they are based on the presemiotic modes, it is the 
semiotic modes that fulfil the communicative function of the media prod-
uct, and different sign types, different forms of representation—belonging 
to different basic media types—may well result from similar forms of 
mediation depending on different forms of expectation and interpreta-
tion. For instance, when trying to make sense of certain inscriptions on an 
old monument, exactly the same visual, ornamental configurations can be 
understood either as icons representing natural objects or abstract ideas on 
the ground of perceived similarity or as symbols representing names or 
places on the ground of conventions.
As noted above, it is often insufficient to consider only the media 
modalities when seeking to understand how media products are catego-
rised. One must also consider their communicative functions in societies 
and a world of constant change. In addition to basic media types, there are 
qualified media types, which depend on history, culture and communica-
tive purposes. They include classes such as lectures, music, television pro-
grammes, news articles, visual art, Morse Code messages, sign language 
and email. Although they are normally based on one or several basic media 
types, and may therefore have a certain degree of stability, their defining 
features are formed by fluctuating conventions. My understanding of 
qualified media types comes fairly close to how other scholars have defined 
media at large: ‘“medium” could be defined in a moderately broad sense 
as a conventionally distinct means of communication, specified not only by 
particular channels (or one channel) of communication but also by the use 
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of one or more semiotic systems serving for the transmission of cultural 
“messages”’ (Wolf 1999: 35–36); ‘what we identify as a specific 
“medium”—as well as what we consider “natural” about and how we per-
ceive and use both traditional and new media—are shaped by a wide vari-
ety of factors, ranging from physical material, technological infrastructure, 
means of access, social conventions, media habits, preferences of commu-
nication partners, and institutional structures’ (Rice 2017: 536).
One could say that the dependence of qualified media types on basic 
media types moderates the potentially radical changes of qualified media 
types. Although societies, technologies, cultures, values, habits and com-
municative expectations change, there is often a natural resistance towards 
complete metamorphoses of qualified media types. For instance, few 
would find a point in letting a qualified medium such as music be devel-
oped in such a way that its basic presemiotic modal qualities (sound evolv-
ing in time) were counted out. Likewise, one would hardly accept a 
qualified media type such as surveillance video to include media products 
that do not contain temporally evolving visual iconicity. Whereas painting 
is a qualified medium because expected aesthetic qualities are to be pre-
sented within certain social and artistic frames that are bound to undergo 
changes, its expected modal traits are relatively stable and provide a use-
able starting point for discussing the limits of the media type. For instance, 
few would accept that a media product that cannot be seen is a painting 
and if it is strongly three-dimensional, rather than two-dimensional, a 
strong case could be made for it being a relief rather than a painting.
By the same principle—qualified media types depending on basic media 
types—there are categorisations that are often understood to form single 
qualified media types, whereas they might be seen as several interrelated 
qualified media. I argue that literature as art is preferably treated as at least 
two qualified media types: literature that one sees (reads) and literature 
that one hears. Of course, visual (written) and auditory literature are 
deeply entangled; we constantly transform the auditory to the visual and 
vice versa when we write down literature and read it out loud but still 
expect the different media products to function in roughly the same way. 
Hence, the qualifying processes are partly similar for the two qualified 
media, but they are still significantly different in certain respects since they 
are based on at least two different basic media.
Thus, qualified media types often contain more solid cores of basic 
media types, which partly justifies the much debated idea of medium spec-
ificity and the controversial notion that there are sometimes also essential 
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differences between qualified media types. Whereas many scholars load 
their revolvers when they hear the word ‘essential’ (because media quali-
ties that are described as essential are often just social constructions), I 
think that similarities and dissimilarities among qualified media types in 
terms of basic presemiotic and semiotic features can be said to be essential. 
Most people in most cultures now understand a qualified medium such as 
film to be a combination of visual, predominantly iconic signs (images) 
displayed on a flat surface and sound in the form of icons (as music), indi-
ces (sounds that are contiguously related to visual events in the film) and 
symbols (as speech), all expected to develop in a temporal dimension. The 
combination of these features is no doubt a historically determined social 
construction of what we call the medium of film, but given these qualifica-
tions of the medium, it has a certain essence.
Because qualified media types are cultural conceptions that are created, 
perceived and defined by human minds, there are no media types ‘as such’ 
and therefore no independent essences of qualified media ‘as such’. 
However, once we agree that, for pragmatic reasons, it is meaningful to 
say that there are dissimilar media types, essential presemiotic and semiotic 
modes are inscribed into these conventionally defined qualified media. It 
would be nonsensical to argue that a static collection of visual symbols 
(letters and words) displayed on book pages or a screen actually consti-
tuted a film. This is because there are essential dissimilarities on a basic 
level between our conceptions of written literature and film. A century 
ago, the two qualified media were construed slightly differently, so the 
essential dissimilarities between what was then called written literature and 
film were slightly different; the same terms were used to refer to somewhat 
different qualified media types.
However, it is not always possible to trace cores of basic media in quali-
fied media. A qualified media type such as popular science is so broadly 
conceived that it can be realised by all kinds of presemiotic and semiotic 
modes as long as scientific ideas are communicated in a way that is not too 
complicated. Whereas such qualified media types are vague in terms of 
modality modes, they may well be precise in terms of communicative 
functions.
Furthermore, not all media products are regularly categorised. As we 
have noted, there is an abundance of variations of media products, espe-
cially considering that any physical item or phenomenon may be drawn 
into communication and acquire the function of media product, but only 
the most institutionalised types of media products are clearly categorised 
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as qualified media types. This is the case for non-professionals as well as 
scholars. Thus, there are several kinds of media products that we normally 
do not categorise in qualified media types. For example, certain television 
programmes are readily understood as instances of the nature documen-
tary qualified media type; however, when using an empty glass to com-
municate the desire to get more beer, it is unclear to what type of qualified 
medium such a glass might belong. Although not urgent, this problem 
should be noted.
1.5.2  The Contextual and Operational Qualifying Aspects
The grounds on which media types are qualified can be divided into at 
least two main aspects. The first is the origin and delimitation of media in 
specific historical, cultural and social circumstances. This can be termed 
the contextual qualifying aspect and involves forming media types on the 
grounds of historically and geographically determined practices, discourses 
and conventions. We tend to think about a media type as a cluster of 
media products that one begins to use in a certain way, or gain certain 
qualities, at a certain time and in a certain cultural and social context. This 
is in line with Joseph Garncarz’s notion that media must be seen ‘not only 
as textual systems, but as cultural and social institutions’ (1998: 253). 
Visual art, Morse Code messages, sign language and email are not eternal 
media types, although they could be neatly described in terms of media 
modalities—they appear, they perhaps eventually disappear, and they are 
fully intelligible only in certain shared circumstances.
Sometimes it is more or less radical technological developments, such 
as the invention of new materials or forms of reproduction, that quickly 
trigger the genesis of what one takes to be new qualified media types (as is 
the case with various forms of so-called digital media). It may also be the 
case that new technology only slowly gives rise to new qualified media 
types. It has been argued that ‘cinema’ did not become ‘cinema’ the day 
the technique was invented (Gaudreault and Marion 2002). It took a 
while before a sufficient number of media products, created through cin-
ematographic techniques, were original and characteristically similar 
enough to be thought of as a new media type. Eventually, two notions 
came to be attached to the same term: ‘cinema’ as a set of techniques and 
‘cinema’ as a qualified media type developed within the frames of, but not 
determined by, the technological aspects. Video presents a similar case. 
First, a set of technical devices for the production, storage and distribution 
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of media products were launched, and only later did these devices give 
birth to a qualified medium with certain communicative qualities 
(Spielmann 2008 [2005]). It is sometimes instead media products based 
on old techniques that are seen as a new qualified media type when they 
are adopted in new contexts, as when photographs are exhibited at galler-
ies and museums and come to be seen as photographic art.
The second of the two qualifying aspects is the general purpose, use and 
function of media, which may be termed the operational qualifying aspect. 
This aspect encompasses construing media types on the ground of claimed 
or expected communicative tasks. Whereas communication is generally a 
goal-driven activity, the goals may be very different, so it is natural to asso-
ciate individual media products with other familiar media products that 
are known to have certain purposes and functions. Therefore, media prod-
ucts tend to be categorised to enhance understanding of what they could 
or should achieve. This means that such classification is not only descrip-
tive but also prescriptive; it may deeply affect the effects on the perceiver’s 
mind. Here, I can hint at only a few of the myriad existing communicative 
functions.
On an overarching level, media products can be thought of as more 
private or more official; there is a difference between how secluded com-
munication is expected to work compared to communication with open 
access for everybody. This is why the idea of a category of mass media 
(often referred to as simply ‘media’) is so widespread. It is a common 
evaluation that one’s more private affairs are preferably communicated 
among a limited group of people that one trusts, whereas some media 
types are capable of reaching large groups of people and are therefore 
suited for communicating things of more general interest. In this way, the 
media types under the umbrella term ‘mass media’ are qualified operation-
ally. However, media types are also qualified contextually. So, even though 
the distinction between private and mass media has never been sharp, we 
have seen in the last few years how the boundary has become increasingly 
blurred in so-called social media, where private and even intimate matters 
are commonly communicated openly and at least potentially accessible to 
a mass audience. Although still useful for most people, the distinction 
between private and mass media types will clearly continue to be debated 
and modified.
On a more specific level, crossing the fragile border between private 
and mass communication, media products may be claimed or expected to 
bond, create trust or share affections among people. We think in terms of 
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caresses, consolations, promises, gifts and acts of courtesy. Although it 
may feel unusual to think of these things as media products, they are pre-
cisely such intermediate entities that enable transfer of cognitive import 
among minds, and we categorise them according to their claimed or 
expected communicative functions. Similarly, media products may have 
main functions to warn, threaten or frighten.
It is also common for media products to be claimed or expected to 
communicate various forms of truthfulness. Although it is not always 
clearly detectible in terms of how we categorise media products, this kind 
of purpose and use probably permeates a majority of media types (with the 
obvious exception of decidedly misleading communication). Qualified 
media types that are maintained to communicate news—television news, 
articles in newspapers, public announcements on streets and town squares 
and perhaps even gossip—are mainly expected to be truthful regarding 
factual and weighty recent events and their interconnections. Qualified 
media types called documentaries are largely construed on the purpose 
and function of representing truthfully and in some detail the intercon-
nections of a specific set of persons and events in the past or in the present. 
There is also a multitude of media types that overtly function to educate, 
inform, instruct, train, provide wisdom and the like—media types that can 
be circumscribed in terms of various forms of expected truthfulness. 
Similarly, artistic media types, even those that are termed ‘fiction’, are 
expected to communicate truthfully, albeit in ways that are partly different 
from those media types mentioned previously. Art is generally claimed and 
believed to communicate general rather than particular truthfulness, for 
instance, not necessarily what a living person with a certain name said, did 
and felt in a specific place on a particular date, but rather what many 
people are likely to say, do and feel under certain circumstances.
Other forms of claimed or expected communicative functions that steer 
the construction of qualified media types include entertaining and aes-
thetic qualities. A performer would not produce stand-up comedy if her or 
his performance was not at all amusing; videogames need to be pleasurable 
to some degree to be regarded as games; movies that fail to be scary in an 
engaging way are not likely to be seen as horror movies; and jokes that are 
not funny for anyone are not really jokes—or at best they are failed jokes. 
Disregarding the obvious difficulty of distinguishing art from entertain-
ment (which is perhaps not really necessary), artistically qualified media 
types such as music, dance, calligraphy, poetry and architecture are con-
strued on the assumption that to deserve to be included in these art forms, 
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the media products must fulfil certain aesthetic standards. Although this 
view has been contested in various ways, it remains a central factor for 
most people.
One can highlight the importance of the operational qualifying aspect 
with a comparison of dance, gesture and so-called body language. 
Although dance is generally considered an art form that is governed by 
aesthetic standards, it is closely related to and dependent on gesture and 
body language—media types that are also seen as part of everyday practical 
communication. All three media types are probably among the most 
perennial and widespread forms of communication (less dependent on the 
contextual qualifying aspect), and they are virtually inseparable in terms of 
modality modes. The primary modes involved in dance, as well as in ges-
ture and body language, are organic and solid materiality (the human 
body), all four spatiotemporal dimensions and visuality. Semiotically, I 
believe that all three media types are equally dependent on icons (significa-
tion based on similarity with elements, chains of events and ideas), indices 
(signification based on contiguity with entities and developments in the 
body’s external surrounding as well as emotional and cognitive processes 
within the body itself) and symbols (signification based on habits—both 
personal habits and collective conventions). Therefore, the difference 
between dance on the one hand and gesture and body language on the 
other remains to be found in the operational qualifying aspect. Whereas 
dance is supposed to fulfil certain current aesthetic criteria in order for it 
to be accepted as such, the same does not apply for gesture and body 
language.
All of these particular qualifying aspects can exist side by side, and they 
may well overlap. As we have seen in some of the examples, the contextual 
and operational qualifying aspects often interact. As Jürgen E.  Müller 
(2008a, b, 2010; cf. Bignell 2019) emphasised, the communicative func-
tions of a media type often arise, become gradually accepted or disappear 
at certain moments in history and in certain socio-cultural circumstances. 
The qualifying aspects are, precisely, aspects of the multifaceted mecha-
nisms that lie behind categorisations of media products, and it is probably 
feasible to split these aspects into three, four or even more specific aspects.
It is impossible to avoid noticing the relativity of most qualified media 
types. Sometimes, a qualified media type may also seem to contain several 
more finely restricted media types. These more limited qualified media 
types might be referred to as qualified submedia types, or simply subme-
dia. The concept of a submedium is effectively the same as most notions 
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of genre. In other words, a genre is a qualified media type that is qualified 
also within the frames of an overarching qualified medium: a submedium. 
However, some genres, such as Western novels and Western movies, being 
subtypes of novels and movies, attach to each other across the borders of 
qualified media types and exist as twin submedia.
In the end, it is probably always possible to add criteria to make further 
distinctions among qualified media types (cf. Ettlinger 2015). Because 
qualification and requalification of media types are bound to continue as 
long as humans exist and are able to communicate, total agreements are 
utopic and unnecessary. Consequently, my ambition here is not to argue 
in favour of certain ways of circumscribing particular qualified media types, 
but rather to highlight the general mechanisms behind basic and qualified 
categorisations of media products.
1.5.3  Technical Media of Display, Basic Media Types 
and Qualified Media Types
Having explained the concepts of basic and qualified media types as differ-
ent forms of categorisation of media products, I will now clarify the rela-
tion between technical media of display and basic and qualified media 
types. I have defined technical media of display as any objects, physical 
phenomena or bodies that mediate sensory configurations in the context 
of communication; they realise and display the entities that acquire the 
function of media products. Thus, every technical medium of display can 
be described according to the range of basic media it can and cannot 
realise—or, more precisely, which presemiotic modes it is more or less fit 
to mediate. One could also argue that different technical media of display 
can realise basic media types more or less completely and successfully. 
However, strictly speaking, it is a contradiction in terms to say that a basic 
media type may be realised only in parts; if one or several modality modes 
are missing, it is actually another basic medium, and one must think in 
terms of media being transformed. This line of thinking is ultimately self- 
evident, considering that basic media types are categories of media prod-
ucts and media products are functions of sensory configurations mediated 
by technical media of display.
Given that every technical medium of display can only realise certain 
basic media types, it follows that they can also only realise certain qualified 
media types. This is because many qualified media are construed on cores 
of basic media and are therefore dependent on particular technical media 
 L. ELLESTRÖM
65
of display. One can only realise a theatre performance by a combination of 
technical media such as human bodies, some form of indoor or outdoor 
area and props. A television set, which displays a feature film very well 
(apart from the size of the screen), is only capable of partly realising a 
theatre performance: the three-dimensional spatiality, complex corporeal-
ity and multisensoriality of the theatre are reduced to a flat screen and a 
concentrated source of sounds—which means that it is not really theatre 
that one sees and hears on the television, but theatre transformed to some-
thing else.
Since the existence of certain technical media of display is a facet of 
every historical moment and cultural space, several qualified media types 
are more or less strongly dependent on specific technical media having a 
socially determined existence (the contextual qualifying aspect). Technical 
media of display inevitably also play a crucial part in the forming of the 
general purpose, use and function of media (the operational qualifying 
aspect). An oil painting can be described as a qualified medium character-
ised not only by certain modality modes but also by unique aesthetic qual-
ities linked to the technical medium of oil colour, which was invented and 
developed at a certain time and in a certain cultural context. Similarly, 
qualified media types such as computer games are inconceivable without 
the resource of recently invented technology, and more specifically, they 
depend on electronic screens as technical media of display, which have 
only existed relatively recently.
This historical and functional closeness between physical existents 
(technical media of display) and qualified ways of categorising media 
(qualified media types) explains why the same term is often used to repre-
sent both, which sometimes creates confusion. We have already noted that 
‘cinema’ (technologies for producing but also displaying cinema) did not 
become ‘cinema’ (a qualified media type) the day the technology was 
invented. Likewise, the term ‘photography’ can refer to devices and tech-
niques for production, to several technical media of display (paper in 
books and magazines, electronic screens, t-shirts and even cakes), or to 
one or several qualified media types (photography as documentation or 
as art).
On the other hand, some qualified media types are broadly conceived 
and not so determined by specific technical media of display. The way that 
sculpture is usually conceived means it can be realised by all technical 
media of display that can mediate solid, three-dimensionally spatial and 
visual materiality, which includes technical media such as bronze, stone, 
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plaster, plastics, sand, ice and metal. This allows for a larger variety of indi-
vidual media products within the same media category.
1.6  What are medIa borders and IntermedIalIty?
1.6.1  Identifying and Construing Media Borders
With a deeper understanding of the multimodal nature of media products 
as well as their categorisation in media types, it is now possible to return 
to the issue of intermedial relations. For good reason, scholars have argued 
that intermediality is a result of constructed media borders being tres-
passed. Indeed, nature does not give any definite media borders, which 
means that it is not evident what intermedial relations are. Werner Wolf 
emphasised that media borders are created by conventions and defined 
intermediality as a relation ‘between conventionally distinct media of 
expression or communication: this relation consists in a verifiable, or at 
least convincingly identifiable, direct or indirect participation of two or 
more media in the signification of a human artefact’ (Wolf 1999: 37). 
Christina Ljungberg stressed the performative aspect of border crossings, 
arguing that intermediality is something that sometimes ‘happens’, an 
effect of unconventional ways of performing medial works 
(Ljungberg 2010).
However, there are at least two kinds of media borders. As we have 
seen, media differ partly because of modal dissimilarities and partly because 
of divergences concerning the qualifying aspects of media, and the con-
ventionality and performativity of media borders are mainly a facet of the 
qualifying aspects (Rajewsky drew a similar conclusion [2010]). Intermedial 
relations between basic media types such as visual moving images and 
visual still images can be relatively clearly described within the framework 
of the four modalities, whereas intermedial relations between qualified 
media types such as auditory literature and music largely also rely on the 
two qualifying aspects.
In the first case, the border between the two basic media (visual moving 
image and visual still image) lies in the spatiotemporal modality, since still 
images are spatial, whereas moving images are both spatial and temporal. 
In the second case, the border between the two qualified media (auditory 
literature and music) is partly modal in character and partly qualified in 
character. It is modal because of differences in the semiotic modality: all 
auditory literature is primarily (but not exclusively) symbolic, and music is 
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primarily (but not exclusively) iconic. It is qualified because the boundar-
ies between what one counts as auditory literature and music largely 
depend on different communicative ambitions and expectations. A read-
ing of a poem that is reasonably close to the sound of ordinary speech is 
generally considered to be literature, whereas a singing performance of the 
same poem counts as music. However, there are many performance vari-
ants between the literary and the musical that cannot be clearly classified 
as either auditory literature or music since there is no definite border to be 
crossed. Instead, there is a border zone that is located differently in differ-
ent periods and cultures. The classification is sometimes simply a question 
of whether the poem is performed within the frames of a poetry event or 
a musical concert. However, this cultural and aesthetic ambiguity of the 
difference between auditory literature and music is clearly linked to the 
semiotic modality. Even a neutral reading of a poem has some iconic 
potential, and what one takes to be the increasing musicality of a more 
varied, rhythmic and melodic reading is, in fact, strongly linked to increased 
iconicity.
Thus, I subscribe to the idea that the borders between what I refer to 
as qualified media types are largely relative. Boris Eikhenbaum’s brief com-
ment from nearly a century ago about the media types that we call art 
forms remains relevant today: ‘None of the arts are fully bound entities, 
since syncretic tendencies are inherent in each of them; the whole point is 
in their inter-relationship, in the grouping of elements under one sign or 
another’ (1973 [1926]: 124–125). I also believe that Mitchell’s later con-
tention that there are no ‘essential’ differences between media that are 
‘given for all time by the inherent natures of the media, the objects they 
represent, or the laws of the human mind’ (1987: 2–3) is broadly cor-
rect—if we consider the qualifying aspects of media types. However, it is 
also the case that several qualified media types have indispensable cores of 
basic media types, which means that once a community has formed these 
qualified media types on the ground of contextual and operational qualifi-
cations, and as long as they are of service, they may differ ‘essentially’ 
regarding modality modes, from other qualified media types. As long as 
we think that a weather forecast on the radio is something that we have to 
hear and a printed newspaper article is something that we have to see, 
there will be an ‘essential’ difference between sensorial modes of these two 
qualified media types.
In brief, then, the classification of basic media types is relatively stable, 
whereas the classification of qualified media types is relatively unstable. It 
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follows from this that media borders can be stronger and weaker; in other 
words, media borders can be understood to be both identified and con-
strued, depending on whether one considers basic media borders or quali-
fied media borders.
1.6.2  Crossing Media Borders
One might understand the crossing of media borders as the phenomenon, 
that one can classify a particular media product in different ways. For 
instance, one might categorise a certain three-dimensional, solid artefact 
as both an artistic sculpture and an object for religious adoration, which 
means that it, in a broad sense, bridges over qualified media borders. This 
is possible because the processes of categorising media products in quali-
fied ways are largely open-ended, overlapping and changing.
However, one might also understand the crossing of media borders in 
a narrow sense as bridging over basic media borders. To explain this, it is 
important to consider the cross-modal cognitive capacities of the human 
mind, which no doubt evolved to make it possible to cope with a multi-
modal world. Practically all media borders can be bridged over to some 
extent, although certainly not completely, through these cross-modal cog-
nitive capacities. They are central for mediality as such and indispensable 
for understanding intermedial relations.
Within a semiotic framework, cross-modal cognitive capacities refer to 
the abilities to create cross-modal representations. In the context of com-
munication, these abilities explain the imperative phenomenon that 
meaning- making often goes beyond the media product’s actual presemi-
otic modality modes. For instance, a visual, two-dimensional and static 
image may represent something that is perceived to be both three- 
dimensionally spatial and temporal, such as a deer running in the forest. 
Whereas we perceive only two actual dimensions with our eyes, we per-
ceive (or rather construe) virtual third and fourth spatiotemporal dimen-
sions in our mind. Similarly, we regularly construe virtual materialities and 
sensory perceptions. A relief on a temple wall that is actually made of stone 
may be understood to represent a living organism such as a lion, which 
means that the representation crosses the border between non-organic 
and organic materiality. When studying a musical score, we only actually 
perceive visual configurations, but we understand them to represent audi-
tory patterns: virtual sound is construed in our minds. All of these virtuali-
ties, these represented objects that are made present to our minds through 
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signs in communication, result from semiotic activity: iconicity, indexical-
ity and symbolicity. Thus, virtual spheres are partly made of interpretants 
resulting from cross-modal representation.
Cross-modal representation in communication involves a difference 
between the presemiotic modality modes of the media product and the 
material, spatiotemporal and sensorial traits of the virtual sphere that it 
represents, which requires cross-modal cognitive capacities. In single- 
modal representation in communication, the material, spatiotemporal and 
sensorial modes of the media product are akin to the traits of the virtual 
sphere that it represents (such as a solid, visual, two-dimensional, static 
image representing a solid, visual, flat and unchanging object). This is 
arguably less cognitively demanding.
The term ‘cross-modal’ is used in various ways in a multitude of research 
areas. In the context of communication, it usually refers to connections 
among the external senses (see, for instance, Brochard et  al. 2013). 
However, in line with the concept of media modalities, cross-modal here 
means the linking of all forms of different presemiotic modes within the 
same media modality. More specifically, cross-modality should be under-
stood here as cross-material, cross-spatiotemporal and cross-sensorial repre-
sentation through iconicity, indexicality or symbolicity. For instance, solid 
media products may represent non-solid objects, static media products 
may represent temporal objects, and auditory media products may repre-
sent visual objects—through iconicity, indexicality or symbolicity. 
Importantly, this means that dissimilar basic media types can partly repre-
sent the same objects. For instance, the notion of a running dog—a solid, 
organic, spatiotemporal and largely visual and auditory object—can be 
represented by a variety of different basic media types, not just solid, 
organic, spatiotemporal and visual or auditory media. This is what I mean 
when I state that cross-modal cognitive capacities can bridge over basic 
media borders: our minds are, to some extent, capable of leaping from 
mode to mode in the act of representation.
The functions of icons, indices and symbols—iconicity, indexicality and 
symbolicity—may be simple and straightforward as well as complex and 
sometimes difficult to grasp. All three sign types may cross the boundaries 
of what Peirce called the representamen, in the respect that something 
visual can represent something tactile, something static can represent 
something temporal and so forth. However, cross-modal representation 
may also mean that something material represents something mental. Our 
minds’ capacity to connect the experience of concrete objects and 
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phenomena with the experience of thinking, feeling, perceiving and imag-
ining is fundamental for our ability to communicate cognitive import. 
Whereas a visual circle may be an icon for a material, concrete object such 
as the sun, it may also work as an icon for mental, abstract phenomena 
such as harmony, satisfaction or eternity because of a perceived similarity 
between the visual form and the cognitive notions. A visual circle may also 
function as an index for the earlier presence of a material object like a pen 
or a brush that actually created the circle. Similarly, it could be understood 
as an indexical sign for the mental act of wanting to draw a circle: there is 
a real connection between the producer’s intention and the realised circle. 
The pen was there, but also the idea was there. Finally, a visual circle may 
be understood as a symbol, a sign based on habits, such as the letter O. In 
English, the written letter O signifies symbolically in at least two different 
ways. On one hand, it stands for a certain kind of sound (or rather a group 
of related sounds), and sound is a material phenomenon that we perceive 
with our external senses. On the other hand, the letter O stands for some-
thing abstract and conceptual in the sense that it represents a linguistic 
function—to form meaningful words—that can only be realised in con-
junction with other letters.
Although abundantly present in all three sign types, cross-modal repre-
sentation is perhaps most noteworthy in iconicity (Ahlner and Zlatev 
2010; Elleström 2017). The ability to perceive cross-modal similarities is 
a remarkable cognitive capacity. While similarities are most clearly per-
ceived among visual and auditory phenomena, respectively (a photograph 
of a boat clearly looks like a boat and a skilled whistler is able to sound just 
like a blackbird), similarities can be established across material, spatiotem-
poral and sensorial borders—and between the material and the mental. 
This is because mode-specific dissimilarities of details can be disregarded 
and similarity can be perceived on higher, more abstract and cross-modal 
levels. For example, visual traits may depict auditory or cognitive phenom-
ena, and static structures may depict temporal phenomena. Hence, graphs 
may depict both changing pitch and altering financial status. Similarly, a 
variety of media types can depict similar ideas and concepts, such as the 
notion of speed, because they are abstracted from a broad range of sensory 
perceptions of different materialities and also mental experiences.
Initially, the purpose of my account of material, spatiotemporal and 
sensorial modes was to clarify the basic properties of media products work-
ing as representamens. However, as I have just demonstrated, it is clear that 
the modalities can also be used to characterise the objects of media 
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products—what they represent, what they call forth in the mind of the 
perceiver in creating a virtual sphere. While represented objects such as 
abstract concepts may have an almost purely cognitive character, objects 
that are made present to the mind in signification may also be more or less 
concrete and physical. A painting of a face represents a face because the 
features of the painting are similar to the features of actual, physical faces 
as they are stored as recollections in our minds (Elleström 2014a). Hence, 
media products have certain material, spatiotemporal and sensorial modes, 
and, similarly, the objects that they depict, deict or describe may have 
either the same or other material, spatiotemporal and sensorial modes—or 
they may have a cognitive nature.
1.6.3  Intermediality in a Narrow and a Broad Sense
Given that media types and media borders are of various sorts and have 
different degrees of stability, it follows that media interrelations are multi-
faceted. Therefore, it may be helpful to provide some elementary divisions 
regarding the general nature of media interrelations. I first postulate that 
mediality is everything pertaining to media in communication. 
Intramediality concerns all types of relations among similar media types, 
and intermediality involves all types of relations among dissimilar media 
types. However, considering that there are (at least) two kinds of media 
borders, there are (at least) two ways of understanding media interrela-
tions, making the classes intramediality and intermediality broader or 
narrower.
The term ‘intramedial’ is commonly used to refer to slightly different 
conceptions depending on how the notion of medium is circumscribed 
(see, for instance, Rajewsky 2002: 12). This is the case also for ‘interme-
dial’. Here, I follow the distinctions that I have recently expounded and 
suggest that media interrelations can be intramedial in a broad and in a 
narrow sense. Intramediality in a broad sense regards relations among 
(media products belonging to) similar basic media types, and intramedial-
ity in a narrow sense regards relations among (media products belonging 
to) similar qualified media types. Similarly, I suggest that media interrela-
tions can be intermedial in a broad sense and in a narrow sense. 
Intermediality in a broad sense regards relations among (media products 
belonging to) dissimilar qualified media types, and intermediality in a nar-
row sense regards relations among (media products belonging to) dissimi-
lar basic media types.
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Thinking of intramedial and intermedial relations in a narrow and a 
broad sense is useful for disentangling the intricate notion of crossing 
media borders. To avoid confusion, it is recommended to keep the intra-
mediality and intermediality classes together, which entails combining one 
broad and one narrow notion. Intramediality in a broad sense (meaning 
relations among similar basic media types) belongs together with interme-
diality in a narrow sense (meaning relations among dissimilar basic media 
types). Intramediality in a narrow sense (meaning relations among similar 
qualified media types) belongs together with intermediality in a broad 
sense (meaning relations among dissimilar qualitied media types).
Elaborating on intermediality, it can be concluded more specifically 
that intermedial relations in a narrow sense are relations among (media 
products belonging to) dissimilar basic media types, that is, relations 
among media types based on different modality modes. This involves 
transgressing relatively strong media borders when moving between 
them. Intermedial relations in a broad sense, on the other hand, are rela-
tions among (media products belonging to) dissimilar qualified media 
types including cases where no differences in modality modes are present. 
Because several qualified media types are based on the same modality 
modes, they belong to the same basic media type, and their interrela-
tions are intermedial only in a broad sense. This involves transgressing 
relatively weak media borders when moving between them. For instance, 
the two media types written poetry and scholarly article are clearly quali-
fied in different ways, although they are both typically understood to 
consist of visual, static and mainly symbolic signs on a flat and generally 
solid surface. Whereas the interrelation between written poetry and 
scholarly article is intermedial in a broad sense, it is not intermedial in a 
narrow sense. Sections of poetry can normally be seamlessly incorpo-
rated into scholarly articles (and vice versa) without modifying modal-
ity modes.
Thus, intermedial relations in a narrow sense are largely a question of 
‘finding’ or identifying media borders between dissimilar basic media 
types. Intermedial relations in a broad sense are more a question of ‘invent-
ing’ or construing media borders between dissimilar qualified media types 
based on similar basic media types. As the mechanisms for classifying 
media products into media types are anything but clear-cut, it is often not 
evident how to apply this seemingly straightforward distinction between 
different forms of media interrelations. However, the division of 
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intermedial relations into a narrow and a broad sense offers a methodical 
way of considering the intricate nature of intermediality.
1.7  What are medIa IntegratIon, medIa 
transformatIon and medIa translatIon?
1.7.1  Heteromediality and Transmediality
Media interrelations are multifaceted. I now wish to add another view-
point on media interrelations, to be placed on top of the ones already 
discussed. I suggest distinguishing between a synchronic and a diachronic 
perspective on media interrelations. Having a synchronic perspective 
means considering how media features appear at a certain moment. Having 
a diachronic perspective means considering how media features appear in 
relation to preceding and possibly subsequent media. Evidently, these two 
perspectives are analytical outlooks; I do not suggest using them to cate-
gorise media products. All media products can be investigated from both 
a synchronic and a diachronic perspective. While there is no doubt that 
certain media products are remarkably apt for diachronic analysis, no 
media products exist that cannot be treated in terms of diachronicity with-
out some profit.
I propose calling the synchronic perspective on media interrelations 
heteromediality. With references to Mitchell (1994) and Elleström (2010), 
Jørgen Bruhn defined heteromediality as ‘the multimodal character of all 
media and, consequently, the a priori mixed character of all conceivable 
texts’ (2010: 229). I think this is an apt description of how media exist 
from a synchronic perspective. For me, the term ‘heteromediality’ refers to 
the general concept that all media products and media types, having partly 
similar and partly dissimilar basic presemiotic modes, overlap and can be 
described in terms of amalgamation of material properties and abilities for 
activating mental capacities that can be understood as various sign func-
tions. This implies that media products and media types can only be prop-
erly understood in relation to each other. In my view, heteromediality, the 
synchronic perspective on media interrelations, is equally relevant for 
intra- and intermedial relations. It is the fundamental condition for medi-
ality as such.
I also propose calling the diachronic perspective on media interrelations 
transmediality. Transmediality has been widely discussed and defined in 
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various but fairly consistent ways. For instance, Irina O. Rajewsky circum-
scribed transmediality in terms of phenomena that are not media-specific, 
such as parody (Rajewsky 2002). I propose a very broad delineation of 
transmediality to match the comprehensive concept of heteromediality. 
For me, the term ‘transmediality’ refers to the general concept that media 
products and media types can, to some extent, mediate equivalent sensory 
configurations and represent similar objects (in Peirce’s sense of the 
notion); in other words, they may communicate comparable things 
(Elleström 2014b: 11–20). This means that there may be transfers in time 
among media. Even though multitudes of more or less different media 
products and media types are used, communication can be grasped as a 
succession of interconnected representations, chains of overlapping virtual 
spheres. Clearly, transmediality, the diachronic perspective on media inter-
relations, cannot be properly understood without profoundly compre-
hending heteromediality, the synchronic perspective on media 
interrelations. As heteromediality, transmediality is relevant for both intra-
medial and intermedial relations. However, because of the complicated 
nature of media differences, transmediality in intermedial relations will be 
discussed separately and receive more attention. In these discussions, 
intermediality means intermediality in a narrow sense (relations among 
dissimilar basic media types), and intramediality means intramediality in a 
broad sense (relations among similar basic media types). This is because I 
want to focus specifically on the role of media modalities.
Heteromediality concerns the combination and integration of media 
products and basic or qualified media types. How can media be under-
stood, analysed and compared in terms of the combination and integra-
tion of modality modes and qualifying aspects? This viewpoint emphasises 
an understanding of media as coexisting modality modes, media products 
and media types. Therefore, (intramedial and intermedial) heteromediality 
can also be called media integration.
Intermedial transmediality concerns transfer and transformation of 
media products and basic or qualified media types. How can the transfer 
and transformation of cognitive import represented by different forms of 
media be adequately comprehended and described? This viewpoint 
emphasises an understanding of media involving temporal gaps among 
modality modes, media products and media types—either actual gaps in 
terms of different times of genesis or gaps in the sense that the perceiver 
construes the import of a medium based on previously known media. 
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Because media differences bring about inevitable transformations, inter-
medial transmediality can also be called media transformation.
Intramedial transmediality concerns the translation of media products 
and basic or qualified media types. I use the term ‘translation’ to adhere to 
the common idea that translation involves transfer of cognitive import 
among similar forms of media, such as translating written verbal language 
from Chinese to English. Therefore, intramedial transmediality can be 
broadly referred to as media translation.
1.7.2  Media Integration
As stated, the synchronic perspective on media interrelations, heteromedi-
ality, is foundational for comprehending mediality as such, and there is 
little point in distinguishing between intramedial and intermedial hetero-
mediality. It is imperative to emphasise both the notion of combination 
and the notion of integration, stressing that sharing and combining media 
properties always entails integrating them to some degree. That is why I 
also refer to heteromediality as media integration. Compared to other 
intermediality scholars, I more strongly emphasise that there is a floating 
scale between combination and integration and avoid stricter divisions. 
For instance, Hans Lund made a heuristic distinction between three kinds 
of word–picture relations: combination, integration and transformation 
(1992 [1982]: 5–9). Claus Clüver distinguished between multimedia 
texts (separable texts), mixed-media texts (weakly integrated texts) and 
intermedia texts (fully integrated texts) (2007: 19).
The core of heteromediality consists of the multimodal character of 
media products, as explained in some detail in the earlier sections of this 
article. Every media product is made of a combination of media modality 
modes, generally including several modes from at least some of the modal-
ities. Consequently, it is fair to say that media products consisting of many 
different modes are integrated or even mixed already as single media prod-
ucts, as Mitchell emphasised (1994). However, it is vital to note that 
media types are modally mixed or integrated in very different ways, allow-
ing different kinds of media integrations with other media types composed 
of dissimilar modal mixtures.
Heteromediality also involves the combination and integration of dif-
ferent media products (that are already integrated on a more basic level). 
The circumstances under which a person is motivated to decide that she or 
he is dealing with ‘one’ media product rather than ‘several’ media 
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products are rarely evident. Therefore, it may be that one and the same act 
of communication can be accurately analysed as consisting of one highly 
multimodal media product as well as of several thoroughly integrated 
media products. For instance, two people engaged in face-to-face com-
munication both continually produce temporal, auditory and visual sen-
sory configurations with a multitude of other modality modes, using their 
bodies and their immediate extensions, and perhaps other items, as techni-
cal media of display to realise a stream of communication. As the two 
minds give each other feedback, the continuous communication is never-
theless segmented in turn-taking to a certain degree; there are moments 
of relative silence or immobility on one side or another, after which some-
thing at least partly new is produced.
Although it may be impossible to determine exactly when or where one 
media product ends and another one begins, it is reasonable to think that 
each communicating mind in a case like this produces several media prod-
ucts rather than one. Similarly, one may experience that there is a certain 
autonomy in what one sees and hears. In other words, gestures and body 
language might (or might not) be perceived as media products that are 
not fully integrated with speech, because we are all familiar with hearing 
speech without seeing gestures and body language, and vice versa. 
However, these mental mechanisms of perceiving either single or several 
media products are certainly affected not only by the representing sensory 
configurations but also by the represented objects. The more successfully 
a single coherent virtual sphere is created, the more one is probably 
inclined to say that the media products are deeply integrated or actually 
constitute a single media product forming one perceptual gestalt. This 
means that, in each communicative situation, such as when one encoun-
ters a multitude of impressions during a lecture involving a variety of edu-
cational aids, it may be an open question whether one is guided by the 
disparity of material, spatiotemporal, sensorial or semiotic modes and feels 
that one encounters several combined and more or less integrated media 
products, or rather perceives a single total and highly multimodal media 
product. In any case, the heteromedial perspective offers theoretical tools 
for disentangling the interrelations.
Media types are categories of media products, which means that it may 
be an equally open question whether we are dealing with a weak combina-
tion or a strong integration of several basic or qualified media types, or in 
fact just a single highly multimodal, inclusive media type. This is because 
media categorisations are subjective and follow pragmatic communicative 
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incitements rather than systematic rules. Nevertheless, it is clear that 
highly multimodal media types, compared to less multimodal media types, 
are more often perceived as combinations and integrations of several 
media types, most likely because one is used to experience and think of the 
various parts separately.
For instance, a qualified media type such as documentary photography 
can be said to be grounded on the basic media type materially solid, visual 
and flat still images. Similarly, a qualified media type such as animated 
cartoons for children might be said to be grounded on a single broad basic 
media type that is materially both solid and in gas form, spatiotemporally 
consisting of time and at least two spatial dimensions, sensorially audiovi-
sual and semiotically dominated by icons as well as indices and symbols. 
However, it is probably more enlightening to think in terms of an integra-
tion of several basic media types (that can actually be perceptually sepa-
rated). On one hand, materially solid, visual and flat moving images, on 
the other hand what might briefly be described as auditory text (verbally 
symbolic, temporal sounds that are heard) and non-verbal sounds (iconic 
and indexical, temporal sounds that are heard).
Theatre, to take another example, potentially combines and integrates 
a multitude of basic media types; almost anything can be brought into a 
scene and made part of the performance. The aesthetic aspects of these 
combinations and integrations of basic media are part of how many people 
understand and define theatre as a qualified media type. Each basic 
medium has its own modal characteristics, and when combined and inte-
grated according to certain communicative ambitions and expectations, 
the result is known as ‘theatre’. Theatre consists of different kinds of mate-
rialities—which are both profoundly spatial and temporal, appeal to both 
the eye and the ear and produce meaning by way of all kinds of signs—and 
it is contextually and operationally qualified in several ways. Therefore, 
theatre could be described as a profoundly multimodal qualified medium 
that is susceptible to intermedial analysis. It makes sense to say that it not 
only integrates several basic media, but also several qualified media; one 
may recognise parts of a theatre performance as, say, music, architecture, 
gesture, dance and speech. However, it might be an overstatement that 
‘theatre is a hypermedium that incorporates all arts and media’ (Chapple 
and Kattenbelt 2006: 20; cf. Kattenbelt 2006: 32) because once the dif-
ferent media types are integrated, they become something else: the quali-
fied medium of theatre.
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To compare, one could argue that the pop song (here narrowly under-
stood as something that one listens to without access to live performance) 
is a qualified medium that combines the two basic media types of auditory 
text (verbal symbols that are heard in a temporal flow) and auditory image 
(icons that are heard in a temporal flow). The consequences of combining 
and integrating these two basic media are not as far-reaching as the com-
bination of several basic media in theatre. Auditory text and auditory 
images have the same materiality: sound waves that are taken in by the 
organs of hearing. Their way of being fundamentally temporal, but also to 
a certain degree spatial, is similar. The difference between auditory text 
and auditory image is clearly in the semiotic modality: whereas significa-
tion in auditory texts is mainly based on symbols and grounded on habits, 
signification in auditory images is mainly based on icons and grounded on 
similarity.
However, an unqualified combination and integration of these two 
basic media types is not enough to produce a pop song. Normally, both 
the auditory text and the auditory image need to have certain qualities 
that confer on them not only the value of ‘lyrics’ and ‘music’ but also of 
‘pop lyrics’ and ‘pop music’. The qualities of qualified media types become 
even more qualified when aspects of qualified submedia types, or simply 
genres, are involved. We usually consider the lyrics produced by the singer 
to be music in themselves, as is the sound produced by the instruments. 
Consequently, the integration of the two basic media in a pop song is 
deep, since the two media types are virtually identical when it comes to 
three of the four modalities. Concerning the fourth modality, the semi-
otic, it is perfectly normal to integrate the symbolic and the iconic sign- 
processes in the interpretation of both lyrics and music. Whereas literary 
texts are generally more saliently symbolic, and music is generally more 
saliently iconic, the combination and integration of lyrics and music stimu-
lates the perceiver to find iconic aspects in the text and to realise the sym-
bolic facets of the music.
Compared to theatre, the basic media of pop songs are strongly inte-
grated because of their identical sensory configurations, which may make 
it seem that they are actually based on one basic media type and constitute 
one qualified submedium rather than an integration of several submedia. 
On the contrary, because of its strongly multimodal character, theatre 
might be seen as comprising several integrated basic and qualified media 
types rather than just one.
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1.7.3  Media Transformation
As noted, the diachronic perspective on media interrelations, transmedial-
ity, is relevant for both intermedial and intramedial relationships. It covers 
all kinds of actual and potential diachronic media interrelations. This goes 
beyond the general field of media history, that is, the study of how media 
types evolve throughout the centuries (we find this narrower sense of a 
diachronic perspective on media in, for instance, Rajewsky 2005: 46–47). 
Regarding the diachronic perspective on intermedial relationships among 
dissimilar media (which I comprehend here as intermedial in a narrow 
sense: relations among dissimilar basic media types), I find it imperative to 
emphasise both the notion of transfer, indicating that identifiable repre-
sented characteristics are actually or potentially relocated among media 
(the narrative of a comic strip can be clearly recognised in a movie), and 
the notion of transformation, stressing that transfers among different 
media always entail changes (the narrative in the movie can hardly be iden-
tical to the one in the comic strip). For the sake of brevity, however, I refer 
to this perspective simply as media transformation; thus, media transfor-
mation equals intermedial transmediality.
Just as a combination of media products and media types involves 
grades of integration, transfer of cognitive import among media products 
and media types involves transformation, to different degrees. The human 
body, a technical medium of display, perfectly realises a solo dance or a 
gesture. In order to communicate something similar to the dance or the 
gesture, the technical medium of a television screen will work quite well, a 
printed still image will do the job less well, and the sound emitted by a 
radio will only be able to realise media products that are radically altered, 
although they may still be able to create recognisable virtual spheres. This 
depends on the dissimilar modal capacities of the various technical media 
of display, suitable for realising different basic media types. Therefore, 
when the transfer of cognitive import among media is restricted by the 
modal capacities of the technical media of display, or when the technical 
media allow of modal expansion—in brief, when the transfer brings about 
more or less radical modal changes—it can be described as 
transformation.
More specifically, transmediality generally involves the idea that differ-
ent media products (belonging to the same or dissimilar media types) may 
trigger the same or similar cognitive import; they may create the same or 
at least similar virtual spheres. Therefore, it is only a short step from the 
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idea that virtual spheres may be transmedial, to varying degrees, to recog-
nising that cognitive import can be transferred among similar or different 
kinds of media. When inserting a temporal perspective, it often makes 
sense to acknowledge not only that similar cognitive import is or may be 
signified by various media, but also that parts of or even whole virtual 
spheres, that are similar enough to be recognised, may recur after having 
appeared in another medium. Thus, transmediality involves actual or 
potential transfers of cognitive import not only among minds (which is the 
indispensable core of communication as such), but also among media—
that is, among minds perceiving different media.
When describing how a media product is perceived and construed in 
prompting specific cognitive import forming a particular virtual sphere, it 
is convenient to simply refer to its characteristics. I used the term ‘com-
pound media characteristics’ earlier to represent the concept that media 
products and media types bring into being individual or typical cognitive 
import that forms specific (types of) virtual spheres in the perceiver’s mind 
(Elleström 2014b). The term includes the word ‘compound’ to avoid 
mixing up the material, spatiotemporal and sensorial media traits that rep-
resent (the presemiotic modality modes) and the multifaceted characteris-
tics that are represented. Therefore, it might be clearer to instead use the 
term ‘represented media characteristics’ or simply ‘media characteristics’, 
while recalling that ‘media characteristics’ refers to the represented cogni-
tive import.
Represented media characteristics include everything that one might 
think of. They may be concrete or abstract and they may be conceived in 
terms of form or content: animals, persons, minds, structures, stories, 
rhythms, compositions, explanations, contrasts, themes, motifs, ideas, 
events, interrelations, moods and so forth. Some of the things and phe-
nomena that media represent have material, spatiotemporal and sensorial 
traits. However, all things that media represent, in the broad sense of mak-
ing them present to the perceiver’s mind, are media characteristics.
The advantage of sometimes using the term ‘represented media charac-
teristics’ instead of simply ‘cognitive import’ is that it emphasises the spec-
ificity of what certain media products or media types represent. Certain 
media characteristics are attached to particular media products and some 
are attributed to particular basic and qualified media types. Ultimately, 
though, ‘represented media characteristics’ means the same as ‘specific 
cognitive import created by the perceiver’s mind in communication’. The 
point here is that represented media characteristics are more or less 
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transmedial, meaning that they can be more or less successfully transferred 
among different media products or even different basic and qualified 
media types (Elleström 2014b: 39–45). This largely, but certainly not 
solely, depends on the present or absent modality modes of the 
involved media.
Returning to specifically intermedial transmediality, I distinguish 
between two forms of media transformation (intermedial transmediality). 
The first is transmediation (repeated representation of media characteris-
tics by a different form of medium, such as a person orally communicating 
the same story as a computer game), and the second is media representa-
tion (representation of another medium of a different type, such as a writ-
ten review that describes the performance of a piece of music).
Transmediation, another kind of medium that again represents some 
media characteristics, can more precisely be described in terms of my pre-
vious distinction between intracommunicational and extracommunica-
tional domains. The intracommunicational domain consists of the virtual 
sphere—represented cognitive import. The extracommunicational domain 
consists of the perceived actual sphere and other virtual spheres: cognitive 
import stemming from previous representations in earlier communication. 
Transmediation occurs when already represented objects from other vir-
tual spheres, created by other media types, become part of a virtual sphere; 
this is the same as saying that media characteristics are represented again 
by another form of medium. For instance, the people in a newspaper pho-
tograph or the visual actions in a film may be described by spoken words; 
a musical score may be performed by a musician; the oral statements of a 
witness may be written down; a story and characters in a theatrical play 
may be adapted to a movie; the gist of a scientific account may be rendered 
into a visual diagram; and written alphabetical text may be transformed to 
Braille writing. Even the recipe in a cookbook being realised as a meal 
communicating, for instance, affection, contrasts or the sense of a certain 
season of the year, can be understood in terms of transmediation.
Examples of media representation, a medium representing another 
medium of a different kind, are dialogues, gestures or photographs being 
heard and seen in a film; a scholarly treatise discussing media interrela-
tions; pictures of drawings on a website; a song about love letters; and a 
written article in a magazine describing social media. If a written article in 
a magazine not only describes social media in general but also, say, events 
that have already been communicated on social media, we have media 
representation and transmediation. The two types of media 
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transformation are not in any way mutually exclusive; on the contrary, 
they often coexist. Furthermore, they include not only transformations 
among specific media products but also among qualified media types and 
between media products and qualified media types. Filmic qualities in a 
written article in a magazine are a case of transmediation from the quali-
fied medium of film to a specific media product. The artistic genre ekph-
rasis is generally defined as poems representing paintings, which is a case 
of qualified submedia representing other qualified media and normally 
includes transmediation of media characteristics from painting to poem.
I want to emphasise that it is not necessarily the technical medium of 
display that ‘forces’ the transformations in media transformation. Naturally, 
media transformations may also result from communicative choices to 
take advantage of the modal possibilities offered by the target medium. In 
the classical example of novels being adapted to films, modal differences 
between the two qualified media types clearly make it necessary to alter 
many things; however, transmediations of this kind also offer possibilities 
for creative choices and voluntary transformations that are desirable. In 
this case, transmediation can be seen as a possibility rather than a problem. 
In other cases, such as transmediations among statements, written reports 
and footage from surveillance cameras in criminal trials, transmediation is 
definitely a problem rather than a creative opportunity; judges rarely 
appreciate inventive new versions of earlier media characteristics.
Obviously, there are many kinds of media transformation. These some-
times involve fairly clear and complete relations between media products, 
such as when a particular newspaper article is evidently recognisable in its 
online version (albeit with fewer words and added animations and hyper-
links), or when a specific novel can be identified as the source of a feature 
film (although the narrative has been abridged and sound and visual ico-
nicity have been added). It is sometimes rather a question of less definitive 
and fragmentary media characteristics that travel among media products 
and media types, such as when musical form is traced in a short story, 
when visual characteristics associated with comic strips can be said to have 
found their way to a television commercial, or when certain formal media 
characteristics of literature are transmediated to dance (cf. Aguiar and 
Queiroz 2015).
As demonstrated in the section on media borders, transfer of media 
characteristics over modal borders is often possible despite essential prese-
miotic and semiotic dissimilarities among media. This is not least because 
our brains have cross-modal abilities; they can make meaningful 
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transmissions between, say, visual and auditory information, or spatial and 
temporal forms of presentation. This allows for media characteristics being 
more or less transmedial. Hence, the fact that there are fundamental or 
even essential media dissimilarities does not preclude shared representa-
tional capacities and the transfer of media characteristics among dissimilar 
media. Over thirty years ago, Dudley Andrew noted that in order to 
explain how different sign systems can represent entities that are approxi-
mately the same (such as narratives), ‘one must presume that the global 
signified of the original is separable from its text’ (Andrew 1984: 101). 
This is no doubt true, especially if one relativises the proposition and adds 
that the represented media characteristics are to some extent separable from 
the representing sensory configurations. Represented objects are ulti-
mately cognitive entities in our minds, and these entities can be made 
present by different kinds of signs, although media differences will always 
ensure that they are not completely similar when represented again by 
another kind of medium.
1.7.4  Media Translation
Although I have discussed transmediality primarily within the frames of 
intermediality (in a narrow sense), the diachronic perspective on media 
interrelations is relevant also for intramedial relations (which I compre-
hend here as intramedial in a broad sense: relations among similar basic 
media types, which may actually involve dissimilar qualified media types). 
I refer to intramedial transmediality as media translation. I choose this 
term because ‘translation’ attaches to the common notion of translation as 
transfer among verbal languages. Hence, media translation is an extension 
of this idea to include transmediality among all forms of similar media 
types, not just media types based on verbal language. Much of what I have 
said about media transformation is also applicable to media translation, 
with the obvious difference that whereas media transformation involves 
dissimilar media types, media translation involves similar media types, 
which makes media translation somehow less complicated to grasp. 
Nevertheless, basic media transformation categories such as transmedia-
tion and media representation have their equivalences in media transla-
tion. Intramedial transmediation would then include phenomena such as 
cover versions of pop songs, remakes of feature films, rephrased oral state-
ments and translations of menus from Spanish to English. Intramedial 
media representation could include dinner talks mentioning any form of 
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speech, paintings representing other paintings, television shows discussing 
television shows in general or specific television programs and news arti-
cles referring to themselves. However, a lengthy discussion of media trans-
lation would not add much to what I have already concluded regarding 
media transformation.
1.8  What Is the conclusIon?
How can media be circumscribed within the realm of communication and 
how can media interrelations be conceptualised? These questions have 
been at the heart of this article from start to end. The incompatibility of 
many of the suggested answers in the past is largely caused by the shifting 
approaches of different scholars and research traditions. Technological 
features, as well as modal and qualifying aspects, have been emphasised in 
diverse and often exclusive ways in the efforts to find slim and efficiently 
operable definitions of the concept of medium. Jürgen E. Müller empha-
sised this problem several decades ago (1996: 81–83). One alternative has 
been to lean on conceptions of media that are open-ended and mind trig-
gering but difficult to handle analytically, such as McLuhan’s (1994 
[1964]). The advantage of working with a set of entangled and comple-
mentary concepts—media product, technical medium of display, media 
modalities and modes and basic and qualified media types—is that such a 
conglomerate of concepts sets certain parameters at the same time as it 
incorporates most of the actual comprehensions of mediality. Therefore, I 
have tried to offer an array of interrelated analytical perspectives that may 
be used for careful analysis of media interrelations, without strictly com-
partmentalising media products and their interrelations.
Although I have provided a few detailed accounts of media and their 
interrelations, my overview requires a more exhaustive elaboration and 
exemplification. I have offered a model for understanding media and inter-
medial relations, and the point of models is precisely to put aside specific 
details to make possible a view that is more generally valid. Therefore, I 
hope that the model may also offer a starting point for methodical analyses 
in the service of various research questions attaching to mediality at large 
and more specifically media interrelations.
In a certain sense, the presented model is bottom-up in nature. Instead 
of beginning with a small selection of established media types and their 
traits and interrelations, which is the usual scholarly methodology, it is 
founded on observations of all kinds of media, leading to a broad but firm 
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definition of the concept of media product and an explanation of media 
modalities that are shared by all media products and hence also media 
types. Hence, the conceptual framework can properly deal with any indi-
vidual media product even if it is found outside of established and well- 
researched areas of communication. The model can also account for the 
plain but central fact that media products and media types are both similar 
and different. While there are four media modalities that underlie all con-
ceivable media, each modality encloses several modes that vary among 
media products and media types. However, these modality modes are not 
always easily detectable properties; rather, they are found on a scale from 
physical traits to perception, cognition and interpretation.
The existence of several modality modes belonging to different media 
modalities means that the concept of media multimodality can be compre-
hended in various ways. In the broadest sense, a media product or a media 
type is multimodal if it combines, for instance, solid materiality, temporal-
ity, visuality and iconicity; in this respect, all media are definitely multi-
modal because they must be realised by at least one mode of each modality. 
In a more restricted sense, media multimodality means that a media prod-
uct or media type includes several modes of the same modality. In this 
specific sense, there are material multimodality (multimateriality), spatio-
temporal multimodality (multispatiotemporality), sensorial multimodality 
(multisensoriality) and semiotic multimodality (multisemioticity). 
Considering this narrower sense of multimodality, all media are at least 
slightly multimodal because the modality modes are generally either over-
lapping or mutually dependent in complex ways that I have only hinted at.
However, I have demonstrated in more detail the ways in which the 
concepts of media products, technical media of display, media modalities, 
modality modes, multimodality and basic and qualified media types make 
it possible to delineate properly concepts such as mediality, media borders, 
intramediality, intermediality, heteromediality and transmediality. Taking 
the intricacy of the many aspects of mediality into account, intermediality 
could actually be described as ‘media intermultimodality’. As argued, I 
think it is worth viewing intermediality as a complex set of relations among 
media that are more or less multimodal in various ways, although I hesi-
tate to use the cumbersome term ‘media intermultimodality’. Nevertheless, 
the concept that it stands for has proven fertile (see Lavender 2014).
Multimodality is vital for mediality, and although an intramedial per-
spective is necessary for understanding many communicative phenomena, 
an intermedial perspective is essential for grasping the intricate field of 
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mediality at large—because crossing media borders is the rule rather than 
the exception in communication. Because of their ubiquity and complex-
ity, I do not think it is possible to circumscribe a specific corpus of multi-
modal media products or intermedial relations, although I find many of 
the scholarly systems of intermedial ‘works’ and ‘relations’ valuable (cf. 
the enlightening overview of intermedial positions and issues in Rajewsky 
2005). Intermedial relations can only be pinned down to a certain extent 
and intermedial analysis cannot live without its twin sister, intermedial 
interpretation.
While intermediality is certainly about specific intermedial relations, it 
is also, and perhaps primarily, about studying all kinds of media with an 
awareness of media differences and similarities. As stressed by Jørgen 
Bruhn (2010), what makes intermedial studies important is that they offer 
insights into the nature of all media, not only a selection of peripheral 
media. Although the objects of intermedial studies may well be, for 
instance, media that have been categorised as ‘intermedial’ or ‘multi-
modal’, they may also be what have been taken to be (for the moment) 
‘normal’ media. The outcome of the studies depends less on the objects of 
investigation than on the way the studies are performed. The ambition of 
the model that I have here outlined, first presented in an initial form a 
decade ago (Elleström 2010), is that it continues to offer helpful tools for 
careful analysis and interpretation of all forms of media interrelations, 
regardless of the inducements and goals of the investigations.
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2.1  IntroductIon
As my wife and I take a seat in the lobby of The Lansdowne, we are asked 
if we would like a tour of the building in case we are interested in renting 
one of their “stylish one, two or three bedroomed apartments”, close to 
Birmingham city centre and with a range of in-house communal amenities 
including the Fitness Studio and the Cultural Mixer with a home cinema 
and pool table (The Lansdowne 2019). We say politely that “we are fine 
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thanks, we already have a house”, and that we are “just here for the per-
formance”. The member of The Lansdowne staff smiles politely and 
walks away.
Having been to see a range of theatre pieces in recent years that deftly 
and mischievously fashion artifices of commercial behaviour as an entrée 
into performance (dreamthinkspeak’s Absent 2015 springs to mind in 
which the façade of the hotel enterprise is utterly convincing until you 
literally see behind the doors), I am always intrigued by events such as that 
transpiring at The Lansdowne: Who and what is “performing” in this 
18-storey residential tower? Specifically we have come to see Stan’s Cafe’s 
It’s Your Film, a piece originally created over twenty years ago in 1998. I 
was fortunate enough to see a performance in that year and fascinated to 
see it again all this time later, particularly with its added spectatorial dimen-
sion for 2019. To quote the marketing blurb from the theatre company:
This unique four and a half minute show is performed to an audience of 
one. Viewers are seated in a passport photo style booth, with the show 
unfolding through a letterbox-sized aperture—it looks like a film but is per-
formed just for you! A story of lost love and detection set in Birmingham, the 
show takes its inspiration from film noir and uses special slide and video 
projections, and even a Victorian theatre trick called Pepper’s Ghost, which 
allows live actors to magically dissolve or be layered over each other. For the 
first time ever, audience members will be invited to watch the performance 
a second time from behind the scenes to see how the magic is done. (From 
a promotional email received 24th April 2019)
My previous knowledge of the piece, as a self-contained performance, 
supresses my incertitude as to the boundaries of the event, but neverthe-
less the scale of the apartment block, its metropolitan bravura and the 
efficient commercial disposition of its employee inform and frame my 
expectation of this urban noir love story. Before we even begin to experi-
ence the piece itself, the qualified media of architecture and what might 
floridly be referred to as the performance of real estate surrounds us at a 
presemiotic and semiotic level—the polished concrete, the airy lobby and 
the industrial signage, signifiers of modernity, youth, urbanity and wealth. 
Elleström’s term, “media product”, which he defines as “the intermediate 
stage that enables the transfer of cognitive import from a producer’s to a 
perceiver’s mind” (2020: 13), has pertinence in this context as the media 
products of property lettings are seemingly at work in the prelude to, or in 
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the all-consuming service of, theatre. The request from The Lansdowne 
developers for Stan’s Cafe to re-stage the show as part of their publicity 
and sales drive is resonant of what Richard Schechner refers to as proto- 
performance (2002), a precedent or impetus to performance, in this case 
an event prompted both by a specific request and by its own previous 
incarnation in 1998 and subsequent iterations. We only experience this 
proto-performativity briefly and superficially in the seemingly innocuous 
collision of newly developed property and re-fashioned theatre, but in that 
momentary juncture, the playful ambiguity of theatre’s encroachment 
into its wider environment and the uncertainty this triggers within us over 
its parameters are unmistakable. The door to the booth is situated to our 
right, the liminal divide, but where we sit is more than theatrical foyer, we 
are embedded within a hybrid of qualified media, architecture and real 
estate co-opted (perhaps unknowingly by the developers) into the theatri-
cal signification of It’s Your Film (a city that is bigger than us, hidden from 
us) and theatre co-opted more consciously and strategically into the quali-
fied medium of real estate performance, or what I later refer to as the 
architecture of commerce.
2.2  recalIbratIon
This capacity of theatre to shapeshift and ingest other media is captured in 
Chiel Kattenbelt’s suggestion that “when two or more different art forms 
come together a process of theatricalization occurs” (2008: 20). This 
chapter outlines and recalibrates theatre’s position as a hypermedium, in 
other words its capacity to envelop a seemingly endless profusion of 
modes, modalities and media (basic, qualified and technical; see Elleström 
2020) within its ambit and reframe them as theatrical performance. This 
quality of theatre offers both opportunities and tensions for contemporary 
artists, audiences/participants and those engaged in the study of interme-
diality as it complicates and multiplies unpredictability into the processes 
of mediation and representation. This hospitality of theatre with its open 
invitation to other qualified and technical media creates a dynamic yet 
crowded environment, alongside which the proliferation of digital and 
post-digital options creates ever-greater challenges to authorial agency his-
torically afforded to writers, directors and actors as well as increasingly 
complex challenges to audiences/participants in understanding the layers 
of signification presented to them or experienced by them.
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The premise that theatre has a particular capability to assimilate all 
other media was notably elucidated in Chapple and Kattenbelt’s influential 
text Intermediality in Theatre and Performance within which they state 
that “theatre has become a hypermedium and home to all” (2006: 24). 
The argument has long been rehearsed throughout the late twentieth and 
early twenty-first centuries, in both multimedial and intermedial theories, 
that specifically theatre has the capacity to embrace other artistic forms 
without fundamentally altering their structure. Peter M.  Boenisch, for 
example, described theatre as a “fully transparent medium” (2006: 112) 
with the ability to leave its incorporated media free of “any palpable fin-
gerprints of its mediatisation” (112) unlike television or film. He exempli-
fies this by stating that “a video might be projected as part of a theatre 
performance, which is then recorded for TV; yet the video on stage is still 
a video, whereas on the television it will be the broadcast of the showing 
of a video” (112). Kattenbelt developed this point further when he pro-
posed that film, television, video and DVD (when they appear in a theatre 
setting) become staged and “in this capacity, not only cinematic, televi-
sual, videographic or digital, but at the same time theatrical” (2008: 
22–23). However, my contention in this chapter is that these recent per-
spectives are limited in the rigour of their analysis and greater interroga-
tion is needed of the complex reality of what is happening in contemporary 
theatre, both in terms of what theatre-makers are seeking to achieve and 
in how audience/participants are interpreting the plethora of media prod-
ucts. My perspective builds upon Elleström’s own recurring dissatisfaction 
with the generalised definition and assumptions of theatre as a hyperme-
dium. Originally outlined in 2010, Elleström reiterates the point in the 
opening chapter of the present publication:
Therefore, theatre could be described as a profoundly multimodal qualified 
medium that is susceptible to intermedial analysis. It makes sense to say that 
it not only integrates several basic media, but also several qualified media; 
one may recognise parts of a theatre performance as, say, music, architec-
ture, gesture, dance and speech. However, it might be an overstatement that 
“theatre is a hypermedium that incorporates all arts and media” (Chapple 
and Kattenbelt 2006: 20; cf. Kattenbelt 2008: 32) because once the differ-
ent media types are integrated, they become something else: the qualified 
medium of theatre. (Elleström 2020: 77)
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In pursuit of this closer interrogation of theatre as a hypermedium, I will 
refer to a range of contemporary productions but with particular attention 
to three performances that I have experienced in recent years, The 
Ferryman (2017) by Jez Butterworth which opened at The Royal Court 
Theatre in London before transferring to the West End where I witnessed 
it at The Gielgud Theatre in 2018; In Many Hands by the Brussels-based 
experimental artist Kate McIntosh, performed at festivals across the world 
and experienced by myself at Utrecht’s Spring Festival in 2018; and finally, 
as already discussed in part, It’s Your Film by Birmingham-based Stan’s 
Cafe Theatre Company. I have selected these productions as they span a 
diverse range of theatrical styles from the more traditional naturalism of 
The Ferryman, viewed en masse in a proscenium arch theatre, the hands-
 on participatory experience of In Many Hands in which the audience are 
invited to touch and share a plethora of objects, through to the fleeting 
solo cine-theatrical experience of It’s Your Film. These brief descriptions 
alone are indicative of the breadth of contemporary theatre practice, not 
just in terms of genre (what Elleström refers to as submedia in 2020: 78) 
but also in terms of materiality, spatiotemporality, sensoriality, diverse 
semiotic signs as well as contextual and operational aspects that draw from 
a profusion of qualified media, not merely conventional theatre.
2.3  HypermedIum and HypermedIacy
Before considering these productions in more detail, it is important to 
establish the most current debates regarding theatre and hypermediality. 
Recently, in Intermedial Theatre: Principles and Practice (Crossley 2019), 
I began to reconsider and modify the conception of theatre as a hyperme-
dium, citing Claudia Georgi’s more nuanced articulation. Her argument, 
which at times uses Elleström’s modal theory, has resonances of Kattenbelt 
and Boenisch, as she writes that theatre is notable for “its ability to inte-
grate other media without affecting their respective materiality and medi-
ality” (2014: 46). Georgi’s theoretical approach becomes more granular 
however as she distinguishes certain aspects of theatre’s mutability, con-
tending that any sign can be incorporated within theatre but as this is a 
trait to be found in other “plurimedial media” such as film, theatrical dis-
tinctiveness is actually evidenced in the material mobility:
What is unique to theatre is thus not its semiotic mobility as such, but what 
could in analogy be termed its ‘medial mobility,’ i.e. the ability to leave the 
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materiality of the incorporated media intact while their respective signs 
acquire an additional semiotic quality as theatrical signs. (Georgi 2014: 47)
In response to this, I reflected on how greater clarity may be gleaned 
beyond the term “additional”, arguing that “[t]he additional layer that 
Georgi refers to may not be easily distinguished as an addition when the 
original semiotic signification may be denuded to the point where we are 
actually perceiving a hybrid between the original and the theatricalized” 
(Crossley 2019: 19). My contention was that the interrelationship between 
materiality and other presemiotic modalities was so intricate that any repo-
sitioning of, or interaction with, material objects on stage (book, statue, 
film, text, fabric, etc.) disrupts and reframes these elements to such a 
degree that further investigation is required to articulate the nature and 
complexity of these cognitive imports (the input and output of communi-
cation from producer’s mind to perceiver’s mind as defined in Elleström 
2020), moving beyond a binary distinction of pre-theatrical and “addi-
tional” theatrical signification.
In addition to the specific term hypermedium, hypermediacy as a 
related but discreet concept has been scrutinised, stratified and defined in 
recent years, initially within Bolter and Grusin’s influential Remediation: 
Understanding New Media (1999) in which they delineated two signifi-
cant types of mediation, referred to as transparent immediacy and hyper-
mediacy. Andy Lavender summates the distinction: “In Remediation Jay 
Bolter and Richard Grusin describe processes of immediacy, that efface the 
appearance of the artwork by giving the spectator an apparently direct 
access to its matter; and processes of hypermediacy, through which you see 
the medial arrangement that presents the artwork for your engagement 
(1999: 33–34)” (2019: 54). In theatre, these two concepts can easily find 
themselves in close proximity and partnership, and in this context of 
hypermediality, I propose certain gradations as to their distinctiveness, 
suggesting they are simultaneous conditions in correspondence during all 
performance. Immediacy can be defined in a variety of forms, including 
direct communication from producer to perceiver (e.g. stand-up comedy), 
but it is also in evidence in a production such as The Ferryman. The per-
formance follows a naturalistic narrative, focusing on the impact of “The 
Troubles” in Northern Ireland on one family in County Armagh during 
the 1980s. Our spectatorship, within a classic West End theatre audito-
rium, is, perhaps counter-intuitively, an invitation to frame our experience 
as immediate and unmediated, emotional and direct as we invest in the 
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grief and the longing of the protagonists. Despite the overtly theatrical 
context in which we sit, the social praxis informing this event directs us 
towards a persistent, yet agreeable, naivety. Whilst our experience is sig-
nificantly enhanced by our extracommunicational knowledge of the socio- 
political events portrayed in the play and our cultural understanding of 
what is expected of us in the stalls with programme in hand and so forth, 
we are persuaded to uncouple the two domains and immerse ourselves in 
the autonomy of the virtual sphere created by the semiosis of intracom-
municational objects on stage, as Elleström proposes: “This is because we 
may perceive them, in part or in whole, as new gestalts that disrupt the 
connection to the extracommunicational domain” (2020: 30). If we 
wished to disengage for a moment and look around us, we would quickly 
recognise the medial arrangements of the artwork, our fellow spectators, 
the gilded proscenium and the specific modes of naturalistic theatre in 
such a space (the artifice of the rustic mise en scène, the stairs to nowhere 
upstage left, etc.), but we decide to resist the hypermediacy of the context 
and remain committed to the virtual, immediate domain.
2.4  temporalIty and SenSorIalIty
Hypermediacy also manifests itself within the construction and participa-
tion of In Many Hands. At the beginning of the performance, the audi-
ence of only forty-five people are invited to wash their hands before 
entering into a large auditorium within which there are three long tables, 
arranged in a triangle, with chairs down one side of each of them. Aside 
from assistants directing where to sit, there is no one overtly performing 
for us. We are intrinsic to the performance as participants but also more 
radically as agents, activating the event and controlling the temporality. 
Such participatory experiences echo Lavender’s contention in the present 
publication, as he notes that “the actor/performer takes on a more pro-
tean form in this environment” (2020: 120). Our own centrality is evident 
in this Fierce Festival description of the performance:
This project steps away from the stage—instead bringing the audience into 
a series of aesthetic sensory situations, inviting them to experiment with 
materials and encounter physical phenomena themselves. In Many Hands is 
part laboratory, part expedition, part meditation—as it unfolds, visitors take 
their time to engage and explore as they wish, following their noses and 
curiosities. (Fierce Festival 2019)
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As the performance progresses, we are passed, one by one, objects of 
interest, all the way down one table, then the other before reaching the 
final participant on the last table—sponges, shells, mud, rocks, seeds, bird 
skulls and dozens more, a multitude of textures, temperatures and resis-
tances, eliciting degrees of intrigue, humour and squeamishness. It feels 
part interactive museum display and part ceremony. The material modality 
of these objects has not been altered to any significant extent; their mobil-
ity from original context into performance is seamless, yet it is the tempo-
rality of the event which is so specific and theatrical. In contemporary 
performance, I would argue that it is our control and manipulation of time 
that is often the most significant factor in creating the “additional” layer, 
or perhaps what I might suggest is a hybrid signification. In The Ferryman, 
the audience are relatively passive in temporal terms (putting aside the 
virtual sphere of temporality), as we sit dutifully through the duration of 
the play. Essentially, it has a fixed temporality, akin to film or recorded 
television. In one sense, In Many Hands also has an overarching fixed 
temporality as the show has a total duration of approximately ninety min-
utes. However, within that timescale the participants construct the tempo-
rality of both personal and collective moments quite significantly. As each 
object approaches, we decide the point at which we accept it from the 
audience member to our right and when we shall pass it on to the person 
to our left. The temporality of the sensorial engagement with each object 
is delineated predominantly by every individual with adjustments made in 
response to prompts (impatience, anticipation) from their “collaborators” 
left and right. The collective autonomy over temporality is heightened in 
the latter stages of the performance as the scale of objects increases to 
include swathes of damp fishing net and finally a large gauze carried aloft 
across the heads of the whole crowd. The intensity of sense data and sub-
sequent sensations is closely intertwined with the ephemeral temporality 
of the touching. The objects which have a static temporality in and of 
themselves are animated by our examination of them and the brevity of 
our connection to them. This temporal agency that theatre is able to 
exploit over media is commented upon by the performance maker Jo Scott:
I am suggesting that performance is always in a process of undoing the tem-
poralities of its media […] because of the intersection between the ‘timing’ 
of the performer’s action and the temporality of the media with which they 
intersect. Intermedial activation in live performance wrestles the fixed media 
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from their moorings and sets them loose, so we feel their happening differ-
ently and the temporality of the piece itself also shifts. (Scott 2019: 112)
As the participant performers in this event, we negotiate the different tem-
poralities and sensorialities for ourselves and between ourselves, executing 
subtle split-second judgements over our experience. In this regard, the 
sensations of the finale are acutely individual as we feel the soft fabric on 
our fingertips, yet also undeniably communal as we are all shadowed by, 
and share the delicate weight of, the expanse of cloth. It may be argued 
that temporal and sensorial control are in evidence in other qualified 
media, with parallels often being drawn between gaming and theatre. It 
could also be suggested that in our encounters with certain art objects, 
fine art and sculpture, for example, we have agency over our temporal 
engagement as we decide to move towards, away from or around such 
objects. However, the particularity of theatre is that the temporalities and 
sensorialities of these other qualified media can themselves be subsumed 
within theatre and theatre-makers can then consciously seek to engineer 
or encourage such participations within the theatrical event.
From a hypermedial perspective, this event combines a number of qual-
ified media: certainly theatre in terms of a performance within an audito-
rium but also museum exhibition and ceremony, facilitated by Kate 
McIntosh and her collaborators, but orchestrated by the audience. Modes 
of theatre such as the atmospheric lighting are intertwined with cross- 
modal modes; the objects are both exhibits and props. To advance Georgi’s 
notion of an additional layer, I would emphasise the dialogic nature of this 
signification as the cognitive import flexes between the extracommunica-
tive knowledge we have of these inert objects but then seeks to place this 
in relation to their presence in the theatrical space. McIntosh has spoken 
of the extensive and meticulous selection process for each of the objects 
(2017), but as they pass through our hands, we have only a transitory 
moment to wrestle with the juxtaposition of modes and what these may 
represent. As Elleström reminds us, “compared to the potentially exten-
sive act of production, the act of perception is brief and quickly channelled 
into interpretation, which of course occurs in the perceiver’s mind” (2020: 
18). Immediacy and hypermediacy are present both in the event as we 
have immediate access to the objects and one another, and they are mate-
rially immediate to us, yet simultaneously the construction of the artwork 
is confidently in evidence, the assistants silently mediating our experience 
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through the passing of objects, the presence of each audience member 
positioned closely in relation to one another, necessarily in touching 
distance.
2.5  SIgnIfIcatIon and partIcIpatIon
The distinction between art and real-world experience is increasingly 
blurred in many contemporary performance genres from performance art 
to gaming and social media–based practice. It is also at work in site-based 
theatre that intentionally draws upon built and social environments such 
as dreamthinkspeak’s Absent or less overtly or consciously such as Stan’s 
Cafe’s It’s Your Film. Immersive theatre, which has seen a global exponen-
tial rise in recent years, may initially seem disconnected from the real world 
as we are enveloped within the complex mise en scène of a performance 
from Punchdrunk, WildWorks, You Me Bum Bum Train and the like. 
However, the centrality of our own material body as close observers or 
participants continues to bombard us with real-world sense data (breath-
lessness as we run, the heat of our face behind a mask, the scents carefully 
embedded in the scenography), and hence this creates a visceral dialogue 
between the virtual and actual spheres. The frisson is in the hinterland 
between the two, as a Punchdrunk performer leads you by the hand for a 
confidential chat in a caravan in The Drowned Man (2013) or kisses you 
tenderly goodnight in Sleep No More (2003–present). These encounters, 
which I have experienced first-hand in London and New York, respec-
tively, are too immediate to consider as discreet or additional layers of 
signification; they are more an instant perception of both/and (to loosely 
appropriate Robin Nelson’s term for intermediality 2010), as it is both 
distinctly fictional and real. It is hypermediated theatrical signification.
Patrice Pavis was alert to this movement in diffuse performance framing 
towards the end of the twentieth century. He wrote that many contempo-
rary artists sought to create “the impression that there is no division 
between art and life, contemporary art has often endeavoured to invent 
forms in which the frame is eliminated” (Pavis 1998: 155–156). Such 
practices bring our attention to the impact of “noise”, as Elleström refers 
to it: “The basic phenomenon of disruptions that occur on the way from 
the producer’s mind to the perceiver’s” (2020: 23). Such a phenomenon 
is of major significance within the capacious hypermedium of theatre. 
When a single media product (painting, sculpture, poem, solo dance, etc.) 
is presented within its own qualified medium of fine art and so on, there is 
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a more predictable bandwidth in the potential cognitive import from pro-
ducer to perceiver’s mind. Whilst the perceiver may draw upon a range of 
extracommunicational domains to inform the intracommunicational 
domain, there is a greater degree of direct and bounded modes, and there-
fore signifiers, that can be employed and thus interpreted. Elleström refers 
to this modal stability in relation to art: “Whereas painting is a qualified 
medium because expected aesthetic qualities are to be presented within 
certain social and artistic frames that are bound to undergo changes, its 
expected modal traits are relatively stable” (2020: 58). However, as the-
atre is able to host a plethora of qualified and technical media within which 
are countless modal options, the increase in disruption and “promiscu-
ous” cognitive import is inevitable. Compounding this promiscuity are 
what may be described as the intentional acts of “noise disruption” embed-
ded within work by the artists themselves, in terms of collision, contradic-
tion and juxtaposition. This premise finds correspondence with Simonson’s 
articulation of “intermedial gaps” in her contribution to the present pub-
lication, “moments that withhold as much as they communicate, and that 
communicate withholding” in which there is the fertile potential for “acts 
of concealment” (2020: 4–5). Such intentions can be seen in, amongst 
others, Montage, Fluxus and Assemblage practices which gathered pace 
within the twentieth century and were often appropriated into theatre 
experimentations. These practices problematise the premise of intention-
ality in relation to the act of production and transfer outlined in Elleström’s 
Fig. 1.1 (2020: 16). The media product may be clearly framed as perfor-
mance, but specific modes of transfer—text, image, audio recordings and 
so on—may have intentionally been found and selected at random, reject-
ing established norms of authorial control. In such instances, the act of 
production is proportionally at a greater divide, in terms of predictability, 
from the act of perception compared to media products within other qual-
ified media. This disruption of cognitive import is amplified when the 
capacity for participant agency is factored in, as we make unpredictable 
interventions in to the processes of mediation.
The movements and timings of all forty-five participants during In 
Many Hands make infinite adjustments to the cognitive import for each 
and every one of us within the room. The tactile nature of the event and 
the plethora of objects we touch multiply the extracommunicational 
domains at play as each person confronts every object with intimacy and a 
degree of vulnerability. Kate McIntosh, in reference to the performance, 
notes how “people’s threshold of what is challenging is really different 
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from one person to another” (2017); a fragile bird’s skull may be anatomi-
cally fascinating to one person whilst an unnerving glimmer of mortality 
to another. In such instances, the “overlaps” between producer’s and per-
ceiver’s minds are unpredictable at best. This is certainly not to say that 
such uncertainty is problematic or a weakness. It is one of the great 
strengths of theatre, particularly in the experimentations of recent decades, 
that coincidence, happenstance and participant agency are central to the 
construction of cognitive import and representation. It may be argued 
that one of the fundamental and particular features of the hypermedium 
of theatre is the facility for collaboration and participant authorship 
through real-time transformation of events.
2.6  angleS of medIatIon and excluSIvIty
This particular capacity of theatre to proliferate new angles of mediation 
and hence profusions of representations can also be seen in It’s Your Film 
as we are taken behind the scenes for the second viewing of the piece. In 
the original version, our viewpoint is intentionally restricted as we look 
ahead towards a small aperture in which images are projected into our 
eyeline, never quite knowing if these are pre-recorded or live, vignettes of 
furtive assignations no more than a few seconds each. For the following 
version, we are taken through a different door and sat alone on a chair to 
the side of the backstage area. What unfolds before us is a choreography 
of three performers, constructing each image in the moment, projected 
through the Pepper’s Ghost device into the booth for the next audience 
member. Such a performance obfuscates the line between extracommuni-
cational and intracommunicational domains as the second experience is 
intensely informed by the preceding experience in the booth. The rich, 
virtual domain of noir intrigue from the first performance is still imprinted 
on the memory as you are witness to its deconstruction a few minutes 
later. The intracommunicational experience of the first bleeds into the lat-
ter’s intracommunicational world as we partly project ourselves back into 
the original experience in order to take pleasure in the conspiracy of the 
backstage reveal.
This playfulness can also be seen in more mainstream work such as 
Network (2018), starring Brian Cranston at The National Theatre in 
London, for which during certain performances you could book a table on 
stage for a fine dining Foodwork experience. Whilst these diners may not 
also have seen the play from the auditorium, as per It’s Your Film, it is 
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setting a similar mediating puzzle as participants enter into a dialogic 
mode of spectatorship, partly immersed within their onstage mise en scène 
and partly projecting themselves out into the perspective of the audito-
rium to imagine the viewpoint usually afforded to the audience. The plea-
sure, according to several audience members I spoke to who participated 
in the Foodwork events, was the thrill of knowing what the main audience 
could and could not see. Pivotal to this thrill is their contextually qualified 
understanding of proscenium arch productions such as The Ferryman.
In both of the examples at The National Theatre and The Lansdowne, 
theatre has created and afforded angles of exclusivity which are a specific 
quality distinct from other qualified media. An art exhibition may have a 
private viewing, but in the end all visitors to the gallery see the same art 
object from a similar angle. A film premiere may have an illustrious and 
select guest list, but the media product is the same in any cinema once on 
screen, whilst a great novel is the same set of symbolic signs in my hand as 
it is for any literary critic. The context of perception is different in each of 
these latter cases but the modalities and modes are the same. However, in 
theatre, the spatial modality can be fundamentally adjusted within any 
given performance event, often affording simultaneously different specta-
torial dimensions as in Network and It’s Your Film. It could be argued that 
gaming has a similar capacity as multiple gamers can be perceiving a virtual 
environment from multiple angles online but these are virtual recalibra-
tions of space whereas theatre can accommodate such virtual spaces mate-
rially intact as well as real-world physical displacements. Alongside the 
material mobility already alluded to by Georgi and others, and the tempo-
ral and sensorial mobility that I have foregrounded, it is clear that spatial 
mobility is also of considerable significance when defining the properties 
and potency of the theatrical hypermedium.
2.7  arcHItecture of commerce
Having considered, with greater nuance, the qualities of theatre as a 
hypermedium, what may be fathomed in regard to theatre’s capacity for 
housing other media and reframing them with hybrid both/and significa-
tion? Is there something unique or dominant in this complex interplay of 
mediation and representation? Before we ascribe theatre such a pre- 
eminent position in a hierarchy of qualified mediation, I am reminded 
again of the experience at The Lansdowne. Earlier in the chapter, I sug-
gested an interdependence between commercial architecture (specifically 
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real estate) and theatre. Whilst theatre can strategically and creatively colo-
nise such space, it is assertable that the dominant qualified medium in such 
scenarios is the commercial environment itself. In free market neo- liberal 
economies, it would be naïve to think that there is always a mutual 
exchange within such practices. At times theatre can subvert or question 
the values of such economies and the marketisation and commodification 
of everyday experiences whilst housing itself in the very centre of such 
commercial institutions. vHotelling (2016) by the Australian company 
Not Yet It’s Difficult is a prime example of this, set within the hotels of 
Gold Coast yet designed to question the façade of hospitality. However, 
alongside such work that pushes back against corporate influence, there is 
undoubtedly an argument that, in many instances, the architecture of 
commerce is a far more voracious and all-consuming qualified medium 
than theatre. It is immediately evident in the Gielgud Theatre, owned by 
the Delfont Mackintosh group, which staged The Ferryman, as £100 
ticket prices are quickly complemented by £10 glasses of champagne 
sipped within the auditorium. The modes of theatre are often aligned to 
the modes of commerce. This correlation is overtly celebrated in the 
Theatre in the Clouds experience at The Shard in London which presents 
theatre near the top of the tower. The Handbook style magazine writes that:
Once seated, the £95 per person ticket allows for you to indulge in two 
glasses of Champagne and a brimming selection of Shangri-La canapés; 
fairly priced considering all that’s involved, plus solely travelling up to The 
Shard’s viewing point costs £32 alone. What’s more, the audience is made 
up of a truly intimate number of people, just shy of 20, making it an idyllic 
date-night experience or something for those seeking a night that subverts 
the norm of dinner dates and drinks. (The Handbook 2019)
The angles of exclusivity in this instance are predominantly driven by 
financial rather than directorial decisions, and the same argument could be 
made of Network and other such productions starring marquee names. It 
must be stressed that these observations of theatre co-opted or central to 
economic imperatives are not offered, on my part, to make broad political 
points, but are placed as a reminder of our contemporary economic con-
text. Jane Jacobs, the renowned activist on urban planning, famously 
stated that “A city cannot be a work of art” (1961: 372), yet works of art 
are often integral, beyond their capacities to entertain, to the economic 
functions of “the city” and likewise they are sustained by these functions. 
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The contextually and operationally qualifying aspects of theatre are often 
indivisible from those of commerce, and if not indivisible, then they are 
brought into convergence for mutual gain. The “communicative task”, to 
use Elleström’s term for the operationally qualifying aspect (2020: 61), is 
often in theatre as well as commerce, to reaffirm and re-sell lifestyle aspira-
tions. The architectural spaces of commerce are technical media, be that 
skyscrapers staging Noel Coward or stately homes staging Shakespeare, 
but they are also a cornerstone of the qualified medium of commerce 
which often houses theatre, or certain modes of theatre, as part of its own 
mise en scène. Moving towards a conclusion, it may seem that I am sug-
gesting that theatre has capitulated to commercial imperatives, but on the 
contrary my specific argument is that theatre’s status as a hypermedium 
needs framing, as Pavis would remind us, in the contemporary context of 
obscured divisions between art and, in this case, commercial life. Theatre 
is both adept at negotiating this relationship, sometimes out of financial 
necessity and sometimes out of creative curiosity, or both. If not in part-
nership with the architecture of commerce, then theatre, as in the case of 
vHotelling, has the armoury to expose the inconsistencies or inequalities 
of the economic systems in which we reside as it has the capacity to inhabit 
and subvert the modalities and modes of commerce.
2.8  concluSIon
At the beginning of this chapter, it was highlighted in many of the refer-
ences that theatre was a particularly special form of qualified medium, a 
hypermedium and an expansive and generous host to all other qualified 
media whose materiality it deftly embraced intact but reframed with the-
atrical signification. Using Elleström’s modalities of media, my intention 
in this chapter has been to enhance these statements by Georgi, Kattenbelt 
and others by establishing the significance of the spatiotemporal and sen-
sorial modalities, alongside the material modality, in realising the hyper-
medium and to shed greater light on what this specific hybridised theatrical 
signification may look like and what it may accomplish.
The mobility of materiality is undoubtedly the most obvious of distinc-
tions for theatre in this context as objects, bodies, recordings, screens, 
social media feeds and so on can all be enfolded within a theatrical event. 
This material mobility can be extended to the consideration of theatre as 
a technical medium, a physical host for performance. Unlike other quali-
fied media, theatre can inhabit and shift through endless technical hosts, 
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from traditional West End theatres to Birmingham residential towers, 
from London skyscrapers to Australian hotel complexes and far beyond. A 
single theatre performance can commence in one type of space and tra-
verse through multiple other spaces (pavements, bedrooms, churches, 
etc.), appropriated as the technical media of theatre for the time they are 
required and then jettisoned back to their original context. Other quali-
fied media are arguably not so flexible, as despite ongoing experimenta-
tions, fine art generally requires (or is perceived commercially to require) 
some form of canvas to realise the basic medium of visual images and lit-
erature needs the pages of a book or a digital device to realise the basic 
medium of written text. It may be initially argued that art, for example, 
can be galleried in any location but the gallery is not the technical medium 
of art; it is just one location, contextually agreed by society, to observe the 
qualified medium of fine art. The act of perception in fine art can be sub-
stantially, if not entirely, delineated from the context in which the media 
products of art are observed. We may profoundly contemplate a master-
piece by Hockney or O’Keefe in the privacy of our own home with a copy 
purchased online, but this is not possible with theatre, even when spectat-
ing online, as we are always cognisant of the physical context. Location for 
theatre is the equivalent of canvas or a book; it is intrinsic to the form, 
enmeshed within the media products of theatre and hence the cogni-
tive import.
Beyond the significance of material mobility, the influence of specific 
spatiotemporal and sensorial affordances within the hypermedium is like-
wise not to be underestimated. Through such affordances, new and imagi-
native angles of mediation are crafted by theatre-makers to reveal the 
medial arrangement whilst simultaneously saturating you, often inculcat-
ing you, in the virtual domain. Theatre, particularly participatory and 
immersive practice, has the extraordinary capacity to suspend the audience 
between the extracommunicational and intracommunicational domains as 
immediate sense data and subsequent sensations converge or conflict with 
the richness of the virtual domain that we are inhabiting and the complex 
set of discourses that we are referencing from beyond the immediate expe-
rience. The acceptance into our hands of the bird’s skull in In Many Hands 
compels us to respond to the surface and appearance of the bone, as sense 
data and affective sensation, whilst simultaneously sensing and perceiving 
the gravity of the ceremony from the pace of movement around us and 
our external knowledge of ceremonial practices extrinsic to this event; we 
navigate both the moment and the context.
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Back at The Lansdowne, my wife and I emerge out of the darkened 
rooms of It’s Your Film, blinking into the light of a Birmingham street. 
Whilst the architecture of commerce may be an undeniably persuasive 
medium, today we did not rent a flat; we saw some theatre.
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3.1  Modes, Modalities and the actor as a MediuM
This chapter considers how the work of the actor or performer might be 
understood with reference to ideas of multimodality. I should explain 
straight away that I sometimes use the terms ‘actor’ and ‘performer’ inter-
changeably, below, since I am less concerned here with distinctions that 
might be drawn between actors who play characters and performers who 
present something other than a fictionalised figure. ‘Actor’ and ‘per-
former’ for present purposes are individuals who convey an act of perfor-
mance that we are interested to describe in a systematic way. I should also 
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say immediately that such description is an attempt to transpose Lars 
Elleström’s ideas about media modes and modalities (2020) to a consid-
eration of performing. Of course, the actor is not a ‘medium’ in the way 
of the media in which she performs (theatre, film, radio drama, etc.). And 
yet the actor has a communicative function that can be elucidated accord-
ing to the principles by which media communicate. There are some con-
ceptual similarities between this project and that of Miriam Vieira in the 
present publication, which demonstrates how architecture as a medium 
intersects with considerations of embodiment and perspective (2020). I 
examine below how we can see the actor as what Elleström describes as a 
‘technical medium of display’ (2020: 33–40) and how this is always a mat-
ter that involves the perception of the spectator.
Elleström makes his case in an essay entitled “The modalities of media: 
A model for understanding intermedial relations” (Elleström 2010) and 
revises and expands upon it in the current publication (2020). As Jørgen 
Bruhn explains in a draft to his article in the present publication, Elleström’s 
approach was novel in taking “seriously the fact that many of the insights 
of both media theory and interart studies had very clear parallels in the 
field of multimodal studies” and in elaborating a scheme that combined 
intermedial and multimodal perspectives within a single system of com-
munications analysis (Bruhn 2020; see also Lotherington 2020: 218, 
226). In multimodal approaches, communicative modes are notably 
diverse and include, for instance, written texts, visual images, diagrams, 
typography, facial gestures, and nods of the head (see, e.g., Bateman et al. 
2017: 16; Djonov and Zhao 2014: 1; Fernandes 2016: 1). A key principle 
is the transactional nature of modes, their work as communicative ele-
ments within a process of signification. As Gunther Kress suggests, “Mode 
is a socially shaped and culturally given resource for making meaning” 
(2014: 60, original emphasis; see also Jewitt 2014: 22). This aligns with 
scholarly interests elsewhere in media and mediation, and Elleström’s 
work brings a semiotic orientation (concerned with meaning making) to 
considerations of the technical and aesthetic infrastructures of media, 
which are themselves pressured by specific historical and industrial situa-
tions. As Heather Lotherington observes, “[m]edia and mediation are 
exceedingly complex in today’s communication landscape. A media prod-
uct or medium exists in historical-social-cultural space as well as physical-
sensorial-cognitive space.” As she suggests, “Elleström’s […] intermediality 
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paradigm offers analytical specificity and categorization that is helpful in 
understanding contemporary communication” (2020: 222, 229).
In some quarters, ‘mode’ (as a way of doing something, or the particu-
lar form that a phenomenon, condition or activity takes) precedes ‘modal-
ity’, which describes ways in which the activity/phenomenon/object can 
be seen to express its mode. However, we are with Elleström, for whom 
modalities (of which there are four) should be ascribed conceptually before 
modes. The modalities and modes then operate synchronously within a 
larger interrelated system of communication. Indeed, the communicative 
aspect (shaped by Kress’s ‘culturally given’) is key. This functional approach 
emphasises the role of the receiver/perceiver amid mediation and circum-
scribes the formation and efficacy of media in the first place. As Elleström 
summarises:
there are four media modalities, four types of basic media modes. For some-
thing to acquire the function of a media product, it must be material in 
some way, understood as a physical matter or phenomenon. Such a physical 
existence must be present in space and/or time for it to exist; it needs to 
have some sort of spatiotemporal extension. It must also be perceptible to at 
least one of our senses, which is to say that a media product has to be senso-
rial. Finally, it must create meaning through signs; it must be semiotic. This 
adds up to the material, spatiotemporal, sensorial and semiotic modalities. 
[…] no media products or media types can exist unless they have at least one 
mode of each modality […] the four media modalities form an indispensable 
skeleton upon which all media products are built. (Elleström 2020: 46)
The skeleton is formed of two distinct kinds of bone (if you will allow 
the analogy to be continued). Three of the modalities—the material, spa-
tiotemporal and sensorial—are ‘presemiotic’ (2020: 47), in that they do 
not originate from cognition but rather describe structuring aspects that 
will then affect cognition. The fourth modality, the semiotic, Elleström 
describes as “the frame for understanding representation. All media prod-
ucts are semiotic because if the sensory configurations with material, spa-
tiotemporal and sensorial properties do not represent anything, they have 
no communicative function” (2020: 49). The four modalities, then, are 
always mutually in play in some way in any process of mediation, and each 
of the modalities can be described by way of a subset of modes. As 
Elleström suggests: “All media are multimodal in that they must have at 
least one mode from each modality” (2020: 53).
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The modalities and modes are given in tabular form in the 2010 version 
of Elleström’s essay, under the headings ‘Modality’, ‘What the modality 
is’, and ‘The most important modes of the modality’. For example, the 
‘sensorial modality’ is described as “The physical and mental acts of per-
ceiving the interface of the medium through the sense faculties” and its 
most important modes given as “seeing, hearing, feeling, tasting, smell-
ing” (2010: 36). This schematic organisation allows for a critical perspec-
tive and a procedure—one based on recognising specific features and 
distinctions and accounting for media operations as, continuously, a com-
bination of modalities and modes (see Elleström 2010: 24).
The model is geared towards elucidation and concerns communication 
that is itself, Elleström observes, always about conveying “cognitive 
import” (2020: 12–13; the revised version of the essay provides greater 
emphasis on this aspect). The four modalities combine within media pro-
cesses that are at the heart of signification, understood here in terms of 
‘representation’ in its semiotic sense—that is, as a means to transact per-
ception on the part of the perceiver, in a domain of cognition. The ful-
crum is the communicative act. A medium in this sphere of analysis is only 
effectual insofar as its operation permits what Elleström calls a “media 
product”, defined as “the intermediate stage that enables the transfer of 
cognitive import from a producer’s to a perceiver’s mind” (2020: 13). 
This is to an extent metaphorical for, as Elleström goes on to say, the 
model envisions not solely a single line of transfer from one individual to 
another but the possibility of multiple producing elements that converge 
into media products conveyed to multiple perceivers. In any case:
A media product is a single physical entity or phenomenon that enables 
inter-human communication […] [it] may be realised by either non-bodily 
or bodily matter (including matter emanating directly from a body), or a 
combination of the two. […] other bodies, such as the bodies of actors, may 
be used as media products. (2020: 8, 13, 14)
Let us remain with the bodies of actors. As Elleström suggests, a media 
product “requires some sort of perceptible physical phenomenon to come 
into existence” (2020: 33)—and such phenomena he calls (in a slightly 
self-deprecating way, noting the “cumbersome” nature of the term) “tech-
nical media of display of sensory configurations” (2020: 34). The actor is 
one such, for she fulfils a central criterion of the technical medium of dis-
play—she “mediates sensory configurations in the context of 
 A. LAVENDER
117
communication; [she] realises and displays the entities that we construe as 
media products” (2020: 34).
In what way can the actor be described as a medium of communication? 
We might start by considering the actor as character, probably the domi-
nant paradigm of Western representational performance, whether in the-
atre, film, television or radio drama, or other kinds of performance such as 
appearance in adverts or short-form online videos. The communicating 
aspects are manifold, which means that the actor can be thought of as a 
technical medium comprised of multiple internal technical media of com-
munication: the actor’s voice, convening signifying information both 
through sonic inflections and verbal utterance; the actor’s gesture, com-
municating through learned socio-cultural codes and aesthetic codes; the 
actor’s costume, but also the manner in which costume items are worn (a 
jaunty angle to a hat, an overweening deportment of a uniform, an embar-
rassed donning of a tie by a teenager); the rhythm of movement; the sig-
nifying aspect of entrances, exits and other positional manoeuvres; the 
nature of interaction with other actors and scenic objects; and any signifi-
cant liaison—by eye contact, gesture or direct address—with the spectator. 
Elleström, following Peircean semiotics, describes such elements variously 
as iconic, indexical and semiotic (2020). These prospective signifying 
aspects can variously be conceived as media products if and where they 
effect perception on the part of the spectator. The actor operates within 
the structures and processes of the medium in which she performs—this 
could be film, theatre, television and so forth (for there are others)—
which will itself be comprised of media products that depend upon the 
organisation provided by, for example, script, direction, lighting, sound 
design and other features that help construct the medium. The actor is 
thereby herself a complex technical medium, disporting media products 
by way of (for instance) gesture, utterance and movement, within a larger 
media product that may form what Elleström calls “one perceptual gestalt” 
(2020: 76). There may be differences to be drawn between the appearance 
of an actor in a live situation to a co-present audience; an actor in a live 
situation appearing to a remote audience; and an actor in a situation that 
was recorded previously, whether through analogue or digital technolo-
gies, accessed at a different time by one or more audience members. In 
terms of Elleström’s model, we are in the realms of distinct qualified media 
types that operate through slightly different arrangements of technical 
media of display. For present purposes, however, I suggest that we con-
sider ‘actor/performer’ as a technical medium comprised of multiple 
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internal technical media of communication and move from this to a modal 
description of the actor’s work and function.
How do we make sense of the actor’s performance as an isolable feature 
of mediation within this larger mediation machine? Elleström addresses 
Yeats’s question: “How can we know the dancer from the dance?”
On one hand, the dancer and the dance are inseparable in the sense that they 
are the same material entity occupying physical space and time. On the other 
hand, they are two different things. Whereas the dancer is a body acting as 
a technical medium of display, the dance is a function of the material body—
a media product. (2020: 36)
This also puts me in mind of ripples from the throw of a stone into a 
pond or the reflections of one mirror in another—a set of interconnected 
iterations that layer perception as an act, not only as a single instance but 
as a composite in which we can find signification in the part as well as the 
whole. This gives us a clue as to how performance might be ‘read’—we 
can find its agency and affect in something as simple as a change of eyeline 
or the travel of a finger on the part of an actor; as multiple as the interac-
tions of a group of actors within a sustained scene of physical interchange; 
and as multi-layered as the transactions achieved when (for example) a film 
captures a relation between actors within a mise en scène that draws atten-
tion to its signifying devices while narration ‘lands’ for the spectator in a 
moment of clarity, exuberance or awful realisation. This is perhaps to say 
that the actor’s performance in itself will in some manner always allow 
only a partial reading; for it cannot be self-contained but will necessarily 
require contextual coordination with the film, staging or other set of cir-
cumstances in which the performance is presented. No performance is 
innocent of the medium in which it appears. That said, we must start 
somewhere, and for the purposes of this chapter, the actor’s body is as 
good a place as any.
3.2  on analysing acts of PerforMance (in 
a MultiModal situation)
My proposition here is that we can transpose Elleström’s idea of modali-
ties and modes from a consideration of specific media to a consideration of 
specific acts of performance. I will come back to how we might do this, 
but first I should address the obvious question: Why would we want to do 
it in the first place?
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One answer is that it would be helpful to have a system to analyse per-
formance that can accommodate the range of performances that now 
inhabit the contemporary cultural scene. This includes character-based 
acting (whether in film, television, online performances, radio or theatre); 
acting that slides between presenting a character and presenting the self; 
the appearance of performers in a wider array of events, situations and 
installations; the performance of singers and other artists in diverse kinds 
of real-time and recorded presentation; the appearance of individuals, who 
may or may not be ‘celebrities’, in reality-based entertainments and sce-
narios; the actions or interactions of members of the public (for want of a 
better phrase—we might also say ‘spectators’ or ‘participants’), who 
become active in events in more or less significant ways; and the appear-
ance of politicians and other figures in the public sphere that can be 
assessed through the critical instruments of performance studies.
You might reasonably suggest that this is too disparate a list, gathering 
dissimilar kinds of performance, and I wouldn’t necessarily disagree—
except that a second answer to the question (‘why consider modes of per-
formance?’) is that performance takes place in this highly interconnected 
and pluralised environment, where we are often witness to (and some-
times party to) different kinds of performance every day and where a cul-
tural slippage across media and types of performance is now routine rather 
than irregular. It is no accident that Elleström developed his model 
expressly for an intermedial situation, with distinct media operating in 
interdependence (Elleström 2010: 12). The field of acting and perfor-
mance lies in a contemporary performance scene that is heavily mediated 
and profoundly plural—not just in the sorts of performance that we see 
but in its varying registers and slippage across forms. Indeed, there has 
been a growing consensus in both communications studies and perfor-
mance studies concerning the mixed and plural nature of the cultural and 
communicative sphere. In Multimodality, for instance, Bateman et  al. 
describe an increasingly interdisciplinary communicative environment, in 
which “we no longer have separate media; we have instead media that are 
capable of doing the jobs of many” (2017: 14). The instances given of this 
include an iPad showing newspaper pages or a website playing music—and 
while these may be more prevalent in some parts of the world than others, 
the acceleration of cross-medial communication is indisputable. 
Performance theorist Shannon Jackson makes a related point from a dif-
ferent disciplinary location, in her discussion of “the hypercontextuality of 
performance”, which she sees as both a condition (performance operates 
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across genealogical fields) but also a challenge (performance is subject to 
dispersal and has an “intensely contingent status”) (Jackson 2004: 6). The 
figure of the actor/performer takes on a more protean form in this envi-
ronment (see, for instance, Dunbar and Harrop 2018: 13). In which case, 
it becomes useful to consider whether there is a common way of calibrat-
ing performance amid such varied and disparate instances.
There are many extant systems for analysing performance. One way of 
taking a perspective on this new project of ‘modal’ analysis is to consider 
the viability of established systems for current performance situations. 
This is not to argue that all the old models must be done away with—far 
from it. Rather, it is a check upon the aesthetic- and context-specific 
aspects of acting/performing systems, which tend to be more adequate 
for some kinds of work than for others. Every system of performance and 
performance analysis is located culturally and has its own specific history. 
To turn first, briefly, to the most celebrated of all (at least, in a modern 
Western context), Konstantin Stanislavski’s system of actor training, devel-
oped over the first part of the twentieth century and consolidated broadly 
between the 1940s and the 1970s. Stanislavski’s ideas had a troubled jour-
ney of transmission into print, subject to delays and editorial partialities. 
His influential volume An Actor Prepares (first published in Russian in 
1936), for example, was described by Jean Benedetti as “a pale shadow” 
of the larger intended oeuvre, An Actor’s Work (Benedetti 1999 [1988]: 
366). The approach and practices that Stanislavski recommended likewise 
enjoyed a mixed journey into different spheres of influence. In An Acrobat 
of the Heart, Stephen Wangh provides a summary of a widely argued his-
torical trajectory, tracing selective strands of Stanislavski’s ‘system’ through 
their migration to other territories. Stanislavski, Wangh suggests,
searched for a method that would depend on inner, psychological practices. 
[…] [He] developed the sense-memory and ‘affective memory’ exercises. It 
was these ‘internal’ techniques that Stanislavski’s students Richard 
Boleslavsky and Maria Ouspenskaya brought from Russia to New York in 
1923. And it was this work that they taught at their American Laboratory 
Theater where Harold Clurman, Stella Adler, and Lee Strasberg came to 
study. (Wangh 2000: xxxiii)
As students of theatre know, this set of practices provided the structure 
and impetus for what would become the American Method system, geared 
around the inner exploration on the part of the actor of the individual and 
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psychological dynamics of the character, drawing extensively on personal 
experience and individual intuition. Meanwhile, as Wangh describes, 
“Stanislavski […] realized that by concentrating so completely on the 
actor’s mind, he had ignored the actor’s body. In his later years Stanislavski 
developed a system of what he called ‘physical actions’” (xxxiv). The dif-
fusion of influence is complicated by way of the inflections made by aco-
lytes, including Michael Chekhov’s work during the 1930s. Chekhov 
(nephew of playwright Anton Chekhov) had been a member of 
Stanislavski’s First Studio and had worked on Stanislavski’s more physi-
cally oriented approach. He disseminated his own adaptation and interpre-
tation of this, focusing on the ‘psychological gesture’, in his work in 
Germany, Lithuania, England and the US. ‘Media products’ associated 
with Stanislavski’s approach, then, are not uniform.
Stanislavski’s teaching had a fraught history in its own right, both in 
terms of its codification through published writings—which took time and 
required extensive editing that Stanislavski himself was only partly involved 
in—and the differing set of understandings that ensued, as the work 
gained traction in different countries and through the work of different 
disciples. I do not mean to unpick that legacy and its differences here (for 
useful discussion, see Carnicke 2009 and Pitches 2006). The larger point 
is that however you nuance it—whether as predominantly concerned with 
internal psychology, the actor’s interior state, or external gesture and the 
physical work of the performer—Stanislavski’s system applies expressly to 
the presentation of character that typically derives from work in relation to 
a playtext. And that simply doesn’t apply to the context, artistic type, 
mode of production, or technical requirement of many instances of per-
formance today. Stanislavski’s system remains useful for the development 
of performance in narrative-based drama in which characters interact 
within a broadly realist aesthetic. It is inadequate as a means by which to 
prepare or explain performance in, for instance, Heiner Müller’s 
Hamletmachine (1977, first presented at the Théâtre Gérard Philipe, 
Paris, France, in 1979) or Punchdrunk’s Sleep No More, the company’s 
site-specific version of Macbeth (presented at the McKittrick Hotel in 
New York from March 2011, and still running as I write)—let alone a 
repertoire of performances in the wider field, including gallery-based 
events, virtual reality projects and postdramatic dance-based pieces. 
Stanislavski’s methods, with their apparatus of ‘magic ifs’, intentions, cir-
cles of attention, and units and objectives, are applicable in some of these 
instances, but not to all and certainly not uniformly.
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The same is true of other systems for producing and analysing perfor-
mance. Let us consider Michael Kirby’s celebrated spectrum (1972) 
describing different modes from acting to performance—an important 
contribution to understanding performance in a gathering postmodern 
context and an account whose attempt to cover a range of performance 
manifestations evinces a not-dissimilar ambition to the present essay. Kirby 
remarks that his work was inspired in particular by the Happenings of the 
early- to mid-1960s, where
every aspect of theatre in this country has changed: scripts have lost their 
importance and performances are created collectively, the physical relation-
ship of audience and performance has been altered in many different ways 
and has been made an inherent part of the piece, audience participation has 
been investigated, ‘found’ spaces rather than theatres have been used for 
performance and several different places employed sequentially for the same 
performance, there has been an increased emphasis on movement and on 
visual imagery. (Kirby 1972: 12)
In response to this situation—which has become a norm in many dif-
ferent locations—Kirby proposed a performance spectrum from ‘non- 
acting’ to ‘acting’, with (for example) ‘Non-matrixed Performing’ at one 
end of the spectrum and ‘Complex Acting’ at the other (Kirby 1972: 8). 
The value of Kirby’s spectrum lies in its attempt both to incorporate and 
distinguish between a wide range of performance activity and its insistence 
that the project is one of classification rather than evaluation (value judge-
ments as to whether the acting is ‘good’ or not, Kirby insists, are irrele-
vant). Its difficulty, however, is that it doesn’t elaborate a set of technical 
calibrations of any degree of subtlety for use by either the critic or the 
performer—rather, it describes the place of a performance on a spectrum 
that is largely determined by the extent to which the individual performer 
can be seen to be engaging in representation-based characterisation, which 
thereby provides a norm against which things are judged. Kirby suggests 
that the “simplest characteristics that define acting […] may be either 
physical or emotional. If the performer does something to simulate, rep-
resent, impersonate and so forth, he is acting” (1972: 6). ‘Acting’ is the 
standard against which other kinds of performance—non-acting—are 
adjudicated.
The spectrum is yet more problematic in relation to contemporary per-
formances where we may well observe ‘acting’ and ‘non-matrixed 
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representation’ in the same performance—as has been the case for over a 
generation, at least. Twenty-five years after Kirby’s “On acting and not- 
acting”, Philip Auslander’s influential collection of essays entitled From 
Acting to Performance was published (1997). Auslander was attempting to 
assess performance in and amid the ascendant paradigm of postmodern-
ism. The New York-based company The Wooster Group provides a refer-
ence point. As Auslander says, “Wooster Group performances […] are less 
representations of an exterior reality than of the relationship of the per-
formers to the circumstances of performance. Their style of performing, 
which at once evokes and critiques conventional acting, could be described 
as performance ‘about’ acting” (1997: 41). Auslander’s essays on this new 
performance scene are perceptive but, as with Kirby, provide a theoretical 
perspective rather than a set of calibrations for use by contemporary per-
formers or that enable precise technical descriptions of contemporary per-
formance. From the 1960s onwards, the incursion of modes of performance 
other than acting has been noted, analysed, and indeed taught. Can we 
conceive of a rubric for this extensive diversity of performance that might 
help us to place it, critique it and teach it by way of a single continuum of 
analysis?
One further brief detour, by way of a partial affirmative. In 1928, 
Rudolf Laban published Kinetographie Laban, which set out the basis for 
‘Labanotation’, his system for describing and classifying human move-
ment. Laban describes four categories: Body, Shape, Space and Effort 
(Dynamics). These key components can be organised by way of eight 
efforts (as outlined below) that each has four components: Space/Focus 
(Direct or Indirect), Time (Quick or Sustained), Weight (Heavy or Light) 
and Flow (Bound or Free). The system is represented in tabular form in 
Table 3.1.
Laban’s system addresses human movement, so while it has proved to 
be consistently useful for actors and performers, it cannot provide a com-
prehensive means of classifying performance activity. You might also sug-
gest that this modernist effort at exhaustive categorisation is in any case 
now inappropriate to the mixed and messy, hybrid and fluid scene of con-
temporary performance. The task before us is to outline a scheme that 
allows for close analysis of a wide range of instances and that recognises 
variety within a system designed to accommodate difference. Allow me to 
attempt just such an effort in a post-postmodern moment, based on a 
reworking of Elleström’s modalities and modes. As we saw above, 
Elleström described the relation between modes and modalities in tabular 
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form, and I propose to retain this schematic approach in the section that 
follows—noting in passing that it provides a means of calibrating interrela-
tions between components that is not entirely dissimilar to Laban’s system 
outlining categories of movement and their respective modal expressions.
The challenge, then, is whether we can elaborate a scheme for analysing 
performance that is adequate to a range of contemporary performance 
acts. I am aware of the dangers, for any system that seeks to be widely 
inclusive may then appear to be context-free (so apolitical) and only 
vaguely specific (so inappropriate for a detailed analysis). I would prefer a 
cultural materialist approach that accommodates local specificity within a 
common scheme, one that seeks to provide a useful tool for analysis of 
apparently diverse objects of performance. The effort is not to reduce 
everything to a single paradigm but to move towards a system that is suf-
ficiently flexible to recognise new forms and combinations whilst both 
allowing and accounting for their differences.
3.3  Modes and Modalities of PerforMance
Elleström describes four key modalities that provide the underpinning 
skeleton upon which any media product is conveyed. As we have seen, 
these can be represented schematically, along with the respective modes 
that attach to the modalities (see Elleström 2010: 36). I do not propose a 
direct reading of the work of the performer by way of Elleström’s four 
modalities—although such a reading would be possible, allowing that the 
Table 3.1 Rudolf Laban’s eight efforts of movement and their four components 
(the system is tabulated in various forms; the one given here is from Espeland 2015)
Direction Speed Weight Flow
Punch Direct Quick Heavy Bound
Slash Indirect Quick Heavy Free
Dab Direct Quick Light Bound
Flick Indirect Quick Light Free
Press Direct Sustained Heavy Bound
Wring Indirect Sustained Heavy Bound
Glide Direct Sustained Light Free
Float Indirect Sustained Light Free
Source: Todd Espeland, The Drama Teacher, 2015; used by permission from Theatrefolk Inc
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actor herself is a medium of communication. Rather, I suggest that we can 
identify four key modalities that apply to any human act of performance, 
taking performance here in its presentational/representational aspect—
what Jon McKenzie describes as ‘cultural performance’ rather than ‘orga-
nizational performance’ or ‘technical performance’ (McKenzie 2001). In 
other words, we are concerned with the scope of performance that in 
Kirby’s spectrum moves from character-based acting through to non- 
matrixed performance—but we are looking for a set of coordinates to help 
describe the composition and effect of each sort of performance before us.
The notion of modalities of performance provides us with such coordi-
nates. We can assign four key modalities: the emotional, the physical, the 
discursive and the contextual (these are further defined in Table 3.2). Each 
can be addressed in relation to specific modes that apply to the modality—
some one or more of which will be present in the performance modality in 
question. All four modalities will be describable in any performance act, 
even if one or more are not predominant. The flexibility and plural poten-
tial combinations mean that the system of analysis can be applied to a wide 
range of performance instances. You might protest that this is like creating 
a map of the world that is as large as the world, if it allows for any and all 
possible performance—except that this is a portmanteau scheme. The four 
modalities are always structurally defining in some manner, their intercon-
nection and combination variable, the specific arrangement of modes 
flexible.
In Elleström’s table, the modalities of media are accompanied by 
respective modes that apply to the modalities. It is worth noting that 
Elleström has removed the table from the extended version of the article 
presented in the present publication (2020). In correspondence during 
the editing process, he suggested that this was “not at all because I think 
it’s wrong as such to use such a table, but because it prompted some sim-
plified and misleading uses of the concept of media modalities”. Informed 
by Elleström’s model—but mindful of his caution—we can outline some-
thing similar in relation to modalities and modes of performance, as seen 
in Table 3.2.
I should emphasise that the model is presented initially as a way of read-
ing and categorising performance. It may subsequently inform ways of 
preparing for and producing performance—it would certainly be possible 
to conceive a range of exercises and rehearsal-room approaches that focus 
on a modal approach to the work in hand, in order to fine-tune presenta-
tion within a particular modality and interrelations between modes. This 
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Table 3.2 Modalities of performance (Lavender, after Elleström 2010: 36)
Modality What the modality is Modes include Applications include
Emotional The apparent emotional 
state of the performer 
and/or character/
persona (bearing in 
mind that the actual 
emotional state of the 
performer may be 


















Particularly relevant to 
character-based acting. Can 
be important to some 
performance art 
manifestations, especially 
where the focus is on the 
lived experience and 
present state of the 
performer
Physical The physical disposition 
of the performer, 
comprised of bearing, 
gesture, movement and 
corporeal interaction 













All forms of performance, 
but especially to the fore in 
dance, circus, promenade 
pieces and other forms in 
which physical registers 
predominate
Discursive The functional aspect 
of the performer in 
relation to the 

















Of varied relevance, with 
diverse registers from an 






is not my immediate priority in the present essay, where I am approaching 
performance as a critic after the act, rather than from the perspective of an 
actor or director of the act. That said, the two perspectives are by no 
means irreconcilable, and the work of developing a modal approach to 
performer training could be highly productive.
We can tabulate the relationship between modalities and modes as seen 
in Table 3.3. The modalities operate in relation to the perceiver. That is to 
say, for example, the emotional modality is relevant insofar as the emo-
tional state presented by the performer is ascribed by the perceiver. It mat-
ters less what the actual emotional state of the performer is (although this 
may also be relevant). If a character played by an actor, for example, 
appears morose, the emotional condition of the actor herself is a second- 
order concern. The first-order concerns are the suitability of the apparent 
emotional state to the material in hand and (for this is not quite the same 
thing) the effect (potentially both in cognition and affect) of the apparent 
emotional state on the perceiver.
The physical modality likewise may involve techniques of performance 
that separate the appearance of physical effort from the actual physical 
effort of the performer (for example, being breathless after running may 
Table 3.2 (continued)
Modality What the modality is Modes include Applications include
Contextual The predominant 
context in which the 
performer appears, 
particularly in relation 
to ways in which the 
performance will be 
understood beyond its 
immediate emotional, 
physical and narrational 
modalities; the 
signifying and/or 
affective social, cultural 
or aesthetic structures 












More notably to the fore in 
some dance pieces, 
installations and site-
specific events. Particularly 
relevant in pieces that 
feature audience/spectator 
participation or action
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belong to the character rather than the actor). A range of techniques are 
employed in drama schools across the world to help performers demon-
strate subtlety and range within emotional and physical modalities. The 
point of the system presented here is to delineate how the modes of these 
modalities might be read in the performance act.
The discursive modality is to do with the meaning and significance that 
the spectator ascribes to the performance that is presented. This will 
depend upon additional information presented by (for example) other 
characters/performers in the piece, the arrangement of narrative, and sce-
nic organisation such as, for instance, the configuration of lighting to cre-
ate a threatening environment. The performer herself does not necessarily 
produce the communicative material that circulates here, but her perfor-
mance is inextricably bound up with it and is enmeshed in a meaning- 
repertoire such that every instance of her performance is readable in and 
through the discursive modality. This applies even in more abstract pieces, 
where story is not at issue but nonetheless figurings of performance 
dynamics produce information for the spectator.
Something similar applies in relation to the contextual modality. For 
example, it matters to some members of the audience who go to see 
Benedict Cumberbatch playing Hamlet that Cumberbatch is a film star 
whose performances carry their trace in the memories of the spectator. It 
matters to some to see a ‘first night’, which comes with the added frisson 
of performers under the pressure of press night, or the sense of being 
among the first to witness a new piece. It matters to some to see a perfor-
mance at a specific venue (one of my pilgrimages of a kind was to the 
Theater am Schiffbauerdamm in Berlin). It matters to some that the 
Table 3.3 Relationship between performance modalities and modes
Modality Modes include
Emotional Disengaged/unemotional, Focused/task-oriented, Bored, Disinterested, 
Distracted, Mildly engaged, Affectionate, Happy, Delighted, Concerned, 
Angry, Sad, Grieving
Physical Active, Reactive, Passive, Fast, Slow, Laboured, Elegant, Constrained, 
Uninhibited, Tense, Relaxed
Discursive Informational, Explanatory, Revelatory, Knowing, Naïve, Contextual 
(triangulated), Authoritative, Innocent
Contextual Scenographic, Compositional, Presentational, Representational, 
Environmental, Relational, Interrelational, Affirmative, Distractive
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performer is one’s daughter in a school play. If the discursive modality 
describes signifying details and meaning-ensembles that are generated by 
or presented within the performance itself, the contextual modality 
describes significant circumstances and situational details surrounding the 
performance that may have a bearing for perceivers.
In order to explore how the modalities and modes might be deployed, 
I will examine briefly four diverse instances: a performance by the actor 
Olivia Colman in the film The Favourite (character-based acting working 
from text); an excerpt from the opening scene of debbie tucker-green’s 
play ear for eye (a theatre performance that is text-based but without the 
sense of character depth that is entailed by more narrative-based drama); 
the appearance of the pop star Miley Cyrus in the episode of the Netflix 
drama series Black Mirror entitled ‘Rachel, Jack and Ashley Too’—Cyrus 
plays an intertextual version of herself as before-the-camera pop star in a 
narrative in which she is behind-the-scenes victim of her own celebrity; 
and the appearance of performers in Brett Bailey’s installation Sanctuary. 
The selection deliberately moves across different sorts of characterisation, 
different dramatic genres and distinct modes of presentation. With all the 
analyses that follow, I will restrict myself to a fairly limited palette of 
modes, in order to suggest predominant features.
3.3.1  The Favourite (2018)
Written by Deborah Davis and Tony McNamara, produced by Fox 
Searchlight and directed by Yorgos Lanthimos, The Favourite is a movie 
set in 1708 and thereafter in the Court of Queen Anne, monarch of a 
newly unified Great Britain. It focuses on the triangular relationships 
between Anne and the cousins Sarah Churchill, Duchess of Marlborough, 
and Abigail Hill (later Baroness Masham), depicting a rivalry between the 
two women for Anne’s favour. As such, the film is both a period drama 
and a character study, exploring in particular the interpersonal dynamics 
between the three women: Olivia Colman, who played Anne, won the 
Academy Award (Oscar), BAFTA Award and Golden Globe Award 
(among others) for best actress for her performance in this role.
The scene that I focus on here is between Anne and Abigail (played by 
Emma Stone). Anne is presented as a tetchy and capricious monarch 
afflicted with physical ailments (she notably had gout) and emotional vul-
nerabilities that are in part ascribed to her loss of seventeen children in or 
close to childbirth. She has seventeen pet rabbits, one for each child, and 
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the scene shows Abigail manoeuvring her way into the Queen’s attention 
and affection by way of her interest in this peculiar colony, housed in the 
Queen’s bedchamber.1 The modal analysis in Table  3.4 is geared to 
Colman’s performance—we could undertake something similar for 
Stone’s performance, but for the sake of concision, we will focus 
on Colman.
The larger part of Colman’s work in this scene, I suggest, is in the emo-
tional modality. She conveys a range that moves from being bored with 
having rather too much time on her hands, to having her interest pricked 
by questions concerning the pets—reinforced, we understand, by Abigail’s 
presumed empathy at the loss of her children, which opens into a reading 
of the character of Anne as defined by sustained and partly repressed grief. 
The emotional registers here are conveyed in part physically—alterations 
of eyeline, tilts of the head, flashes of the eye and so forth—along with a 
rhythm to the performance that evokes its emotional throughline. Colman 
presents the queen precisely as a regal figure, with a characteristic physical-
ity to do with monarchical sway and inherited position, but also suffused 
with individual attributes derived from illness, age and circumstance. 
There is, too, the particular reading of persona in which the actor’s deport-


















Table 3.4 Modal analysis of 
Olivia Colman’s performance 




The ‘contextual’ modality is differently pertinent. The film is based on 
historical circumstances, so there is inevitably a negotiation in the viewer’s 
mind concerning the balance between an envisaged actuality and the con-
ventions and tactics of dramatization. Colman’s appearance as the lead 
character in an international movie means that we read the performance in 
relation to conventions and comparators pertaining to Hollywood movies, 
and not least the trajectory provided by female leads in films dealing with 
similar monarchical topics: Judi Dench as Queen Victoria in Mrs Brown 
(1994) and Victoria and Abdul (2017), Cate Blanchett in Elizabeth 
(1998) or Helen Mirren in the mini-series Elizabeth I (2005), for instance. 
We may also bring to the movie foreknowledge of previous performances 
by Colman, Stone and Rachel Weisz (who plays Sarah Churchill), so that 
the performance mode is coloured by relationality arising from other 
screen appearances in the lineage of each particular actor.
3.3.2  ear for eye (2018)
ear for eye is a play by the British playwright debbie tucker green (who 
prefers the lower case for her name and the titles of her works). Its inau-
gural production opened on 31 October 2018 at the Royal Court Theatre 
in London with tucker green as director. The play is in three parts. The 
first focuses on exchanges between small groups of characters, specified as 
African Americans or Black British—for example, a son and his parents, 
and an activist and an older mentor. The second focuses on a discussion 
(in part about a mass shooting in the US) between a white male academic 
and a black female student. The third presents filmed segments in which 
Caucasian individuals in friendship or family groups recount, verbatim, 
protocols from the Jim Crow laws affirming racial segregation in the US, 
and British and French slave codes. The play as a whole, then, presents a 
series of scenes and sequences in which characters (none of whom we get 
to know in any close or detailed way) discuss or negotiate nuances of inter-
relation with others, particularly elaborating on racial perspectives and 
prejudices and individuals unpack historic and schematic constructions of 
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African Americans.
SON        So if I put my hands up—
MOM        A threat, threatening.
SON        Slowly?
MOM        Provocative.
SON        Showed my palms
MOM        inflammatory. Could be.
SON        … (If I) raised my hands just to—
MOM        no
SON        to just—
MOM        no
SON        but
MOM        aggression
SON        but just to show that they’re—
MOM        an act of/aggression
SON        that I’m—
MOM        that won’t work, that doesn’t work Son.
               SON thinks.
SON        If I left them down
MOM        Belligerent?
SON        By my side—?
MOM        Attitude.
(tucker green 2018: 4; the excerpt from ear for eye by debbie tucker 
green is reprinted courtesy of Nick Hern Books www.nickhernbooks.co.uk)
Given the stage direction—mother and son are African Americans in 
the US—we understand the scene in the context of race relations in the 
US but also more generally. It becomes clear in the scene that from the 
mother’s perspective there is no physical attitude on the part of her son 
that could not be construed as threatening or provocative by a (presumed 
white) policeman who chose to interpret his posture in this way. How 
might we describe the performance envisaged by this text (see Table 3.5)?
The modes calibrate differently depending on which performer we 
observe, although the scene as a whole can be characterised in relation to 
the attributes above. In terms of the emotional modality, the scene depends 
on our understanding that the mother is concerned for the safety of her 
son, while he becomes angry at the lengths to which he has to go to avoid 
her (or an imagined other’s) ascription of threat. In the physical modality, 
both characters are gesturally reactive in response to utterances of their 
interlocutor, and the physicality of the scene is generally tense and held, 
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rather than, say, relaxed and fluid. Discursively, the scene (as with the play 
as a whole) does not follow key characters in order to tell a story, but 
rather presents a nugget of exchange that thematises the lived experience 
of black people amid racism; hence the work of the performers is informa-
tional and expressly requires that we read the scene metatextually as an 
emblem of black experience in the face of oppressive social and civic 
authority structures. Contextually, the performance provides aesthetic 
pleasure through the jagged, schematic and non-naturalistic dialogue, 
thereby asking spectators to recognise it as overtly compositional, while 
simultaneously it invites recognition of the larger social situation that it 
depicts, so that the performers’ bodies are literally representational—rep-
resenting (through a set of transparent dramatic devices) the perspective 
of black citizens—and intertextual in calling to mind the Rodney King 
beating and other instances of racially motivated police aggression.
The modes and modalities are not entirely self-contained—the intertex-
tual designation, for example, could also belong to the ‘discursive’ modal-
ity. Modes within modalities may vary for individual spectators. For 
example, the ‘contextual’ modality might contain aspects of meaning that 
arise from watching a performance at the Royal Court Theatre, which may 
be different for a serial visitor interested in ‘new writing’ (the theatre’s 
programming focus) than for a first-time visitor interested specifically in 
the topic of the play. Whilst we should be careful to acknowledge that 















Table 3.5 Modal analysis of 
performance in an excerpt 
from ear for eye
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reception can vary widely, the modal ensemble allows us to be reasonably 
precise in categorising the operation of performance in this piece as 
distinct from other sorts of performance in other situations.
3.3.3  Black Mirror—‘Rachel, Jack and Ashley Too’ (2019)
Black Mirror is a dystopian science fiction series created by Charlie 
Brooker. Its first two series were broadcast by Channel Four in the UK 
(the first episode aired on 11 December 2011), before the programme was 
bought by the video streaming service Netflix. Each episode is self- 
contained, typically telling a story with a twist or playing out the envisaged 
logical conclusions of a future development of contemporary technol-
ogy—the programme is largely geared around the interface between 
human agency or insufficiency in relation to the imagined use or exploita-
tion of technology. The episode that I consider here, entitled ‘Rachel, Jack 
and Ashley Too’ (directed by Anne Sewitsky), was released as part of 
Season Five on Netflix and first aired on 5 June 2019. It brings two paral-
lel storylines together. Ashley O, played by Miley Cyrus, is a pop star (like 
Cyrus in real life). Ashley’s management team develops a small robotic toy 
doll that can interact (largely by talking in a motivational and saccharine 
way) with its owner. When Ashley starts to rebel against her controlling 
manager, she is incarcerated. Meanwhile the teenage Rachel (played by 
Angourie Rice), an Ashley fan, receives one of the dolls as a present. After 
a device malfunction, the doll speaks not in marketing platitudes but with 
the ‘authentic’ voice of the incarcerated star. Various adventures of libera-
tion follow.2 In Table 3.6 I suggest some of the predominant modes of 
Cyrus’s performance across the piece as a whole.
‘Rachel, Jack and Ashley Too’ is inherently multimodal, in the interme-
dial sense, in that it features pop performance by Ashley alongside scenes 
showing her being interviewed on television and ‘actuality’ scenes out of 
the eye of any diegetic camera. This makes Cyrus’s performance as a whole 
more complex than might be the case in a less modally diverse format. 
There is—as we might expect—a wide range of modes in the physical 
modality, covering Ashley’s performance as a singer, her appearance as 
‘pop star’ and the more private (and in places comically vulgar) behaviour 
of the character in a domestic setting. The discursive aspect of Cyrus’s 
performance is not the least complicated part of this piece. Functionally, it 
reveals plot information; operates across generic registers while indicating 
a witting manifestation of these registers; presents a character who does 
not know what is happening to her and who seizes the initiative in a way 
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that resonates with feminist and #MeToo discourse. Contextually, the 
episode gains traction precisely for the casting of a music star in role as a 
music star within a dark narrative of exploitation. Meanwhile Cyrus 
performs a set of modal negotiations (of pop iconicity, trauma, liberation 
narrative and postmodern intertext) within a single drama—a black mir-
ror indeed.
3.3.4  Sanctuary (2017)
Conceived and directed by South African artist Brett Bailey and presented 
by Third World Bunfight, Sanctuary was first presented at the Fast 
Forward Festival in Athens on 3 May 2017.3 I visited the installation on 9 
June 2017 at the Theater der Welt Festival in Hamburg, Germany, and 
write about it in Lavender (2019: 57–59). Sanctuary is an installation for 
spectators to walk through. It creates the figure of a maze—the myth of 
the minotaur is invoked—as the holding pattern for a series of ‘stations’, 
Table 3.6 Modal analysis of Miley Cyrus’s performance in Black Mirror—
Rachel, Jack and Ashley Too
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each of which features a performer playing a fictional character presented 
as if actual. The performers do not speak and barely perform any physical 
action, instead simply sitting or standing in situ, so the human figures here 
are not so much characterised as displayed. Accompanying segments of 
text give us to understand that, for example, one character is ‘Mahmoud, 
36, dress shop owner’ and another is a 23-year-old make-up artist. All are 
connected by the theme of migration and immigration, and they variously 
inhabit their stations amid scenographic devices (fences, police tape, 
orange life jackets) that evoke the holding pens and arrival centres of the 
contemporary refugee situation. How might we categorise the work of 
performance in this piece (see Table 3.7)?
The performance of the human figures is modally limited, strikingly so, 
particularly in the emotional and physical modalities. That is not to say 
that it is less important to the effect of Sanctuary than the performance in 
our previous instances. It attains its potency through the discursive and 
contextual modalities, as we read into it a set of circumstances and histo-
ries that are geographically specific while also responding to the larger 
civic and political crisis of migration (amid systemic failure on the part of 
nation states to find an adequate set of responses). You might argue that 
























modality—such as scenographic, compositional, presentational—are open- 
ended and would apply to any kind of performance. I do not necessarily 
disagree, but the point is that these modes come to the fore, and the perfor-
mance thereby attains its distinctness through the specific use of the figure 
as a symbolic scenographic presence rather than, as with two of my previ-
ous examples, a (so to say) fleshed out character. The environmental and 
relational aspects of the piece partly concern its figurings of actuality and 
fiction, both thematically (it draws on actual instances of migration, even 
if it alters these within the fictional scenarios of the event) and by way of 
the audience’s encounter, navigating an actual space which is also designed 
as a fictive labyrinth. In many ways, Sanctuary is a good example of what 
Mark Crossley describes as work that is “both distinctly fictional and real” 
and as “hypermediated theatrical signification” (Crossley 2020: 104).
Sanctuary does not feature character-based or narrative-driven perfor-
mance, so it is useful here in helping to delineate the scope of a modal 
approach. In her contribution to the present publication, Kate Newell 
considers how adaptations of Margaret Atwood’s The Handmaid’s Tale—
and in particular accompanying graphic representations such as cover art 
and illustrations—shape particular responses to the material. As she sug-
gests, “each adaptation foregrounds certain modalities to lead perceivers 
toward particular interpretations of the communication transfer” (2020: 
36). Whilst I have transposed modalities from those outlined by Elleström, 
a similar principle applies, in that the foregrounding of specific modes 
within the modalities of performance leads spectators towards particular 
interpretations. The issue is not that any particular mode is unique or 
requires definition in an entirely bespoke way in relation to the perfor-
mance in view. Rather, it is that the modal ensemble defines the perfor-
mance, and a modal analysis provides insights as to how this ensemble is 
prepared and presented.
3.4  towards a MultiModal PerforMance analysis
Elleström suggests that
Every medium consists of a fusion of modes that are partly, and in different 
degrees of palpability, shared by other media. […] Since the world, or rather 
our perception and conception of the world, is utterly multimodal, all media 
are more or less multimodal on the level of at least some of the four modali-
ties. (2010: 24)
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If we transpose this to a consideration of modes and modalities of 
performing, the shared principle is that in performance acts we also 
observe a fusion of modes, to different degrees, where performance is 
multimodal with respect to interrelating modes across the four modalities 
(emotional, physical, discursive and contextual). A focus on modes and 
modalities allows us to set aside questions about the psychology of charac-
ters or the interior drives of actors, in favour of a more interrelational 
exploration of actions, interactions and conveyances of communicative 
information. It provides a way of calibrating—either in advance (for training, 
rehearsal, preparation) or after the event (by way of analysis and critical 
review)—the constitutive features of any particular performance act.
I have presented here a speculative set of starting points, both as a form 
of analysis and as a potential set of coordinates for performance prepara-
tion. A next step would be to test this in workshop and rehearsal situa-
tions, with actors and performers preparing work for public presentation. 
Might performance be helped, or changed, if the performer pays attention 
to the respective modalities? Might it take on different nuances if the per-
former explores the relevant fusion of modes and how the multimodal 
dynamic shifts as the performance moves along? This is for fresh explora-
tion. We can pause meanwhile at the observation of Bateman et al. that 
“Modes presented together then need to be interpreted with respect to 
one another and so cannot be considered independently” (2017: 17). A 
multimodal approach to performance requires this critical disposition, for 
the performers in front of us present a complex set of communicative pos-
sibilities. They are a channel for intracommunicational elements within the 
world of the drama or performance event; they operate in relation to 
extracommunicational features derived from our knowledge of the world; 
and they are phenomenal figures in their own right, summoning and shap-
ing a communicative repertoire that is inherently multimodal.
notes
1. The scene can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=pG22rNMENSg (accessed 2 September 2019).
2. A trailer for the episode can be viewed at https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=OY-uKFw4dZM (accessed 2 September 2019).
3. For details, see https://www.onassis.org/whats-on/fast-forward-festi-
val-4/fff4-sanctuary. A trailer for the piece is at https://vimeo.
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4.1  ScreenS and FrameworkS
Examining phenomena of intermediality (with)in moving images requires 
supplementary methods imposed by the current post-digital era that “no 
longer seeks technical innovation or improvement, but considers digitiza-
tion something that already happened and can be played with” (Cramer 
A. Virginás (*) 
Sapientia University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania
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2013). Besides the most basic substratum of media history and/or philo-
sophical aesthetic theory—as introduced by Paech (2011), Petho ̋ (2011) 
and Bruhn and Gjelsvik (2018) in the analysis of filmic intermediality—
insights from semiotics, communication theory and narratology need to 
be invoked and combined systematically. Media history and philosophical 
aesthetics allow for cataloguing the cases of twenty-first-century commu-
nication technological and media cultural developments being incorpo-
rated, with a relative easiness and rapidity, by filmic diegesis1 originally 
formatted for the analogue platform. It is of the latter process that Joachim 
Paech wrote in the early 2010s that “[w]e shall see what happens with the 
intermediality of film in those new media surroundings where film cannot 
be distinguished any more from what it is not” (2011: 19). Trying to 
answer this question, descriptions of cases of intermediality in/of film 
need to be complemented with a communication and media theoretical 
meta-framework which I outline here. Thus, a space may be configured 
where the poetic methods generated by the relatively quick transforma-
tions along ‘the analogue to the digital to the post-digital’ axis may be 
conceptualized and structured, simultaneously accounting for the extraor-
dinary ‘multimodal heteromediality’ of the cinematic medium (cf. 
Elleström 2020: 73–75).
Theorizing the specific condition of moving images in the post-digital 
era Thomas Elsaesser envisages a formation that “does not project itself as 
a window on the world nor requires fixed boundaries of space like a 
frame”, but “it functions as an ambient form of spectacle and event, where 
no clear spatial divisions between inside and outside pertain” (Elsaesser 
2016: 133). In a similar vein, and based on the analysis of moving-image 
art installations in the twenty-first century—among them Pipilotti Rist’s 
Layers Mama Layers from 2010—Giuliana Bruno observes that “We no 
longer face or confront a screen only frontally but rather are immersed in 
an environment of screens” (Bruno 2014: 102). Rist’s 2007 installation 
Dawn Hours in the Neighbour’s House definitely fits Bruno’s description of 
the process “where one becomes an integral part of a pervasive screen 
environment in which it is no longer preferable or even possible to be 
positioned in front of the work” (Bruno 2014: 102). From the window-
panes of the terrace, on to the plasma TV screen, through the floor and 
the edge covers of the books on the shelf in Dawn Hours every element 
functions as a screen that lights up and then fades in the dark, creating a 
“a fluid, haptic world of surrounding screens” (Bruno 2014: 102).2
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The argumentation of this chapter starts from the observation that it is 
possible to isolate an intermediary screen(ic) formation that may be situ-
ated somewhere amongst analogue photographic cinema shown on a fixed 
(canvas) screen that necessitates a fixed spectator; Elsaesser’s post- 
photographic, possibly digital cinema without clearly fixed, window-like 
boundaries and finally Bruno’s surround screen environments that are 
fully immersive. This intermediary screenic formation may be described as 
the narratively significant embedding of electronic screens in film diegetic 
worlds designed for vertical cinematic screens—be they fixed analogue or 
mobile digital ones. It may be exemplified with television sets that the 
characters watch, with computers or mobile phones used by characters in 
action, or indeed CCTV cameras that convey unusual angles on otherwise 
well-known diegetic spaces. While the filmic narrative which embeds elec-
tronic screens to the extent that even “multiple diegetic worlds” (Elsaesser 
2016: 69) may be generated was already present in the television and 
video era, our post-digital age and its givens of digital image-making, 
image-processing and image-display have led to its enhanced proliferation. 
Analysing the proposed intermediary screenic formation will constitute 
the discussion part of the chapter, governed by the hypothesis that its fea-
tures are most adequately understood in the above sketched multidisci-
plinary framework, that is therefore demonstrated to be a suitable one to 
examine the changes in phenomena of intermediality pertaining to film 
“in those new media surroundings where film cannot be distinguished any 
more from what it is not” (Paech 2011: 19).
The framework of philosophical aesthetics allows us to observe that 
such embedded electronic screens tend to be neutralized as pro-, or even 
afilmic objects,3 which are there to emanate Roland Barthes’ “effect of the 
real” (1968).4 In this capacity, these intermediary screenic formations mir-
ror the numeric increase of electronic digital screens as conditioned by the 
technological changes along the turn of the twenty-first century. 
Furthermore, and as suggested by Roger Odin’s observation, such elec-
tronic screens are understood as frames that aestheticize, and also re-order 
levels of reality (2016: 183). This aspect is also supported by my analyses 
of such electronic screens in Euro-American arthouse films that create 
Second Cinema-type filmic diegeses adhering to conventions of (hyper)
realism, non-hypermediation and character-centred storytelling (Virginás 
2018). These screens also focus, in a hypnotic manner, the viewers’ atten-
tion, as Dominique Chateau so convincingly argues (2016: 197). Finally, 
thanks to what Jacques Derrida names “the labour of the frame”, such 
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embedded electronic screens “[labour] (travaille) indeed [and generate a] 
structurally bordered origin of surplus value, overflowed (debordée) on 
these two borders by what it overflows, it gives (travaille) indeed” (Derrida 
1987: 75). While these observations definitely may be invoked to charac-
terize diegetic electronic screens that introduce frames and edges in the 
diegetic worlds as constitutive backgrounds, they can be used, with the 
same validity, to describe paintings or photographs hung on film diegetic 
walls too.5 In order to account for the medium specificity/ies involved in 
constructions that involve electronic screens in the process of building the 
film diegetic world, semiotics and its offshoot, communication and media 
theory are to be invoked.
Lars Elleström’s “The Modalities of Media II” (2020) offers itself as an 
adequate framework in this respect due to its multi-level design, its multi- 
angle medium sensitivity6 and its reckoning with historical change. In a 
draft of his contribution to the present publication, Jørgen Bruhn identi-
fies “the model’s main strength” as “encompass[ing] all imaginable mate-
rial units that enables communicative interaction”, thus “cut[ting] through 
the oft repeated discussions whether it is the canvas or the motif of an oil 
painting that is the ‘medium’ or whether a mobile phone is a medium or 
a technical device” (2020). Its adequacy is also signalled by Bruhn and 
Gjelsvik’s building on it in their recent Cinema Between Media: An 
Intermediality Approach (2018) or indeed by the successful application of 
the media modalities model to the examination of moving images by 
authors in the present publication (Crossley 2020; Lavender 2020; Lutas 
2020; Newell 2020; Simonson 2020; Tseng 2020). Obviously, the appli-
cation of any model also involves its testing on fuzzier cases, thus extend-
ing its validity, or, conversely, suggesting its limitations and a number of 
such adjustments must be signalled already at the outset of the present 
examination. The scope of the current endeavour is definitely broader 
than the basic entity of analysis in Elleström’s media theory, constituted by 
“the transfer of cognitive import from a producer’s to a perceiver’s mind” 
through “the intermediate stage” named “media product” (Elleström 
2020: 13). At least two ways must be mentioned in this respect: the higher 
number of producer and perceiver minds as well as the complexity of the 
media products themselves involved in film(ic) communication which is 
dependent on interlaid electronic screens.
The fundamental importance of the first aspect—namely, that “the 
minds of scriptwriters, directors, actors and many others combine to cre-
ate the motion picture, [while] the audience consists of a multitude of 
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perceiving minds” (Elleström 2020: 25)—must be acknowledged, even if 
it is only fleetingly touched upon in this analysis. Second, the complexity 
of the media products involved in the current examination means that 
“transfers of cognitive import” need to be accounted for. The “clusters of 
media products” or “media types” (54) are conceived of as “realized by 
either bodily or non-bodily matter” (35) and ultimately shown to be 
dependent upon “technical media of display” for their realization (35). 
The electronic screens present in film diegetic worlds could be easily over-
looked as the “technical media of display” par excellence, or indeed simply 
categorized as metaleptic devices allowing for the change of narrative lev-
els,7 at the same time contributing to creating the filmic diegesis and con-
sequently forming a part of the filmic medium.
Thanks to Elleström’s model, a more detailed scrutiny of these forma-
tions becomes possible, and in order to proceed in this direction, Sect. 4.2 
is devoted to characterizing diegetic electronic screens as “basic media 
types”, which are defined as the combination of four “media modality 
modes” (Elleström 2020: 55–58): “at least one material mode (as, say, a 
solid or non-solid object), at least one spatiotemporal mode (as three- 
dimensionally spatial and/or temporal), at least one sensorial mode (as 
visual, auditory or audiovisual) and at least one semiotic mode (as mainly 
iconic, indexical or symbolic)” (Elleström 2020: 46). My specific task in 
this respect is in many ways similar to how Mark Crossley examines theatre 
performances with the aim of “establishing the significance of the spatio-
temporal and sensorial modalities, alongside the material modality, in real-
ising the hypermedium and to shed greater light on what this specific 
hybridised theatrical signification may look like and what it may accom-
plish” (Crossley 2020: 109).
Though the mentioned four modality modes are evidently interrelated,8 
applying this grid to the specific case of electronic screens embedded in 
film diegetic worlds highlighted the strong interdependence of the mate-
rial and the spatiotemporal modes, as well as the chain-reaction triggered 
in all the four modality modes by one of the modes being changed. These 
changes in the modality modes of electronic screens may be demonstrated 
to have a connection to the ‘analogue to digital to post-digital’ platform 
and paradigm changes, especially since the media modalities model also 
includes historical change through the differentiation between “basic” and 
“qualified media types” (Elleström 2020: 54–66). Thus, Sect. 4.3 in the 
present study will focus on the embedded electronic screens’ “qualifying 
aspects” in order to offer a historically grounded characterization.9
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The proliferation of television screens, video monitors, computer or 
mobile screens (with)in film diegetic worlds is an apparently simple 
numeric increase of certain objects within the filmed space, a phenomenon 
conditioned by, and thus mirroring technological changes during the 
twentieth and twenty-first centuries. According to the main argument of 
this chapter, this intermediary screenic formation should be considered a 
dense, complex and versatile audiovisual and narrative method that could 
have emerged only in our current post-digital era. With the aim of fine- 
tuning the model of media functioning presented in “The Modalities of 
Media II” (Elleström 2020) for this specific phenomenon, while simulta-
neously hoping to achieve a systematic description of electronic screens in 
film diegetic worlds, Sect. 4.4 will aim for a description of the intermedial 
processes at work in such examples.
4.2  diegetic electronic ScreenS aS “BaSic 
media typeS”
Media products and their ensuing communicative effects are characterized 
by three such modalities—the “material”, the “spatiotemporal” and the 
“sensorial”—that are considered “presemiotic”, as compared to the 
fourth, “semiotic” modality (Elleström 2020: 41–54). While the author 
stresses that all four modalities are equally relevant, the semiotic modality 
is seen to somehow sustain all the others since “if the sensory configura-
tions with material, spatiotemporal and sensorial properties do not repre-
sent anything, they have no communicative function, which means that 
there is no media product and no virtual sphere in the perceiver’s mind” 
(Elleström 2020: 49). In line with this observation, we can conceive of the 
electronic screens in film diegetic worlds as always being—partially or 
fully—within the semiotic modality. The content that these inlaid elec-
tronic screens display might be graphs, texts, videos, television pro-
grammes and, evidently, other films: thus all the three semiotic modes 
(iconic, indexic and symbolic) might characterize their functioning in 
communicative situations. However, as the diegetic electronic screens are 
par excellence “technical media of display” as well, a more precise descrip-
tion of the process along which the three presemiotic modalities morph 
into the semiotic one becomes possible. Hence, after a description of 
embedded electronic screens from the perspective of the presemiotic 
modality modes, a focus on how these screens assume their semiotic 
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modality modes within the diegetic worlds will be discussed in the next 
subsection.
4.2.1  Changes in the Material, the Sensorial 
and the Spatiotemporal Modality Modes of Diegetic 
Electronic Screens
The (electronic) screens that I deal with are generally solid as for their 
material modality and are made of inorganic canvas, plastic, steel or glass. 
Very diverse examples fitting the above characterization may be cited: a 
televisual screenic image watched by the main protagonists and showing 
an undressing Bette Davis in Joseph L. Mankiewicz’s 1950’s All About 
Eve as embedded in the credit sequence of Pedro Almodóvar’s 1999 All 
About My Mother. The final ‘love or death’ duel from Billy Wilder’s 1944 
Double Indemnity appears in a somewhat similar manner in Brian de 
Palma’s 2000 Femme Fatale, on a television screen on which the female 
protagonist’s profile is mirrored simultaneously. Finally, reference is made 
to the projection on a portable canvas of a moving image excerpt from a 
1940s Veronica Lake-movie in Curtis Hanson’s 1996 L.A. Confidential, 
again unfolding under the watchful eyes of the hero couple in the film 
(Virginás 2019).
The standard screenic materiality is, however, disrupted in the genre 
(or “submedium”10) of science fiction, which may be described as predi-
cated upon the “main formal device [of] an imaginative framework alter-
native to the author’s empirical environment” (Suvin 1972: 375). In this 
context, non-solid, near-plasma and even liquid screens as well as organic 
screens may be mentioned. In Steven Spielberg’s 2002 Minority Report, 
the computer screens—as objects in the first-level diegesis—look like 
translucent windowpanes hanging horizontally, resembling air or water 
drops as for their texture and mode of existence. They are easy to manipu-
late, information may be organized and grouped, or processed through 
hand gestures and also by voice. These Minority Report screens may be 
turned off and integrated seamlessly in the background or they may shine 
full of information when needed—recalling Rist’s rhythmically lighting 
unusual screenic surfaces in Dawn in the Neighbour’s Room. As for the 
organic screen, in David Cronenberg’s 1984 Videodrome, the bulky TV set 
in producer Max Renn’s bachelor apartment is developing veins and lips 
in the hallucinatory scene of its transforming into the producer’s lover, 
Nikki Brand (or her body).
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However, the conception of non-solid and fluid screen surfaces is per-
haps nowhere exploiting to a more astonishing degree the multimodal 
“heteromediality” (Bruhn 2010) of the cinematic medium than in Denis 
Villeneuve’s 2016 Arrival. Here, the screen’s mediality can be read as 
possibly indexing and symbolizing the perception of the alien entities 
landing on Earth, simultaneously with conveying the perplexed emotional 
state of the protagonist, Dr Louise Banks, a linguist establishing contact 
with the outer space creatures. Even on the first occasion of its appearance 
the giant screen interface separating the aliens from the humans is defi-
nitely displaying gas, smoke and plasma-type materiality, being focalized 
primarily by the members of the human crew and, occasionally, also framed 
by the more than three-dimensional spatial perception of the aliens 
(Fig. 4.1).
This aspect of non-solid materiality is further emphasized thanks to a 
number of elements conditioned by the digital cinematic medium’s speci-
ficities: the gut-deep roars and fluid movement of the heptapod aliens 
created through composite animation-and-CGI techniques; the detailed 
view of the vapour blinding Louise’s view from within her spacesuit; and 
finally, the specific mode of writing that the aliens have, which deforms, 
disperses and flows away after it has performed its basic role of (possibly) 
creating cognitive import in Louise and the team’s minds. On the occa-
sion of the third visit in the aliens’ tower-like spaceship, Louise takes off 
her astronaut suit and advances towards the two alien entities, in an effort 
to make them integrate the (written/symbolic) word ‘Louise’ with the 
Fig. 4.1 De-solidifying alien and solid human screens in Arrival (dir. Denis 
Villeneuve, 2016). All rights reserved
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object of her (self/body). Shown from one side, as a small figure dwarfed 
by an aquarium-like screenic entity containing the heptapods, Louise’s 
human figure serves to counterbalance the liquid, non-solid, possibly 
organic materiality that makes the aliens perceptible to the human eye as 
if through a screen interface (Fig. 4.2).
The fully transparent materiality of this dividing screen is re-configured 
as partly solid when—after Louise’s having placed her palm on it—the 
heptapod also sticks a floral-shaped body member to it. This scene in the 
film is fundamentally based on how media theorist Sybille Krämer sees the 
“material modality modes” of all media as dependent on what she defines 
as transparency: “[m]edia are indeed bound to materiality, but their trans-
parency is practically required: air, water or crystals are thus the most 
favourable materials for media of perception”, she observes (Krämer 
2015: 32).
However, it is not only the dividing screen within the spaceship of the 
alien heptapods—where earthly physical laws of gravity and three- 
dimensionality do not apply—that de-solidifies. When we are shown the 
army and the scientific team’s common efforts at deciphering the hepta-
pod auditive strings on the large computer screens positioned inside the 
earth base, these electronic screens’ content is effortlessly transferred and 
complexly mirrored on the transparent plastic dividing sheets of the mili-
tary tents (Fig. 4.3). A similar effect is created by such set design when 
several large screens are positioned side-by-side to ensure simultaneous 
Fig. 4.2 Transparency as an essence: Louise facing the alien creatures in Arrival 
(dir. Denis Villeneuve, 2016). All rights reserved
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reception of developments on all the twelve earthly sites where the aliens 
have landed.
This process of de-solidifying the interface screen between humans (Dr 
Louise Banks and the team) and aliens (the two heptapods, Abbott and 
Costello) may be positioned thus as one striking marker of how space, 
time, memory and ultimately identity will de-solidify in Arrival. The pro-
cess reaches its climax in the scene when Louise is transported to the alien 
ship within a capsule that they sent for her. Here the screenic interface is 
first suggested—or indeed “transmediated” (Elleström 2020: 81–83)—
through a number of non-(electronic) screenic entities: smoke that is later 
shown to be emanating from the frost-like cubes Louise lands upon; 
Louise’s slowly fluttering hair; and even her sentiment of angst and 
extreme fright from maximum exposure in a possibly hostile environment 
being perceptible to her (and to us) as layers of clouds where the alien 
heptapods move/swim/fly freely. However, the ultimate screen frame, 
that of the cinematic image, remains firmly in place, as suggested by the 
total view of a small Louise facing a giant heptapod, while both of them 
are limited to the right by a black rectangle, recalling the initial screen that 
separated the two worlds all throughout the alien–human contact narrative.
These embedded and (generally) electronic screens are characterized by 
two spatial coordinates: height and width, and by the temporal coordinate 
when solid, with their sensorial (multi)modality an audiovisual one. 
However, when the embedded electronic screens are shown to acquire 
non-solid and/or organic materiality traits, the fourth spatiotemporal 
Fig. 4.3 Human screens losing solid materiality in Arrival (dir. Denis Villeneuve, 
2016). All rights reserved
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dimension of depth is added and activated as well. When screens de- 
solidify as in Minority Report or Arrival, or are attributed organic qualities 
as in Videodrome, they open towards depth. An interesting case where 
depth is added to a materially “solid and flat” and sensorially “audiovisual 
[electronic] screen” is to be found in Ridley Scott’s 1984 Blade Runner, 
in the famous sequence when Deckard, the detecting figure, is analysing a 
photograph he found in replicant Leon’s apartment. Deckard sits opposite 
a computing device that seems to be a mix of a scanner, a printer, a com-
puter and a television set, on which he performs the analysis of the found 
photograph. The device is governed by Deckard’s voice, and he quarters, 
zooms in and out on the originally printed photograph, up to the point 
when, among details reminiscent in their figurative manner of old Dutch 
masters, a new figure, unseen up to now in the mentioned setting, appears: 
a female replicant known as Zhora. That this computer screen in Blade 
Runner is a passageway in depth to an equally important, yet  different(-level) 
diegesis is also suggested by the last element Deckard discovers on the 
analysed photograph: the fake scales of which club dancer Zhora’s shawl is 
made, which will become the next element in advancing the investigation 
for the rebellious replicants, among them Leon and Zhora (Virginás 
2014). Yet, this opening of a solid screen towards depth is accompanied by 
a change in one of the other modality modes: a change of proportions 
within the sensorial modality—this is a voice-governed, rather than just 
watched screen—engenders depth being added to the other three spatio-
temporal coordinates in this scene from Blade Runner.
In these scenes quoted from Minority Report, Videodrome or Arrival 
we can observe that besides watching and hearing the sensorial mode of 
tactility is also added to the functioning processes of the screens within the 
examined diegetic filmic situations. Simultaneously we can notice another 
process of how change in one of the modalities—in this case the sensorial 
one—entails changes in at least one of the other modalities too. This 
might be the material one: de-solidifying the ‘audiovisualtactile’ screens as 
in Minority Report or Arrival; or attributing them organic qualities as in 
Videodrome—or, indeed change occurs in the spatiotemporal modality, 
with tactile screens opening towards depth. To hint at one of the main 
conclusions of this analysis, material modality changes of the examined 
screens seem to trigger changes in the spatiotemporal and sensorial modal-
ities too and vice versa. These processes support the displacement of (qual-
ified) media boundaries that we have been witnessing between analogue 
filmic, analogue electronic, digital filmic and digital electronic media—a 
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phenomenon sometimes referred to as ‘the death of cinema’ and dealt 
with in detail in the next section (entitled “The Qualifying Aspects of 
Electronic Screens”).
4.2.2  Diegetic Electronic Screens on the Verge of the Presemiotic 
and the Semiotic Modalities
As demonstrated in the previous subsection, diegetic electronic screens 
allow for conceptualizing the interdependences present between the three 
presemiotic media modality modes: the material, the spatial and the senso-
rial. Furthermore, electronic screens inlaid in film diegetic worlds some-
how bridge over the difference between the Elleströmian categories of 
“technical media of display” not creating cognitive import and the “media 
types” that create cognitive import. Thus, they are adequate units of anal-
ysis on which to base a description of the passage from the three presemi-
otic media modality modes to the semiotic one which covers iconicity, 
indexicality and symbolicity in Peircean terms. Andy Lavender’s work 
pondering on this aspect is also illuminating since he conceives of the 
material, the spatiotemporal and the sensorial modalities as “rather 
describe[ing] structuring aspects that will then affect cognition”, with the 
semiotic modality evidently originating from cognition (2020: 115, 
emphasis in the original). Interestingly, presenting a clear case of academic 
serendipity, as the articles in the present publication were written simulta-
neously and independently, Tseng’s contribution also touches upon these 
issues. Using the umbrella term of “digital mediated images” she consid-
ers that it “should be read as a broader conception than that of just the 
new digital media used diegetically by fictional characters in the film […]: 
in this chapter, it describes various forms of added realism, among them 
news footage, intra-diegetic camera, and computer screen” (Tseng 2020: 
175–176). My contribution adds to this observation the categorization of 
embedded screens to be presented in what follows.
The mediating capacities of the electronic screens examined here may 
be conceptualized, and also categorized starting from the observation that 
in the absence of communicative function and a virtual sphere “created in 
the perceiver’s mind” the sensory configurations will not become media 
products and thus do not represent anything (Elleström 2020: 21). Based 
on this, I differentiate between three types of diegetic and non-cinematic 
(electronic) screens embedded in film diegetic worlds: decor screens, 
diegetic screens and metadiegetic screens. Screens belonging to the first type 
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constitute a background or an atmosphere-like environment in Bruno’s 
sense, existing in a presemiotic condition always on the verge of bursting 
into semiotically meaningful surfaces of communication: the diegetic tele-
vision, video, computer or mobile screens may form part of the decors and 
will be called decor screens henceforth. The second type of diegetic screens 
are watched, manipulated or otherwise used by diegetic characters, thus 
illustrating the activation of the semiotic modality too, besides the other 
three; these will be nicknamed diegetic screens. The third type of screens is 
primarily there for the afilmic/actual sphere/extracommunicational 
domain viewer to watch and create cognitive import based on it, these 
might serve the narration and be visible, evident or meaningful only for 
the actual viewer; therefore I will shorten them as metadiegetic screens. 
Obviously, the positionings of the respective screens may change from 
scene to scene and within the same filmic narrative.
My classificatory scheme may be seen as somewhat bordering on what 
Gérard Genette defines as “the main types of relationships that can con-
nect the metadiegetic narrative to the first narrative, into which it is 
inserted” (1983: 232). Obviously all three types of embedded electronic 
screens are capable of carrying metadiegetic content with respect to the 
first diegesis as unfolding on the cinematic screen. However, this aspect 
must not be equated with these screens assuming a fully semiotic modality 
within the respective diegetic scene: as we shall see, there are interesting 
correlations between embedded electronic screens as chiefly characterized 
by the presemiotic modality modes (or the decor screens), inlaid electronic 
screens as chiefly characterized by the full emergence of the semiotic 
modality within the diegetic reality (diegetic screens), embedded electronic 
screens as chiefly characterized by the full working of the semiotic modal-
ity in the extracommunicational domain of the actual viewer (metadiegetic 
screens) and finally the three types of relationships as described by Genette.
 Decor Screens
When in the first case, the respective diegetic electronic screens might 
serve the purpose of connoting a family, private environment and its social 
positioning. As an illustrative example, we can think of the rugged TV set 
that Carla Jean Moss—the declassed girlfriend of one of the chief protago-
nists—is watching in their even more derelict cabin home in the Coen 
brothers’ No Country for Old Men (2007). In contrast, such screens might 
index an institutional, thus public context, perhaps a secret headquarters 
with magnificent-scale operations as in the case of Q’s base in the 
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Bond-sequel Skyfall (Sam Mendes, 2013). We can categorize decor screens 
as belonging to the sphere of profilmic reality—“the reality photographed 
by the camera” (Buckland 2003: 47) and with evident links to afilmic real-
ity, which “exists independently of filmic reality” (Buckland 2003: 47). 
Souriau and Buckland’s afilmic reality resembles what Lars Elleström 
defines as “the extracommunicational domain” preceding and surround-
ing ongoing communication (Elleström 2020: 27–33)—in our case every-
thing pertaining to the film—containing electronic screens—a viewer is in 
the process of watching. Relating such decor screens (be they televisions or 
surveillance camera images) connoting a- and profilmic reality to the 
extracommunicational domain is even more pertinent in the light of the 
observation that “[v]ital parts of the extracommunicational domain are 
constituted by perception and interpretation of media products” 
(Elleström 2020: 28).
The second type of relationship that Genette conceives of between the 
first narrative and the metadiegetic narrative “consists of a purely thematic 
relationship, therefore implying no spatio-temporal continuity between 
metadiegesis and diegesis: a relationship of contrast […] or of analogy” 
(1983: 233). Interestingly enough, it is decor screens which are foremost in 
connoting and also indexing afilmic reality and the extracommunicational 
domain that are bound to perform this Genettian “thematic, contrastive 
or analogical” relationship between the filmic diegesis and the (Genettian) 
metadiegetic level as embodied by the electronic screens. What I name 
decor screens constitute a ‘presemiotic screen environment’: thus they draw 
attention to the aspect of the “mediation” rather than that of “representa-
tion” (Elleström 2020: 38–40)11 while communication is going on, and 
this feature is mirrored in the Genettian model as non-existent “spatio- 
temporal continuity”. An adequate example in this respect may be cited 
from David Cronenberg’s Maps to the Stars (2014): in a scene Agatha, the 
evil-doer incognito who is working as a personal assistant to Hollywood 
star Havana Segrand, arrives at her employer’s home. In the luxurious, 
English country-style kitchen the “vertical viewing dispositif” (Strauven 
2016: 144) stands out through its minimalist, technologically up-to-date 
outlook, while showing a live television talk show in which Havana repeats 
the story of her long-dead actress mother, with essentially no new piece of 
information added to what has been presented up to now in the filmic 
diegesis unfolding on the cinematic screen. However, the superficial flat-
ness of the television talk-show as mediated through this decor screen is in 
a Genettian ‘thematic contrast’ to Havana, the actress’ inner torments 
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regarding her abusive mother, and, in addition indexing the hardships of 
her getting the role about which she is interviewed.
 Diegetic Screens
Apparently the same objects that functioned or will function as decor 
screens may re-appear as diegetic screens having further function(s) and 
role(s) within the diegetic world/reality (or “the fictional story world cre-
ated by the film” (Buckland 2003: 47)). A survey of what I call diegetic 
screens could start with examples of diegetic characters being interpellated 
by televisual screens: like director Max Renn being addressed by his secre-
tary through a televisual screen in Videodrome. Or indeed manipulating 
data through screens: as journalist Mikael Blomkvist does when examining 
the digitized celluloid photographs taken on the occasion/day of a four- 
decade- old crime in The Girl with the Dragon Tattoo (Niels Arden Oplev, 
2009). Thus, if the decor screens highlight the extracommunicational 
domain, diegetic screens will direct our attention to the “intracommunica-
tional domain” or “the formation of cognitive import in ongoing com-
munication” (Elleström 2020: 27).
Those scenes where the characters watch, examine, analyse and dis-
sect—usually digitally—stored and displayed audiovisual moving images 
are detailed examples of representing and conceptualizing the perceivers’ 
minds and those brief moments of perception as followed by lengthy pro-
cesses of interpretation. The moments with the embedded electronic 
screens not only draw attention to the various and active modality modes 
of the involved qualified media types but also dramatize and thus prolong 
“the act of perception” which “is brief and quickly channelled into inter-
pretation” otherwise (Elleström 2020: 18). Such diegetic screens result in 
the creation of communicative situations where cognitive import might 
emerge, with the representation conceived of as always already dependent 
on the material modality of the video, the television or the computer. 
However, as “[t]he mediated sensory configurations of a media product 
do not transfer any cognitive import until the perceiver’s mind compre-
hends them as signs”, and therefore “the sensations are meaningless until 
they are understood to represent something through unconscious or con-
scious interpretation” (Elleström 2020: 50), scenes with diegetic screens 
present us the mess of creating cognitive import while faced with elec-
tronic screens. Characters using or watching television or mobile screens, 
video monitors or laptops may be positioned as providing detailed analyses 
of the “border zones” between the material modality (“the latent 
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corporeal interface of the medium”), the sensorial modality (“the physical 
and mental acts of perceiving the present interface of the medium through 
the sense faculties”) (Elleström 2010: 17) and, evidently, the semiotic 
modality (which is necessary to create cognitive import in 
communication).12
Genette delimits “direct causality between the events of the metadieg-
esis and those of the diegesis, conferring on the second narrative an 
explanatory function” (1983: 232, emphasis in the original). This is evi-
dently the case when diegetic screens are employed to show content that 
founds, explains or perhaps precedes the diegetic events, thus performing 
a temporal re-ordering as well, on the level of the plotline. One of the 
most striking examples is provided by Alex Garland’s Annihilation (2018), 
the story of a five-member female expedition sent to an alien dominated 
zone, the so-called Shimmer. The main protagonist, Lena, only accepts 
participation in the dangerous trip to help somehow her soldier husband, 
who returned from a similar previous mission deeply hurt and deranged. 
When quite advanced in the territory and also in their process of under-
standing how the Shimmer decomposes DNA, the group finds a memory 
card, which they will watch on the minuscule screen of their portable digi-
tal video camera. The activity repeats itself when Lena enters the danger-
ous Lighthouse, where a similar video camera on a tripod faces a sitting 
corpse covered in ash. Both occasions contain sequences from the previ-
ous expedition’s experiences and therefore their accumulated knowledge; 
thus, the electronic diegetic screens inlaid in this filmic diegesis reveal the 
past of, and therefore explain, the diegetic world itself. The small video 
screen often morphs into covering the whole cinematic surface (screen) in 
a creative effort to convey to the actual audience the extraordinary destruc-
tive effects of the Shimmer, but also as a method to represent the emo-
tional involvement, sadness and painful reminiscences that Lena, as a 
focalizer character, goes through. Lena is able to see her moribund hus-
band, possibly genetically transformed by the alien forces in the diegetic 
present, as a fully human, yet already seriously damaged person in the 
diegetic past as framed by this small electronic diegetic screen, which there-
fore directly re-connects to the cinematic diegetic level too.
 Metadiegetic Screens
The third type of represented screens, metadiegetic screens, are there only 
for the afilmic/actual sphere/extracommunicational domain viewer to 
watch, who is quite different from the intracommunicational domain 
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viewer existing within the diegetic reality of the given film, such as Lena in 
the previously quoted Annihilation. These screens might serve the narra-
tion and be visible, evident or meaningful only for the actual viewer of a 
given film: no character in the film diegesis is possibly or fully sensing what 
I name metadiegetic screens, and therefore no diegetic character is capable 
of creating semiotically meaningful cognitive import based on them. An 
interesting example for such a screen may be recalled from Olivier Assayas’ 
2014 Clouds in Sils Maria. The last part of the film presents the theatrical 
performance of the play entitled Maloja Snake: the story of a powerful 
firm executive (Helena as played by an older actress in the diegetic world) 
and her painful lesbian love story with her ruthless young assistant (Sigrid 
as played by the rising star, Jo-Ann). Sigrid enters the cubes signifying the 
company offices, takes files from the desks of the office workers, and at the 
end of the theatrical scene, but also that of the filmic sequence, she exits 
the geometrical, sterile office space towards the audience, stopping at the 
extreme edge of the stage. The camera focuses on Jo-Ann-as-Sigrid’s 
angry, disillusioned, tired and sad face: this female face is filmed in real- 
time and projected on the huge canvas of the stage in magnified propor-
tions, with a bluish lighting effect superimposed on it. The view created is 
that of a beautiful female head squeezed through the grid of pixels and 
geometrical lines that define such a body in a digital environment of 1s 
and 0s. The analogue narrative filmic image of an actress performing a role 
in the sketchy environment of a theatre play is transmediated into the digi-
tal filmic image of the same theatre actress in the front of our very eyes, 
creating a hybrid representation that is neither analogue filmic image, nor 
filmed theatre scene, or digital filmic image but all at the same time.
Such (intra)diegetic shots transforming into (meta)diegetic, long- 
duration, fixed shots, which often are close-ups, exemplify what Roger 
Odin calls “inclusion”, for example, those moments when “the mental 
cinema screen encompasses and somehow erases the physical space” (Odin 
2016: 179). These long-duration shots ambiguous as for their diegetic 
status—no focalizer character’s optical point of view matches them—turn 
into moments of true spectacle offered to the afilmic, extracommunica-
tional domain film viewers in a digital era, staging the process of immobi-
lizing animate images, of which Gaudreault and Marion write that “within 
the flow of digital visual media and through the widespread animation of 
these media, the ‘moveable’ image has become almost the norm and the 
still image the exception” (2015: 77). The urge towards an aesthetic atti-
tude that framing entails is also definitely present in such moments: as 
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Roger Odin argues, “the desire to see something ‘framed’ reflects a will to 
transform the world into an aesthetic” (Odin 2016: 183).
This scene with Jo-Ann, the young actress’ face projected on the huge 
theatre canvas—doubling as an embedded screen—while shown as a super 
close-up for the cinematic viewer, also exemplifies the third type of rela-
tionship between the diegetic (in this case, the cinematic) and metadi-
egetic (in this case, conveyed through the [electronic] screenic embedded 
within the diegetic world). This is described in Narrative Discourse: An 
Essay in Method as “involve[ing] no explicit relationship between the two 
story levels: it is the act of narrating itself that fulfils a function in the dieg-
esis, independently of the metadiegetic content—a function of distraction, 
for example, and/or of obstruction” (Genette 1983: 233). Thus, the nar-
ratological roots of an apparently intermedial analysis have become evi-
dent: besides their evident function as (afilmic) indices of our post-digital 
era, capable of conveying what Elleström calls “extracommunicational 
truthfulness”, the embedded television or video screens also create “intra-
communicational coherence” (2018) through complex metaleptic narra-
tive structures that constitute the fictional spatiotemporal continuity of 
the film. Thus, a dual functionality may be attributed to them: as a- and 
profilmic indices and also framing devices that re-order narrative levels. In 
this respect, this line of analyses may be added as a further argument, 
achieved through semiotic and narratological methods, to Tseng’s state-
ment that “[i]t is the contextualization of these digital frames in the 
broader narrative structures, which achieve specific narrative functions” 
(Tseng 2020: 181).
However, such a clear-cut differentiation of decor, diegetic and metadi-
egetic screens is a conceptual possibility rather than an always functional 
method of practical analysis. While it offers a semiotic and narratological 
basis for understanding the multitude of embedded electronic screens, it 
is also an adequate tool for describing more fuzzy examples. Spike Jonze’s 
2013 Her, for example, introduces us to a futuristic world where humans 
occupy the cinematic diegetic space, and the digital Artificial Intelligence 
inhabits the diegetic computer screens. This is how the romance of ghost- 
writer Theodore Twombly, surrounded by muted sounds and warm 
colours, and operation system Samantha, a sensual voice and computer 
screen operations, unfolds in a fully metaleptic manner, jumping from cin-
ematic to computer screen(ic), from diegetic to metadiegetic level and 
back. As Liviu Lutas formulates it, “metalepsis should be the violation of 
the frontier between different levels of representation” (2020: 155). To 
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Theodore’s understated question referring to her functioning, Samantha 
confesses that “basically I have intuition. The DNA of who I am is based 
on the millions of personalities of all the programmers who wrote me”. 
Significantly, when Samantha utters this sentence, we leave the spatial 
parameters of an interior with a human figure seated in front of a com-
puter desk, and we get a view from behind a glassy, transparent surface—a 
possible space-divider in Theodore’s apartment, but perhaps we get out-
side his apartment’s windows. The effect is that contours lose their sharp-
ness, light effects and colour patches become more expressed, and the 
cinematic filmic image and screen transform into a screenic surface with 
abstract forms and patterns. So, parallel to the digital objects, graphics and 
consciousnesses pertaining to the embedded electronic metadiegetic 
screens asking for and getting their place in the cinematic realm, the 
diegetic filmic image starts to acquire pixelated qualities. Thus, an inter-
esting composite moment of transmediality is offered between analogue 
(scanning) representation and digital (sampling) representation. It may be 
suggested to be variation on the process that Joachim Paech describes as 
“the repetition or retake of characteristic cinematographic forms in digi-
tally produced films” (2011: 18) as here we witness a further layer of digi-
tal characteristics overimposed on it.
4.3  the QualiFying aSpectS oF electronic ScreenS
As already suggested, the complexity of the media products involved in 
the presently examined “transfers of cognitive import” needs to be 
accounted for. As such a reference to the concept of “qualified media 
[types]” realized through “technical media of display” (Elleström 2020: 
33–37) is an important aspect of this complexity, it shall be dealt with in 
this section. The “qualifying aspects” of the media types—previously 
described as based on the four media modalities—refer to “all kinds of 
aspects about how we produce, situate, use and evaluate media products 
in the world” (Elleström 2020: 55). There are two qualifying aspects: the 
so-called contextual and the operational aspects.
The “contextual qualifying aspect” involves “the origin and delimita-
tion of media in specific historical, cultural and social circumstances” 
(Elleström 2020: 60), and it is in reference to film that Elleström notes 
that “[t]he combination of these features is no doubt a historically deter-
mined social construction of what we call the medium of film, but given 
these qualifications of the medium, it has a certain essence” (2020: 59). 
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The fundamental aspects of film—described as “a combination of visual, 
predominantly iconic signs (images) displayed on a flat surface and sound 
in the form of icons (as music), indices (sounds that are contiguously 
related to visual events in the film) and symbols (as speech), all expected 
to develop in a temporal dimension” (Elleström 2020: 59)—come into 
question when technological change is as quick and self-evident as in our 
analogue-to-digital era. Thus, one needs to acknowledge that “some basic 
modal groupings are commonly distinguishable at a certain time and in a 
certain culture, and that the future may hold new habits and technical 
solutions that make novel basic media types relevant” (Elleström 2020: 
56). Friedrich Kittler, among so many others, has been right in drawing 
attention to the diminishing chances of separating film, video or television 
with the advent of the digital (era) when he observed that “[i]f the histori-
cal synchronicity of film, phonograph, and typewriter in the early twenti-
eth century separated the data flows of optics, acoustics and writing and 
rendered them autonomous, current electronic technologies are bringing 
them back together” (Johnston 1997: 5–6). Meanwhile, our present is 
still characterized by the culturally (and perhaps also cognitively) funded 
differences—or the contextual qualifying aspects—among the mentioned 
technical and electronic media.
These differences might also be sustained by such constructions in film 
diegetic worlds where these various media, indexed by the corresponding 
screens, are present as apparently afilmic, but actually profilmic objects 
with serious functions in the narrative development. In the framework 
provided by the concept of the “contextual qualifying aspects”, the 
embedded electronic screens may be definitely described as contributing 
to fixing the specificity of the media involved, especially in such cases when 
these screens convey moments of glitch and noise, de-neutralizing televi-
sion or video as in David Cronenberg’s Videodrome or David Lynch’s Lost 
Highway. With the aim of supporting the general hypothesis of medium 
specificity being sustained, a number of close readings of noisy non- 
neutralization of a medium through diegetic electronic screens follows.
Videodrome sets up the rules of its diegetic electronic screen use aiming 
at making the medium visible and filling it with noises of all kinds already 
in the introductory credit sequence. First, animated letters fill the cine-
matic screen, their candy colours and rudimentary design disturbing, evi-
dently, the cinematic immersion, and a shortly visible screenic glitch of a 
black-and-white nonfigurative formation informs the actual viewer that 
the sensible surface of this screen does not bear messages as usual 
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according to norms. In this context, the decrease in image quality may be 
identified as a Krämerian (media) noise that makes the medium—in this 
case, video and television image and apparatus—apparent and perceivable 
to the actual cinematic viewer, as “only noise, dysfunction and disturbance 
make the medium itself noticeable” (Krämer 2015: 31). The opening 
sequence from Videodrome ends with a cinematic close-up on producer 
Max Renn’s hand and face, while the television screen in the background 
recedes, its texture and sensible surface losing features, becoming a simple 
patch of colour in the diegetic space, illustrating Krämer’s formulation 
that “[a]t the same time that media bring something forth, they them-
selves recede into the background; media enable something to be visual-
ized, while simultaneously remaining invisible” (Krämer 2015: 31).
In David Lynch’s 1997 Lost Highway, the ominous video cassette left 
on the dream’s pair’s villa staircase definitely presents a differently scaled 
virtual world (Manovich 2001: 112), hypnotically capturing its diegetic, 
and the actual viewers’ attention too (Chateau 2016: 197). The content 
of the cassette and therefore that of the television screen is full with visual 
glitches and auditive noises (Fig. 4.4) that often cover the whole cinematic 
screen. As if an effect of the noiseful video and televisual medium, in Lost 
Highway most prominently the whole cinematic screen becomes blurred 
and is covered with nonfigurative patches of light, recalling Florian 
Cramer’s observation that “the characteristics of any medium only reveal 
themselves in its misbehavior at the low end” (2013).
Fig. 4.4 When noise specifies a diegetic electronic screen: Lost Highway (dir. 
David Lynch, 1997). All rights reserved
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Noise is introduced to (re)present the cinematic medium, “un- 
aisthecizing it” to use Krämer’s thesis: “The implementation of media 
depends on their withdrawal. I will call this ‘aisthetic self-neutralization’. 
[…] The invisibility of the medium—its aesthetic neutralization—is an 
attribute of media performance” (Krämer 2015: 31, emphasis in the origi-
nal). These instances where diegetic electronic screens are scattered within 
the filmic diegetic spaces examined are non-neutralizing the media 
involved, making them ‘visible’ according to the Krämerian model, also 
demonstrating their non-noise-free use primarily for the actual viewer and 
occasionally for the diegetic spectator too.13
Meanwhile, “[t]he second of the two qualifying aspects is the general 
purpose, use and function of media, which may be termed the operational 
qualifying aspect. This aspect encompasses construing media types on the 
ground of claimed or expected communicative tasks” (Elleström 2020: 
61, emphasis in the original). In their co-authored volume, The End of 
Cinema?, André Gaudreault and Philippe Marion set up a system based on 
twentieth-century media history, taking as a principle the substitution of 
the cinema silk screen by the electronic cathodic television screen, and 
then by the electronic portable small computer screen.14 They argue that 
“[w]e might even view the emergence of the small (but highly cathodic) 
screen as the point of rupture between a ‘hegemonic cinema’ and this 
‘cinema in the process of being demoted and shared,’ which is often called 
‘expanded cinema’ but which we believe would be more appropriately 
described as ‘fragmented cinema’” (Gaudreault and Marion 2015: 11, cit-
ing Guillaume Soulez’s conference intervention). Thus, “hegemonic cin-
ema” would denote the first part of the twentieth century when the cinema 
theatre silk screen was the sole framed surface which displayed electroni-
cally mediated and also always pre-recorded moving images. “Expanded 
cinema” should denote developments of the second part of the twentieth 
century, when television and then video-camera screens appeared as elec-
tronic surfaces where cinematic worlds and narratives would expand, obvi-
ously altering the nature and the significance of framed storytelling based 
on moving images. Finally, the twenty-first century brought us into the 
era of what Gaudreault and Marion (2015) name “fragmented cinema”, 
with the same cinematically constructed narrative worlds scattering fur-
ther on “the electronic portable small computer screen”, becoming com-
patible with such surfaces.
Pertaining to how the “operational qualifying aspects” of screen-based 
technical media evolve in the post/digital era, such constructions as 
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(smaller) electronic screens (with visible frames) inserted in film diegetic 
worlds may be attributed the role of training the film viewers for experi-
ences of expanded and fragmented cinema. They force the audience to 
constantly shift between the actual cinematic screen conventions and the 
mental screen (Odin 2016) of smaller formats. This may be exemplified 
with further and more recent examples: news presenter Anna living 
through her diegetic marital (melo)drama on the television screen while 
she presents the news in Thomas Vinterberg’s Commune (2016); the 
emotional happenings banished on mobile or television screens as opposed 
to the rigidity and frozenness of the diegetic cinematic world in Andrei 
Zvagintsev’s 2016 Loveless (Fig. 4.5) or indeed the most important viral 
video of the diegetic world as encaged on the museum curator Christian’s 
mobile phone screen in Ruben Östlund’s The Square (2017).
4.4  the intermedial proceSSeS at work 
in the examined Filmic SeQuenceS
As signalled in the introduction, the identifying of intermedial processes at 
work in such filmic construction involving electronic screens must close 
and also generate the analysis that has just been performed. What are the 
media that are interrelated in film scenes where characters appear on a 
black-and-white television screen as news presenter Anna in Commune or 
where they watch low-resolution videos on their mobile phone screens as 
the museum curator Christian in The Square? Can we meaningfully assert 
Fig. 4.5 Caught between decor screens and diegetic screens: Loveless (dir. Andrei 
Zvagintsev, 2016). All rights reserved
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that an entangled intermedial happening is at stake when Anna’s flat, 
desaturated, electronic TV image morphs into a cinematic close-up of 
fine-grained texture, with brighter colour qualities (Fig. 4.6)? Is it possible 
to argue that the disappearance of the frame belonging to the smaller elec-
tronic screens in such instances induces intermedial tensions between 
film/cinema and other electronic artistic screens of television, video or 
mobile phone—such as in the scene where the guerrilla marketing video 
made to promote the contemporary art museum leaves behind Christian’s 
mobile screen to widen and cover the whole cinematic screen area?
The previously presented characterization based on the four media 
modalities—and the two qualifying aspects of the cinematic, the televi-
sion, the video, the computer and the mobile (phone) screens—should 
guide us in this respect. Answering this string of questions requires one to 
establish the media borders that are crossed whenever (non-cinematic) 
electronic screens are inserted into film diegetic worlds. This can be 
achieved via the two operations proposed by the media modalities model: 
first, “‘finding’ or identifying media borders between dissimilar basic 
media types” and second “‘inventing’ or construing media borders 
between dissimilar qualified media types based on similar basic media 
types” (Elleström 2020: 72). The first operation would leave us with 
“intermedial relations in a narrow sense”, while the second with “interme-
dial relations in a broad sense” (Elleström 2020: 71–73).
Ours is evidently a case of ‘broad intermediality’, when borders between 
“dissimilar qualified media types based on similar basic media types” are 
Fig. 4.6 A meta/diegetic embedded electronic screen in Commune (dir. Thomas 
Vinterberg, 2016). All rights reserved
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crossed, with the medium of film being the paradigm-case for television, 
video and computer screen-based audiovisual media. However, this bor-
der is not simply the one apparently existing between analogue (cine-
matic/celluloid, analogue television and electronic video) and post/digital 
(computer and mobile media) qualified media types. As the examples of 
Videodrome and Blade Runner show, the modality changes that de-solidify 
or enliven the diegetic electronic screens, adding depth to their otherwise 
flat spatiotemporal modality, or sound and tactility to their sensorial 
modality, cannot be fully identified with the analogue/digital/post-digital 
divide—even if the post-analogue and post-digital eras present us with 
more numerous screens that share these characteristics. Therefore, what 
become pertinent are the changes which seem to exist in the sphere of the 
so-called presemiotic modalities: the material, the spatiotemporal and the 
sensorial modalities of these predominantly electronic screens that play a 
role in the film diegetic worlds. Thus, one of the chief results of the analy-
ses performed is to have demonstrated the mutual chain reactions between 
modalities or that change in one (presemiotic) modality of the examined 
interlaid screens triggers changes in the other two as well. Thus, the inter-
connectedness of solid materiality/non-organic materiality/two- 
dimensional spatiality/audiovisual sensorial modality and that of non-solid 
materiality/organic materiality/three-dimensional spatiality/audiovisual-
tactile (synaesthetic) sensorial modality with respect to electronic screens 
embedded in film diegetic screens should have become evident.
The above summarized and interrelated modality changes—with the 
mobility of screens a subcase in this respect—may be in turn understood 
as routinely employed to argue for the ‘fluctuating qualifying aspects’ that 
separate the television/video era from the digital one. This is a further 
argument for the case of ‘broad intermediality’ at work whenever diegetic 
and non-cinematic electronic screens appear in film diegeses, as the con-
structedness of these media borders is relatively easy to reveal. Or, as Kate 
Newell states in her reading of The Handmaid’s Tale adaptations in vari-
ous media in the present publication: “such borders, while useful theoreti-
cally, are always constructed and perceptual. That is, no material ‘border’ 
exists between, say, the animated and live-action segments of a particular 
film, yet audiences perceive aesthetic differences, and articulate that differ-
ence in terms of juncture and border crossing”(Newell 2020: 35).
The cases presented definitely draw our attention to how the borders 
between the qualified media are displaced, since even if they may “have a 
certain degree of stability, their defining features are formed by fluctuating 
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conventions” (Elleström 2020: 57). In the framework of the media 
modalities model, these questions pertain to the sphere of mediation, or 
“the material realisation of the media product, made possible by a techni-
cal medium of display”, as opposed to representation, or “the semiotic 
conception of the medium” (Elleström 2020: 40). Thus, the analyses pur-
sued in this chapter offer proof of what I consider an important axiom of 
“The Modalities of Media II”, namely that “[a]lthough mediation and 
representation are clearly entangled in complex ways, it is vital to uphold 
a theoretical distinction between them” (Elleström 2020: 40). Through 
the examination of the electronic screens dispersed in film diegetic worlds, 
a distinction between mediation and representation may be shown to 
exist, as well as fixed through/in the analyses. Furthermore, analysing the 
changes in the modalities of the examined screens also allows us a more 
precise or even more fine-grained examination of how “the transfer of 
cognitive import among media is restricted by the modal capacities of the 
technical media of display” or of cases when “technical media allow of 
modal expansion” (Elleström 2020: 79). Thus, we can have a better grasp 
of what happens when we see the same thing on a filmic image, as a hap-
pening or a view in a film diegetic world, and with the embedded elec-
tronic screen’s more pixelated, more blurry image, in a mise-en-abyme-type 
structure.
Both the cinematic screen and the diverse electronic screens dispersed 
within film diegetic worlds may be situated at the intersection of the cat-
egories presented previously: “[b]asic and qualified media [that] are cate-
gories of media products” and the “technical media of display” which are 
“physical entities needed to realise media products and hence media types” 
(Elleström 2020: 9). To some extent, an analogy to Friedrich Kittler’s 
system of media functioning may be shown to exist. Kittler emphasizes 
that storage and information manipulation are interweaving with trans-
mission in the case of media as “[t]here are, first of all, media of transmis-
sion such as mirrors; secondly, storage media, such as film; and thirdly […] 
machines that manipulate words or figures themselves” (Kittler 1997: 
132–133). Within this context, screens may be described as framed spec-
tacles related to electronic and technical media: film, video, television and 
computer or mobile (phone). These media not only produce or store but 
also distribute content, in accordance with Lars Elleström’s definition of a 
technical medium, which “should consistently be understood not as a 
technical medium of production or storage but of ‘distribution’ in the 
precise sense of disseminating sensory configurations” (Elleström 2014: 
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14). This definition allows one to fix the screens in the moment of “dis-
tributing/disseminating sensory configurations” according to the various 
media(l) apparatuses they are the endpoint of. It is this aspect of the elec-
tronic screens embedded in film diegetic worlds that quite blatantly shows 
their transitory or hybrid position between “technical media of display” as 
“[d]evices used for the realisation of media products” and media types 
with semiotic qualities (Elleström 2020: 34). This hybrid nature is also a 
manifestation of the fact that although “[c]inema, written narrative litera-
ture, and sculpture are examples of qualified media types […] it is impor-
tant to stress that not all qualified media are aesthetic” (draft of 
Bruhn 2020).
In order to position the examined phenomenon—the functioning of 
the electronic screens in film diegetic worlds—as one worthy of “careful 
analysis and interpretation” and also to argue for its presenting a form of 
“media interrelations” (Elleström 2020: 86), I have crossed a number of 
checkpoints. I characterized the media products and media types that film 
and the embedded electronic screens cover according to the correspond-
ing framework of the media modalities model; I presented the filmic 
examples and established a taxonomy of embedded electronic screens 
based on the previous descriptions; and finally, I showed that the media 
borders that are crossed need to be construed (Elleström 2020: 66–68). 
However, this does not mean that the crossed media borders are arbitrary; 
moreover, a finely tuned system of interrelations on the level of the prese-
miotic modalities of the embedded electronic screens has been revealed, 
and this may be suggested as feeding the currently upheld differences 
between the various qualified media types—cinema, television, video and 
computer—involved.
noteS
1. Warren Buckland defines it as “the fictional story world created by the 
film”, based on Étienne Souriau’s model referring to the seven levels of 
filmic reality (Buckland 2003: 47).
2. A similar de-framing conceptual turn in theatre art (theory) is noted by 
Mark Crossley with reference to the work of Patrice Pavis, who “was alert 
to this movement in diffuse performance framing towards the end of the 
twentieth century”, observing that “contemporary artists sought to create 
‘the impression that there is no division between art and life’”, thus invent-
ing “‘forms in which the frame is eliminated’” (Crossley 2020: 104).
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3. While afilmic reality “exists independently of filmic reality”, profilmic real-
ity refers to “the reality photographed by the camera” (Buckland 2003: 47).
4. In her contribution to the present publication, Chiao-I Tseng also empha-
sizes the importance of this aspect, based on empirical and cognitive audi-
ence studies, arguing that “blending conventional cinema with the media 
frames, which the viewers use in their day-to-day life, increases the viewers’ 
perception of message authenticity and enhances the persuasive and rheto-
ric function of narratives” (Tseng 2020: 182).
5. I am indebted to Beate Schirrmacher and Joachim Paech, who discussed 
these aspects with me.
6. In her contribution to the present publication, Heather Lotherington 
points to a fundamental characteristic of the media modalities model, 
which separates it from the majority of communication models, namely 
that it has “an innovative theoretical stance grounded in art, rather than 
linguistics” (Lotherington 2020: 218).
7. See Liviu Lutas’ contribution to the present publication, which performs 
the hard work of re-defining metalepsis as a device that “should also be 
seen completely beyond its initial connection to the language-based con-
text” (Lutas 2020: 150).
8. “[T]he four media modalities form an indispensable skeleton upon which 
all media products are built. By ‘modalities’, I thus mean the four necessary 
categories of media traits ranging from the material to the mental, and by 
‘modes’ I mean the specific media traits categorised in modalities” 
(Elleström 2020: 46–47).
9. A possible direction of analysis signalled by Lotherington, too: “a discus-
sion of technical media invites an ontological lens on what constitutes 
technology, which exceeds the purview of this article, calling into question 
the relationship of qualified (socio-historical aspects of media) and techni-
cal media of display” (2020: 226–227).
10. “The concept of a submedium is effectively the same as most notions of 
genre. In other words, a genre is a qualified media type that is qualified also 
within the frames of an overarching qualified medium: a submedium” 
(Elleström 2020: 64).
11. “Mediation is the display of sensory configurations by the technical 
medium (and hence also by the media product) that are perceived by 
human sense receptors in a communicative situation. It is a presemiotic 
phenomenon that should be understood as the physical realisation of enti-
ties with material, spatiotemporal and sensorial qualities—and semiotic 
potential. For instance, one may hear a sound. Representation is a semiotic 
phenomenon that should be understood as the core of signification, which 
I delimit to how humans create cognitive import in communication. When 
a perceiver’s mind forms sense of the mediated sensory configurations, sign 
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functions are activated and representation is at work. For instance, the 
heard sound may be interpreted as a voice uttering meaningful words” 
(Elleström 2020: 39, emphasis in the original).
12. In his contribution to the present publication, Andy Lavender also high-
lights that “[t]he model is geared towards elucidation, and concerns com-
munication that is itself, Elleström observes, always about conveying 
‘cognitive import’” (Lavender 2020: 116).
13. As Anthony Enns observes, “the danger always exists that the medium 
might introduce a degree of noise or interference into the act of transmis-
sion by making his presence felt instead of remaining neutral and transpar-
ent, such as when the devil attempts to manipulate listeners, when the 
psychoanalyst falls in love with his patient” (Enns 2015: 17).
14. “One of the principal effects of the digital shift has been the big screen’s 
loss of hegemony […] In fact projection onto a movie screen has become 
just one way among others to consume images. The screen may have a 
greater aura, but it is now just one means of consumption among others” 
(Gaudreault and Marion 2015: 9, emphasis in the original).
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5.1  IntroductIon
This chapter investigates the intermedial relation of different media frames 
blended in narrative film and in what ways the intermedial blends, particu-
larly the digital mediated images in films, impact on the two narrative 
functions—namely, the viewer’s interpretation of message truthfulness 
and affective engagements. The term ‘digital mediated images’, as it is 
applied in this chapter, should be read as a broader conception than that 
of just the new digital media used diegetically by fictional characters in the 
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film (cf. Tseng 2018b): in this chapter, it describes various forms of added 
realism, among them news footage, intra-diegetic camera, and com-
puter screen.
We live in a culture that is increasingly reshaped by transformations in 
audiovisual media. Within the last 20 years, our film experience and its 
presence in everyday life have changed rapidly—the film experience now 
encompasses a larger, ever-shifting human interaction with technologies of 
perception and expression. Against the backdrop of our increasingly tech-
nologically mediated society, this chapter addresses why digital mediation 
in film is a valuable resource for exploring the persuasive and rhetoric 
capacities of audiovisual storytelling itself and how it addresses questions 
of perception, affect, and truthfulness.
For decades, new media features have been frequently blended in the 
making of narrative films. In the 1960s, McLuhan (1964) already pro-
posed that new inventions and technologies produce variations in sensory 
input that customarily require adjustments from our sense organs. More 
recently, Brown also argues, “digital technology has expanded cinema and 
the psychological sciences have expanded our understanding of perception 
to such a degree that new theories of cinema and our perception(s) of it 
are urgently required” (Brown 2013: 8). In summary, it is generally 
believed that the emergence of new media forms leads to the constant 
modifications to the way we experience audiovisual storytelling. Drawing 
on these technology-centered proposals, one focus of this chapter is pre-
cisely to interrogate to what extent evolving technologies blended in nar-
rative film modify the viewers’ narrative interpretation process and viewing 
experiences.
Academic discussions of digital mediation in film have often been 
focused around particular genres, for instance, found footage in horror 
films (Heller-Nicholas 2014; Sayad 2016), computer screen and diegetic 
camera in thriller or war films (Stewart 2009; Pisters 2010). This chapter 
poses the question from a different perspective and instead broadly asks 
how the aesthetic choices of digitally mediated images generate the seem-
ingly paradoxical narrative impacts and interpretative outcomes—subjec-
tive affective intensity and objective narrative truthfulness. In principle, 
mediated images in film often function to enhance the viewer’s interpreta-
tion of truthful storytelling. For example, historical docudrama or biopics 
often use news reports or historical archive footage for endorsing the 
authenticity of information source. Thrillers or horror films use the strat-
egy of found footage, namely, images shown via the character’s handheld 
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camera or computer screen, to add narrative realism through simulating 
the visual aesthetics we are familiar with in our day-to-day life. In many 
other cases, using mediated images in film are dominantly subjective and 
evoke a viewer’s affective attachment rather than detaching the viewer to 
reflect on objective fact. Section 5.2 will first review perennial paradox of 
two seemingly mutually exclusive narrative effects: emotional engagement 
and message truthfulness. Section 5.3 will then tackle the paradox by pro-
posing a multi-leveled, semiotic framework synthesizing cognitive research 
findings and semiotic conceptualization (cf. Tseng 2018a; Tseng et  al. 
2018), distinguishing the two analytical levels: presemiotic level of media 
properties and semiotic level of narrative semantic structure (cf. Elleström 
2020). This chapter will then employ the framework to analyze the various 
forms of digital-mediated images in film. The analyses will shed light on 
how the affective and interpretative functions are closely intertwined 
rather than paradoxical.
5.2  PerennIal Paradox: achIevIng affectIve 
and truthful ImPacts
For decades, affective engagement and cognitive-logical interpretation in 
audiovisual narratives have been regarded as incompatible processes. 
Several film scholars, for instance Deleuze (1986), have argued that the 
transformative and immersive power of cinema specifically arises from an 
ability to produce non-cognitive affective immersion that can persist 
beyond the conscious consideration of narrative interpretation. While 
cognitivism sees cinema as naturally conducive to human systems of 
meaning- making, the affect-centered perspective argues that film narrative 
is able to destabilize the schema of human thought of logical order of 
event perception and action, and this non-cognitive, bodily experience is 
the basis for generating affective response in film Deleuze (1989: 169).
The paradox of emotional engagement and cognitive-based interpreta-
tion of message truthfulness has also been raised in the broader realm of 
communication research. Recent empirical evidence has shown that affec-
tive engagement in the character-based narratives can powerfully achieve 
narrative persuasive impact, and the narrative focusing on cognitive rea-
soning of truthful events decreases the strength of such impact (Green 
et al. 2002). One explanation for this is that the fundamental constituents 
of human memory and social communication rest on a person’s 
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experiences and the experiences of others, rather than the cognitive activi-
ties of knowledge reasoning (Schank and Abelson 1995). In other words, 
research suggests that it is the default mode of human thought that a nar-
rative way of thinking drawing on someone’s personal, emotion-laden 
experience endows individual cases and anecdotes with significant weight 
toward evaluating evidence (Bruner 1991).
Moreover, the paradoxical relation between affective engagement and 
logical reasoning of truthful events and actions is also the center of debates 
in the context of educational impact. Some scholars believe that emotional 
engagement in fictional story might distract the learning of socially and 
politically important issues, because by engaging a narrative in an affective 
way, the communication fails to reach the goal of engaging scientific, logi-
cal reasoning (Bogost 2007, 2017). Moreover, scholars also indicate that, 
since affect-centered storytelling can be highly persuasive regardless of the 
validity of the underlying truthful claims, the use of narrative messages 
becomes an oversimplification at best or manipulative at worst (Dahlstrom 
and Scheufele 2018). Even an otherwise desired outcome (such as correct 
knowledge about climate change) could be viewed negatively if the desired 
reasoning process of message truthfulness was not engaged. Hence, in 
terms of educational purposes, the paradox comes into focus: affective 
storytelling can engage people and make educational information relevant 
to personal experience, while simultaneously encouraging a narrative way 
of thinking that places scientific stories on a similar level to any other plau-
sible story that may or may not support message truthfulness.
In sum, it is believed that the processes of affective engagement and the 
representation of message truthfulness are mutually exclusive. One 
decreases the impact of another, that is, the more affective engagement is 
triggered, the more uncertainty, less truthfulness of the narrative becomes. 
And vice versa, the more authentic the message one intends to communi-
cate, the more affect-neutral narratives one needs to construct. The next 
section tackles the issue by showing the interconnectedness rather than 
mutually exclusiveness of the two processes. This tricky relationship can be 
best unraveled by analyzing the coexisting functions of affective and truth-
fulness in film using the techniques of mediated images.
 C.-I. TSENG
179
5.3  tacklIng the Paradox vIa semIotIc aPProach 
to narratIve functIons
As various digital, dynamic forms of mediated images emerge in cinema, 
film researchers have argued that inserting multiple frames stirs up the 
viewer’s awareness of non-diegetic manipulation of filmmaking and hence 
destabilizes the coherent semantic contents of the narratives (cf. Stewart 
2009; Ecke 2010; Poetzsch 2012). Nevertheless, our previous work has 
insisted that the multiple frames in the film actually do not disrupt the 
narrative construction at the semantic level (Tseng 2016, 2018b). In other 
words, despite the ever-present framing devices of digital mediated images, 
such as timecodes, hyperlinks, shaky images—the linearity and sufficient 
cohesion mechanisms of the narrative semantics still construct a straight-
forward meaning comprehension path for the viewers. Our analysis untan-
gled the confusion of narrative incoherence and disruption of digital 
mediation, and this is based on the semiotic framework distinguishing the 
two fundamental analytical levels: media materialities and semantics of 
narratives.
For tackling the paradox of affective engagement and meaning inter-
pretation in film, this chapter expands our previously proposed semiotic 
framework and puts forward a multi-leveled approach to narrative func-
tions, integrating semiotic and cognitive findings, and addresses how the 
media affordances of digital mediation can actually synchronize different 
narrative functions at the narrative semantic levels.
In particular, we discuss these issues by exemplifying and analyzing the 
beginnings of several recent films substantially using digital frames, such as 
Redacted (2007), Cloverfield (2008), Searching (2018), and Profile 
(2018). We focus on the beginnings of the films because beginnings in all 
films function specifically to establish a hypothesis and emotional expecta-
tion, to provide first impressions that later developments of the narrative 
will be measured against (Hartmann 2009). In psychological terms, the 
function of the initial portions of a film has been described according to 
the primacy effect and priming (Luchins and Luchins 1962) or anchoring 
bias (Tversky and Kahneman 1974). A distinctive structuring function has 
also been theorized in studies of text linguistics, for example, by Martin 
(1992), who develops the notion of “macro-themes” to describe a com-
municative function that serves the role of signposting the organization of 
the text following.1
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In addition, we select these films for analysis because they represent the 
application of evolving media technology in narrative films within the 
recent two decades. Some films are made in the 2000s when portable digi-
tal camera is widely used for documenting and preserving events, while 
others are made ten years later, when online communication and social 
media become a crucial part of the communication and information distri-
bution. As the following sections will show, despite the evolving technolo-
gies, the main narrative functions of truthfulness and emotional 
engagement remain stable, while different media affordances between 
camera and computer screen indeed bring about some distinctive ways of 
realizing these narrative functions.
5.3.1  Multi-leveled, Semiotic Approach to Narrative Functions
Several film scholars have proposed that a general distinction needs to be 
made between the process of narrative interpretation and the perception 
of individual media techniques. This distinction is particularly significant 
when examining the evolution and functions of film style. More specifi-
cally, it has been frequently argued that a high degree of narrative and 
discourse stability is the basis of narrative inference and genre expectation 
for spectators, despite the gradually dynamic deployment of audio-visual 
devices in recent decades. For instance, Bordwell (2006) identifies major 
features of spatial-temporal styles that have been astonishingly robust 
throughout the evolution of filmmaking. Jones (2015) compares 3D and 
2D formats and shows how they function similarly in terms of narrative 
coherence and effect. Bordwell and Jones both argue that despite the 
evolving visual techniques over time—such as shorter average shot lengths, 
the use of wider range lenses of 3D format and computer-generated 
images—the composition of “space, time, and narrative relations (such as 
causal connections and parallels)” in mainstream films remains straightfor-
ward to identify and leads the viewer to effortless comprehension and 
prediction of film narrative (Bordwell 2002).
The distinction between filmic semantic meaning and media properties 
is shown in the diagram in Fig. 5.1. The analytical levels are developed for 
film, building on the theoretical notion of semiotic stratification, in par-
ticular, on the distinction between a stratum of discourse and one of form 
(Martin 1992). The left part of the diagram is the multi-leveled frame-
work generally divided into media techniques at the bottom level and nar-
rative semantics, social-cultural domains at the higher levels. The 
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distinction is reminiscent of stratification that occurs in semiotic approaches 
such as the distinctions of expression plane and content plane by 
Hjelmslev (1953).
The more important notion, as far as meaning making in film is con-
cerned, is the interrelationship between these strata. These strata are inter-
related by realization: that is, film semantic configurations are ‘realized in’ 
the contextualization of media properties, and at the highest level, social- 
cultural aspects such as genres or aesthetic styles are realized in the contex-
tualization, configuration of semantic structures. On the basis of this 
framework, what needs to be particularly noted is that a single type of 
material or film devices does not lead directly to any specific kind of mean-
ing interpretation. For instance, as mentioned in the previous section, the 
media property of ‘digital mediated frames’ does not directly lead to any 
dynamic or demanding meaning interpretation processes. It is the contex-
tualization of these digital frames in the broader narrative structures, 
which achieve specific narrative functions.
Similar distinction has also been explicitly pointed out by Elleström 
(2020), when pointing out the crucial categories of presemiotic phenom-
enon of mediation and semiotic phenomena of representation. In 
his words:
Mediation is the display of sensory configurations by the technical medium 
(and hence also by the media product) that are perceived by human sense 
receptors in a communicative situation. It is a presemiotic phenomenon that 
Fig. 5.1 Strata of narrative functions in film analysis
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should be understood as the physical realisation of entities with material, 
spatiotemporal and sensorial qualities—and semiotic potential. For instance, 
one may hear a sound. Representation is a semiotic phenomenon that 
should be understood as the core of signification, which I delimit to how 
humans create cognitive import in communication. When a perceiver’s 
mind forms sense of the mediated sensory configurations, sign functions are 
activated and representation is at work. For instance, the heard sound may 
be interpreted as a voice uttering meaningful words. (Elleström 2020: 39)
Applying the analytical strata to examine digital mediation in film, the 
rest of this chapter will address the hypothesis: The two seemingly para-
doxical narrative functions, message truthfulness and affective impact, can 
actually complement each other, when the presemiotic property of digital 
media frames are contextualized/semiotized with the narrative strategies, 
such as restricted narration or media channels widely used in the societies 
of the audience.
To address the hypotheses, the stratified semiotic framework put for-
ward above needs to consider the latest findings of the cognitive research, 
in order to explain how the functions of truthfulness and affective engage-
ment are achieved by blending digital media frames in films. This is eluci-
dated in the following subsections.
5.3.2  Media Frames, Human Memory, and Truthfulness
In general, blending conventional cinema with the media frames, which 
the viewers use in their day-to-day life, increases the viewers’ perception of 
message authenticity and enhances the persuasive and rhetoric function of 
narratives. This hypothesis draws on the recent findings of neuro- cognitive 
sciences (Zacks 2015: 101–107). The empirical evidence shows that a 
piece of information does not necessarily have a persuasive impact in the 
moment we perceive it, but its significance may grow in our memories 
over time. Moreover, our memories about the media channel which car-
ries the information may be blurred over time. For instance, we have prob-
ably all experienced this before: you can remember the content of a certain 
piece of information but do not quite remember where you saw, read, or 
heard it. Hence, the plausibility and truthfulness of a message framed by 
mediated images in film may increase over time. This is precisely the 
empirical foundation of mediated image and the narrative function of 
enhancing truthfulness in film.
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Using mediated images to increase the truthfulness has been applied in 
cinema for decades. For instance, Oliver Stone’s film JFK (1991) cuts 
between actual footage of the alleged assassin Lee Harvey Oswald and the 
staged images of actor Gary Oldman who plays Oswald. It mixes fact with 
fiction to propagate the idea that Kennedy was the victim of a conspiracy. 
Phyllida Lloyd’s Iron Lady (2011) uses a similar strategy, intercutting 
between close-ups of Meryl Streep and real news footage, which some-
times includes archival images of Margaret Thatcher, in an attempt to blur 
the boundary between factual frames and fictional frames. Apart from 
biopics, several recent war films also use online news report, YouTube 
clips, Skype chats, and diegetic camera to add the realism and truthfulness 
of the representation of soldiers’ experiences and trauma. Along the same 
lines, the mediated images enhance the persuasive function, message 
truthfulness, and ideological impact through blending fictional narrative 
with the media frames that we use in our day-to-day life (Tseng 
2018b: 54–55).
5.3.3  Distinguishing Embodied and Contemplative Affects
The narrative functions of affective engagement and truthfulness can be 
seen as intertwining rather than paradoxical if we consider the multi- 
layered research framework of human emotion recently put forward by 
several affective psychologists (cf. Asma and Gabriel 2019).
In general, human emotions are filtered through the three inter- relating 
layers of mind: At the lowest primary level, affective intensity, such as fear, 
lust, thirst, prod human beings for the exploitation of resources. At the 
middle level, human brain creates a close link between these primary affec-
tive systems and the experiential learning and conditioning that we 
undergo in our daily life. At this secondary level, fear, for instance, becomes 
more specific due to the day-to-day encounter with people and other 
objects. For example, we tend to be afraid of the dark, we have fear of 
height, we feel uncomfortable in a restricted, cramped space or when hear-
ing grating sounds. At a higher level, emotion is enmeshed with higher- 
level conceptual and narrative thinking. At this level, we arrive at 
social-cultural related emotions, such as ruminations and elaborate, con-
templative feelings. The empirical evidence also found that, although 
higher-level emotions are still rooted in the lower level of human primary 
affective instinct, nevertheless, the higher level plays a crucial role in the 
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cognitive executive functions of the mind, slowing and policing our more 
automatic primary responses.
We can generally map these basic layers to the affective functions of 
audiovisual storytelling reviewed above. The affective types, which are 
bodily grounded and regarded as non-cognitive, can be categorized as 
emotions at the two lower layers. For instance, embodied affective response 
triggered by restricted space in film, distorted images and creaking sounds. 
The digital media frames can trigger these embodied affective responses 
when they are contextualized in particular narrative strategies. This is 
exemplified in the war film Lebanon (2009). Digital media frames are con-
textualized with the strategy of confined space. This film is a compact war 
film focusing on a group of Israeli soldiers operating a tank in hostile ter-
ritory during the 1982 conflict in Lebanon. Example screenshots of the 
film are displayed in Fig. 5.2. Many scenes of the film use the limited, 
rounded-off perspective of the frames (implying the soldiers’ perspective 
from the tank toward the battlefield outside). In other words, Lebanon 
blends the frames of the soldier’s telescope with restricted space to embody 
a cramped and suffocating affective response.
Finally, the higher-level emotions, namely, the more elaborated, 
empathy- related emotions are triggered by cognitive reasoning within 
particular social-cultural contexts. Mapping this to affective functions in 
film, this emotional level is the ‘product’ of cognitive, semiotic process, 
generated by the interpretation of film narrative events. This is precisely 
the level where the function of message truthfulness complements with 
emotional engagement—the viewers’ contemplative emotion is supported 
by the metaphorical link between film events and the viewers’ truthful, 
factual life experiences and is in turn the crucial factor for perspective 




taking, reflecting on the significance of social-cultural, educational issues 
dealt within the film.
Several recent films composed substantially of computer screen com-
munications make use of the affective engagements based on this higher 
level. The film Profile (2018) is such an example. Shown in Fig. 5.3, this 
film follows a British journalist who dives into the online propaganda 
machine of the so-called Islamic State. The entire film is composed of 
online communication between the journalist and an ISIS fighter. In the 
beginning of the film, journalist Amy Whittaker creates a new Facebook 
profile under the alias of Melody Nelson, in order to investigate the 
recruitment of young European women by ISIS. She creates a persona 
online of a woman who has recently converted to Islam. Soon Amy is 
contacted by Bilel, an ISIS fighter from Syria. They begin to talk to each 
other via Skype, before she dangerously develops real romantic feelings for 
him. Throughout this film, the use of computer screen and online chats 
establishes the metaphorical link to the truthful communication form that 
is widely used in our digital age. The link then enhances the empathetic 
affective engagement drawing on the audience’s familiarity with Skype and 
other social media. This then supports the contemplative emotion trig-
gered by issues and stories depicted in the film.
5.3.4  Forms of Digital Mediation in Film 
and Affective Engagement
It is often argued that blending mediated frames such as diegetic camera 
or computer screen in film enhances the viewer’s emotional attachment to 
the character due to the dominant use of point-of-view shots. Despite the 
embodied affective response possibly triggered by point-of-view shots, as 
Fig. 5.3 Selected screenshots from Profile (dir. Timur Bekmambetov, 2018). All 
rights reserved
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analyzed in the Lebanon example, nevertheless, empirical investigation has 
suggested that the film technique of point-of-view shot itself does not 
automatically trigger any higher-leveled empathetic emotion (Andringa 
et al. 2001). In other words, the use of the point-of-view shot does not 
directly function to evoke particular emotional engagement in film (Smith 
1994: 39). The chapter argues that this aspect again needs to be unpacked 
with the distinction of presemiotic media properties and semiotic struc-
tures. The affordances of point-of-view shots to generate empathetic, 
affective engagements can only be highlighted when these media proper-
ties are contextualized in the particular semantic structures of narrative, 
for instance, when restricted narration (Bordwell and Thompson 2010: 
Chapter 3) is constructed.
Restricted narration refers to confining the viewer’s narrative knowl-
edge via a character’s first-person documentation, and observation is the 
narrative strategy that has been used in filmmaking for decades before the 
emergence of digital mediation. Ever since the emergence of the portable 
camera, films such as Georg (1964), The War Game (1965), and 84 Charlie 
MoPic (1989) have made use of the technique of mediated images to pres-
ent a compilation of first-person observations. The use of footage from a 
mediated first-person perspective confines the audience’s knowledge to 
what a specific character knows. One major affective function of such 
restricted narration is that it powerfully builds suspense, uncertainty (this 
is why handheld camera footage or compute screen footage is widely used 
in horror films) and forces the viewer to empathize with the character’s 
experiences in the story world. In other words, restricted narration 
through first-person observation is an effective channel for locating the 
audience to empathize the character’s developments contextualized within 
the narrative structures.
The horror film Cloverfield, shown in Fig. 5.4, is a particularly interest-
ing example of restricted narration. The entire film is composed of camera 
footages filmed by characters. The film begins with a clear exposition, 
endorsing the truthfulness of the footage resource—it is framed as a gov-
ernment SD video card. The official-looking writing tells us we are about 
to see video recovered from a camera found in Central Park. When the 
tape starts, showing the main characters in happy times in the bedroom of 
her apartment overlooking Central Park, its readout date of April plays the 
role of an omniscient opening title. In the course of the film, the digital 
readouts explicitly tell the viewers when the story events take place in the 
earlier phase of their love affair and when we are seeing the horror attack 
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by a monster in May. In other words, although the footage looks frag-
mented in order to represent the truthfulness of recovered footage by the 
government, they are cohesively bound together into a conventional hor-
ror genre structure.
Due to the restricted narration throughout the film, the viewers know 
no more than the characters being attacked by a monster. But the viewers 
are first given glimpses of the main characters’ relationships and emotional 
responses to their peril and are able to build empathy drawing on the 
character-centered narrative developments. The film also gives more wide- 
ranging information about what is happening outside the characters’ 
immediate situation, by showing newspaper reports, radio bulletins, and 
TV coverage of action occurring elsewhere.
Another form of digital mediation draws on simulating the interactive 
experiences that we encounter each day, for example, social media on 
computer screen, smartphone interaction, and YouTube videos. As men-
tioned in the analysis of Profile, this form of digital mediation has the 
potential for triggering our empathetic attachment drawing on the meta-
phorical projection from the communication that we encounter within 
our daily social circle. Nevertheless, along the same lines, the affective 
intensity of digital mediation is built upon combining our familiarity of 
the media forms and the contextualization of these digital media proper-
ties within the narrative semantics of story contents. Often the affective 
impact substantially relies on the dramatically emotional story themes that 
the characters are dealing with. In other words, digital frames might add a 
layer of emotional attachment to the overall emotional impact due to our 
daily experiences with these media platforms; nevertheless, the overall arch 
of story forms and contents remains the main trigger of empathetic, affec-
tive intensity.
Fig. 5.4 Selected screenshots from Cloverfield (dir. Matt Reeves, 2008). All 
rights reserved
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This proposal can be best exemplified in recent films such as Redacted 
(2007). This war film is based on a real event that took place in Samara in 
2006, when a group of young American soldiers raped and murdered a 
14-year-old girl and killed her family. In an interview at the 45th New York 
Film Festival, the film director Brian de Palma explained that he was 
adopting an experimental method to tell the story by using footage he 
found on the Internet. However, in bringing these fragmented media sto-
ries together, he had to fictionalize and restructure that existing material, 
and it is this process that ultimately gives the film a classical, coherent nar-
rative structure.
The film begins with a video diary recorded by Private Angel Salazar’s 
camcorder, which provides the main media source for the events depicted 
in the film. This is followed by several other mediated formats: a French 
documentary with voiceover narration, reports from Arab news channels, 
camera recordings played on Al Qaeda sites, embedded journalist reports, 
clips from ‘Soldiers’ Wives’ and the ‘Get Out of Iraq’ campaign websites, 
military surveillance cameras, recordings of military hearings, and so on. 
Pisters argues that in this film, “all these different formats and screens are 
entangled in complex ways and present different points of view of the 
same events” (Pisters 2010: 238). The dominant strategy of the film, 
namely, representing points of view, is used right in the beginning when 
the film opens with footages of soldier’s handheld camera.
As discussed above, these media devices are contextualized in the sol-
dier’s war narratives drawing on the discourse of restricted narration—
right in the beginning of this film, we are confined to see through the 
soldier’s eyes and are put to interpret truthful experiences of these 
American soldiers. The main character and his interaction with other sol-
diers are presented by him filming himself and his surroundings, shown in 
Fig.  5.5. This is the technique of mediated first-person point-of-view 
within restricted narration defined by Bordwell and Thompson (2010: 
Chapter 3)—although the character captures story events for the viewers, 
the footage nevertheless fit the premise of video recording to the demands 
of coherent, conventional narrative structures.
A decade later, several films start to use computer screen to represent 
first-person point-of-view. While several film critics celebrate the new way 
of filmmaking, nevertheless, the semantic strategies of restricted narration, 
for representing truthful message sources and emotional response drawing 
on characters’ narrative developments, remain similar to other forms of 
digital media frames used decades ago.
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Searching, shown in Fig.  5.6, for instance, deals with a father who 
breaks into his missing daughter’s laptop to find out everything he possi-
bly can about her sudden disappearance. The entire film takes place from 
the perspective of computer screens, which not only truthfully demon-
strates the crime-solving potential of the Google search engine and social 
media information but also shows just how much of ourselves exist in 
online spaces. The film begins with several video clips and pictures shown 
directly from the main character’s computer. These videos and pictures 
linearly depict story background: the family Kim’s life and finally their loss 
of the mother/wife. The film beginning, like Redacted and Cloverfield, 
first anchors the viewer’s emotional attachment to the main characters by 
showing their intimate life experience and character features, before the 
traumatic events unfold.
As our example analyses show, film substantially using digital mediation 
often starts with endorsing the truthful media sources and lead to frag-
mented first-person point-of-view; nevertheless, these films still construct 
Fig. 5.5 Selected screenshots from Redacted (dir. Brian de Palma, 2007). All 
rights reserved
Fig. 5.6 Selected screenshots from Searching (dir. Aneesh Chaganty, 2018). All 
rights reserved
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conventional and coherent narrative structures, providing sufficient back-
ground knowledge for the viewers to interpret the linear, straightforward 
story events, which evoke empathetic, emotional attachment to the main 
characters.
5.4  fInal remarks
To date, several film scholars have mixed the perception of media and nar-
rative functions. This chapter pointed out the problems caused by the 
mixture of media properties and meaning interpretation process. It pro-
posed to distinguish levels of mediation and semiotic representation draw-
ing on the findings of cognitive and semiotic research. This chapter 
particularly uses the film technique of digital mediation to show the pro-
cess of contextualizing mediated frames in order to realize semiotics-based 
narrative functions, above all, representation of message truthfulness and 
affective engagements, which have long been regarded as paradoxical.
Mediated images have been used in cinema for decades for enhancing 
the affective engagement and to endorse the first-person truthful narra-
tion. On the basis of the multi-leveled framework delineated in Fig. 5.1, 
digitally mediated frames is a presemiotic property—it can be contextual-
ized in horror films to achieve the semiotic functions of affective intensity; 
it can also be semiotized in drama or war films for enhancing first-person 
truthful narration. As the film examples presented in this chapter, digital 
mediation in film can often interconnect the affective and truthful narra-
tive functions. Moreover, in the last two decades, digital mediation has 
moved the mediated first-person point-of-view from portable camera to 
computer screen. As we could see in the above example, analyses, despite 
the change of media frames, the narrative functions of restricted narrative, 
representation of truthful message resources and straightforward character 
engagement remain dominant.
Nevertheless, the distinctive media affordances of computer screens 
used in film bring about other narrative functions which camera footage 
does not construct. While camera footage reflects a medium that bears 
narrative actions, computer screens simply bear narrative actions. 
Computer screens add a touch of immediacy to the first-person point-of- 
view. For instance, the character’s typing and deleting the message on the 
screen or dialing Skype calls, clicking on webpages, and so on are all part 
of immediate point of view. Essentially, the viewers are just watching words 
and dialing, clicking, browsing actions on a screen, but the actions feel 
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relatable and human. In our real lives, we do not just passively watch com-
puter screens like we watch camera footage; in our lives, we constantly 
interact with them as a means of communication which, in turn, has grown 
new forms of human behavior in our age. Computer screen-based, imme-
diate point of view in narrative film depicts this new interactive format of 
ours and new affordance of media which has been explored in cinema today.
Nevertheless, the comparison between computer screen and camera 
footage holds only when we base the analysis on the multi-leveled semiotic 
framework—the function of enhancing immediacy in computer screens 
can be achieved only when particular semiotic structures are realized: for 
instance, when the character’s actions of clicking, typing directly on the 
computer screen are shown to the viewers within the first-person film 
frames. Simply showing a computer screen without co-patterning these 
event actions would not achieve the same effects. For instance, in the war 
film Redacted, analyzed in the previous section, several websites, YouTube 
videos, and Skype chats are also shown via computer screens (see Fig. 5.7). 
However, the semiotic structures of these scenes in Redacted do not reflect 
the character’s interaction with the media features of computer screens. 
Fig. 5.7 Selected screenshots of computer screen scenes from Redacted (dir. 
Brian de Palma, 2007). All rights reserved
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Here, the computer screen is a platform similar to the intra-diegetic cam-
era screen which carries the mediated actions. This might still endorse the 
message truthfulness due to the digital frames the viewers are engaged in 
daily, but the first-person perspective is not realized in this kind of event 
construction.
In summary, this chapter has analyzed films made in the last two 
decades, entirely composed of digital mediated images. The analyses com-
pared the different media affordances and narrative functions of camera 
footage and computer screens. While the narrative functions of truthful-
ness and affect remain stable, the affordances of computer screens add the 
immediacy of actions to the first person point of view in film. Through the 
analyses, I hope to have shown that subtle comparisons of semiotic repre-
sentation, media perception, different types of affective response, and 
emotional engagements can be more effectively unraveled with a multi- 
leveled framework, which encompasses sufficient research synthesis across 
empirical findings of cognitive studies and semiotic theories.
note
1. The application of ‘macro-theme’ to film narratives has also been discussed 
in our previous work, which unravels how puzzle films or narrative complex 
films construct beginning structures for the viewers’ narrative affective and 
narrative predictions (Bateman and Tseng 2013).
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6.1  IntroductIon
Smartphones, tablets and computers make texts available in a number of 
different technological formats and have changed the way we read in the 
digital age. This raises the question of whether we need to understand 
reading on new terms. It can be done by theoretically embracing and 
investigating the multimodality of texts as a precondition for media- 
specific analysis, as suggested by Lars Elleström (2020). It can also, in 
continuation hereof, be investigated in relation to the multimodal aspects 
of reading as well as to the technological conditions for reading. To illus-
trate the current changes in digital reading this chapter discusses a medium 
that has gained huge global popularity because of the development of 
digital technologies. It is also a medium that challenges a traditional con-
ception of what it means to read a book because—can you read with 
the ears?
An audiobook is an electronic book format which is listened to instead 
of being read in the traditional sense. Long before e-books became avail-
able, literature appeared in the form of audiobooks in electronic and digi-
tal formats. Historically, the audiobook has been described as a kind of 
by-product of the printed book and as a service for readers who for various 
reasons have difficulty reading printed books—either because they do not 
see well, have not learned to read (yet), or because they are dyslexic.
This has changed with the advent of digital media: first, the audiobook 
is no longer a by-product which, if the sales figures for the printed book 
are high enough, is recorded long after the book is printed. Today, the 
market for audiobooks is so big that they are often published at the same 
time as both the printed and the e-book, which creates a flexibility of read-
ing choice from the moment of publication. Second, audiobooks are no 
longer for the few, but for everyone. The digital audiobook appeals to a 
much broader group of consumers than audiobooks did previously. As 
early as 2006, an American study showed that people who listened to 
audiobooks on an average became younger, compared to earlier years, and 
more well off (Audio Publishers Association 2006: 1). In addition, around 
half of audiobook customers are men, who otherwise only buy one in four 
books sold (Arvin 2010). By definition, an audiobook is a recording of a 
printed, published book (Have and Pedersen 2016), but the explosion in 
usage of audiobooks has caused a detachment from the printed original, 
so the audiobook is recognised as a medium in its own right. The mobility 
of the audiobook and the possibility for readers to engage with literature 
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at the same time as they are, for example, doing exercises or commuting 
by bike, train or car, also fits well with a modern lifestyle.
The digital audiobook raises a number of interesting issues regarding its 
modal aspects—not at least compared to the experience of reading a 
printed book. We have previously discussed the distinct features of the 
experience of book reading and audiobook reading, building on Lars 
Elleström’s ideas of the modalities of media (Elleström 2010; Have and 
Pedersen 2012, 2016). Here we have been highlighting that according to 
Elleström’s model for understanding media (2020), the digital audiobook 
and the printed book differ in a number of aspects, which makes it evident 
that we need to understand the different literary experiences in a media 
sensitive way. This means that we underline the importance of technology 
and the context of the reading situation, while being sensitive to the spe-
cifically auditive sensory aspects of the audiobook (e.g., the voice and the 
temporal aspects of the experience).
The chapter takes a context and user perspective on the experience of 
audiobooks and asks the fundamental question, to what extent we can say 
that we ‘read’ an audiobook. Reading is conceptualised as an institution-
alised skill which is learned in school and which is connected to the coop-
eration between sight and cognition. Research on reading in schools is 
often tied closely to national contexts, and in that sense, you will find both 
similarities and differences when it comes to national research on reading. 
It seems, however, that concepts like phonemic awareness, phonics, flu-
ency, vocabulary and comprehension are among the ingredients of reading 
definition, in this case, the national reading panel of the United States 
(Read Naturally 2018).
If reading in everyday usage means, among other things, visually “per-
ceiving the content of written or printed texts”, as Gyldendal’s Den Store 
Danske dictionary (2019) defines it, we cannot say that we read an audio-
book. If, on the other hand, reading is about “recreating mental images 
on the basis of identification of the text’s words”, as it is defined in the 
same source (2019), we may argue that we can read by listening to litera-
ture in the same way that we also use the concept of reading when speak-
ing of Braille. In a Danish context, the aspect of written word decoding 
has for many years been at the core of the reading definition put forward 
by leading reading researches which makes it difficult to include use of 
audiobooks as a reading practice.
We wish to emphasise the sensorial as well as the technological aspects 
of the reading activity; in that sense we regard the audiobook reading 
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activity as multisensory in itself. This also can be said to be the case regard-
ing printed book reading: you read a book in a specific setting, using your 
sight to visually and cognitively perceive the written text; in that sense, 
also reading a book takes place in a situation where sounds, smells and 
other bodily senses are important. The audiobook reading activity, how-
ever, not using sight for the reading activity, creates new possibilities for 
mobile reading experiences, listening while walking, bicycling or driving, 
and the mobility takes part in the meaning creating, semiotic process of 
reading a book. The multisensory aspects act beyond language; however, 
they take part in the meaning creating process. In this sense, we displace 
the focus of interest in the analytical strategies from a more classical close 
reading of a text to include also the technological aspects as well as the 
sensory, situational and context-oriented aspects of the reading situation.
The first two sections of the chapter are about what sort of medium the 
audiobook is, how we use it, and what sort of reading experience it affords. 
Thereafter three sections follow which suggest, on the basis of Helle 
Helle’s novel Ned til hundene (Down to the Dogs) (2008), how the audio-
book experience as a whole may be analysed with regard to ‘technological 
framing’, ‘reading situations’ and ‘the voice’, respectively. After these 
three sections, the reading of audiobooks is discussed in relation to the 
experience of time and depth, before the chapter concludes with a 
brief résumé.
6.2  the Formats oF the audIobook
Whether it makes sense to call an audiobook a book is an open question, 
since it as a medium, as experience and in usage is fundamentally different 
from the printed book (Have and Pedersen 2016). Technologically and 
materially, the audiobook has nothing in common with the printed book; 
rather, it shares its technology and formats with music. Thus, the techno-
logical histories of the audiobook and of recorded music run parallel. The 
starting point was Edison’s invention of the phonograph in 1877, the 
original aim of which was to record speech. Later, in around 1900, the 
vinyl record was invented, and in the 1970s, the cassette tape became the 
audiobook’s primary storage medium, so that it could now be listened to 
on cassette recorders, Walkmans and the inbuilt tape decks in cars. It was 
also with the invention of the cassette tape that the term ‘audiobook’ 
began to be used about recorded books (Rubery 2011: 8).
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In the 1980s, the digital CD slowly began to take over the market for 
audiobooks. First as digital audio CDs to be played on traditional CD 
players, later as MP3 CDs. MP3 CDs can be played in the CD player at 
home or in the car, but the compressed files can also be transferred via a 
computer to most computer-based playback media such as smartphones 
(Sterne 2012). Even though audiobooks are today still in circulation as 
both CDs and cassette tapes, audiobooks have become less tangible and 
are now primarily disseminated via the Internet as downloads or via 
streaming. Due to technological developments, audiobooks have thus 
become easier to use. To take an example from Matthew Rubery’s intro-
duction to the book Audiobooks, Literature, and Sound Studies (2011), 
the development of storage media for audiobooks means that Tolstoy’s 
War and Peace in an unabridged edition has gone from demanding 119 
vinyl records, 45 cassettes or 50 CDs, to having become today, with the 
MP3, weightless (Rubery 2011: 9).
That it nevertheless makes sense to speak of an audiobook, in spite of the 
technological, aesthetic and usage-based differences from the printed 
book, is due to it requiring, according to our definition of an audiobook, 
a prior or contemporary printed book and an institutionalised literary con-
text in the form of authors, publishing houses, bookshops, libraries and so 
on. This means that not all recordings of texts read aloud are audiobooks 
and that a recorded oral tale without a written source is not an audiobook 
either. This also means that there are differences between audiobooks, talk 
radio and podcasts—even though they all more or less consist of texts read 
aloud—because the two last-named typically arise from media institutions 
and ‘on-demand blogging culture’. At the same time as the audiobook is 
part of the literary ecology, it is also part of the culture surrounding mobile 
sound media—that which Michael Bull described as “iPod culture” 
(2007), but which has today become part of a broader smartphone cul-
ture. With the smartphone as the primary platform for listening to audio-
books, the discussion of the audiobook as a medium is also inscribed in a 
broader discussion about media convergence, where it merges with vari-
ous other everyday private and social digital activities (Schulz 2004). By 
defining the audiobook as a sound recording of a literary or academic 
book which is read aloud, usually by professional actors or the author 
him/herself, we understand the audiobook as a remediation of the book 
(Bolter and Grusin 2000), which underlines that the auditive mediation of 
literature adds substantial new aspects to the work. The narrative and its 
structure are the same, but in the audiobook the way in which it appears, 
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and thus is experienced, changes radically (Bednar 2010: 80). Seen histori-
cally, the audiobook is not just a remediation of the printed book but also 
refers back to the oral tradition of oral tales and the reading aloud of nov-
els, long before literature became an institutional concept (Ong 2002).
6.3  do We read an audIobook?
Today, we access texts in a number of different ways, among them in 
books, on paper, smartphones, tablets and computers. When we listen to 
an audiobook, are we then reading the book, or are we listening to it, and 
are these two activities fundamentally different? In 1994, Sven Birkerts 
wrote in the chapter “Close listening” in The Gutenberg Elegies (1994) of 
both a fascination and an aversion to the audiobook experience:
[O]nce we grant the audio book its attractions, we are still confronted with 
the question of its whatness. This is no mere epiphenomenon; it is a full- 
fledged trend. As life gets more complex, people are likely to read less and 
listen more. The medium shapes the message and the message bears directly 
on who we are; it forms us. Listening is not reading, but what is it? (Birkerts 
1994: 145)
Audiobook researchers today do not necessarily agree with Birkerts that 
we do not read an audiobook when we listen to it. In order to discuss the 
differences between listening and reading, it is however necessary to speak 
of the activity of listening as something other than reading understood as 
a visual decoding of writing. One argument for such a differentiation is 
that in our everyday usage of media, we also change between platforms 
when ‘reading’. Don Katz, the founder of Amazon’s audiobook service 
Audible, who has a promotional rather than research-based perspective on 
the matter, says:
We’re moving toward a media-agnostic consumer who doesn’t think of the 
difference between textual and visual and auditory experience […] It’s the 
story, and it is there for you in the way you want it. (Don Katz cited in 
Alter 2013)
The individual semiotic and sensorial expressions—individually or 
together—function, according to Katz, to a greater degree than previously 
as channels which mediate stories. Katz is perhaps right in saying that in 
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everyday usage we think less about the specific sensorial medium (e.g., 
sound or writing) in which the story appears. It may be argued, on the 
other hand, that the technological medium, the experience and the physi-
cal usage are different depending on whether you are reading Scott 
Fitzgerald’s novel The Great Gatsby from 1925 as black ink on white pages 
with a hardcover, whether you are listening to Jake Gyllenhaal reading the 
novel aloud through headphones on a smartphone or whether you are 
allowing yourself to be absorbed in the darkness of the cinema together 
with other cinemagoers while watching Baz Luhrmann’s film version from 
2013. The medium is of importance, and this transposition is not a fric-
tionless transition, but it alters the object itself. An analysis of an audio-
book must therefore be medium-specific and medium-sensitive. A story 
changes when it is moved to another medium, and strategies of analysis 
must therefore be developed which are sensitive to these material and 
technological differences (Hayles 2004). The concurrent presence of both 
audio and visual text at, for example, the smartphone, offers the techno-
logical possibility to read with both the eyes and ears on the same plat-
form—for example, through Amazon’s feature Whispersync for Voice, 
which makes it possible to change ‘seamlessly’ (as they describe it) between 
an e-book and an audiobook version, which supports Katz’s argument 
about the ‘agnostic’ media consumer.
In everyday speech, it is still widespread to speak of the activity of read-
ing an audiobook as listening, but in our experience, consumers of both 
audio and paper books do not specifically differentiate between which 
books they have read and which they have listened to (cf. also Bednar 
2010: 81). When you have listened to Jake Gyllenhaal reading The Great 
Gatsby, or to Helle Helle reading her own Ned til hundene (2008), have 
you then read that book? In one sense, the person reading aloud has read 
the book for you, but in this chapter, we want to insist that reading should 
not be reduced to the visual decoding of writing but can also be an audi-
tive decoding of an audiobook, which offers a different form of literary 
experience.
Using the Danish author Helle Helle’s novel Ned til hundene as a recur-
ring example, we will in the following describe which parameters are 
important to include in an analysis of the audiobook as a medium, and of 
particular audiobook experiences. The specific technology, access and 
reading situation are important, being bearers of meaning in the analysis 
of medium sensitivity. In this method, we refer to the American philoso-
pher of technology Don Ihde’s so-called postphenomenology, an 
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analytical strategy which seeks to integrate a material perspective into an 
experience-oriented phenomenological philosophical position. Ihde writes 
that “postphenomenology is a modified phenomenology hybrid” (2009: 
23). The fundamental premise of a postphenomenological position implies 
that we understand technology as objects which act and together with the 
situation as a whole constitute a dynamic understanding of our lifeworld. 
In this way, this chapter also tries “to probe and analyze the role of tech-
nologies in social, personal, and cultural life” (Ihde 2009: 23).
If we analyse audiobook reading and book reading in continuation of 
Elleström’s conception of modalities (2020), it is not possible to accept 
the idea of a seamless transition. Instead, taking into account the material, 
the sensorial, the spatiotemporal, as well as the semiotic modality, the 
audiobook performs the reading experience on distinct and almost totally 
different terms from the printed book as we have elaborated on earlier 
(Have and Pedersen 2012). In this sense, the theoretical framework for 
analysing the audiobook is inspired by Elleström (2010, 2020), however 
adding some perspectives. We are studying the audiobook reading situa-
tions from an everyday, sociologically oriented perspective as well, also 
including discussions of how the audiobook takes part in circuits of cul-
tural value, renegotiating also the production side of digital publishing 
(Have and Pedersen 2019). As we see it, reading an audiobook takes place 
in a triangulation between everyday practice, specific technological for-
mats/conditions and specific aesthetic or modal literary experiences of 
reading.
6.4  narratIve and themes In Ned til huNdeNe by 
helle helle
Helle Helle’s novel Ned til hundene came out in 2008 and was published 
by Gyldendal Lyd (Gyldendal Sound) the same year, read by the author 
herself. Helle Helle usually reads her texts herself, and she has often been 
singled out as exemplary with regard to successful author recordings. 
Following a brief presentation of the novel’s narrative and its narrative 
characteristics, some important analytical focus points will follow, which 
attempt to encompass some of the audiobook’s particularities as a medium 
and reading experience.
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The novel takes place in the countryside somewhere in Denmark, 
where we in the opening scene meet a 42-year-old female main charac-
ter, the author Bente, who at the beginning of the novel finds herself 
with a suitcase in a not defined place. We understand that the main char-
acter has left her home without a clear aim and that she is waiting for a 
bus in a corner of provincial Denmark. The bus is cancelled because of a 
storm warning, and the main character is invited by Putte and John into 
their home, where they live with their dogs. We are, on the one hand, 
witness to a tense situation, where someone has left something behind 
for an unclear but potentially problematic reason. This reason is never 
quite revealed, but the reader follows the main character’s life with John 
and Putte and their friends, while we are presented with glimpses of 
Bente’s past: her husband Bjørnvig, who is a dermatologist, and her 
woes as an author with writer’s block, who has left her disintegrating 
marriage—and perhaps oeuvre—behind.
The novel follows life with John and Putte, with whom the author has 
taken up residence, taking part in everyday life by feeding the dogs, filling 
in lottery tickets, playing a number of board games and visiting John and 
Putte’s family. In general, the story describes this scenario from the Danish 
provinces where fundamental existential questions probably lurk beneath 
the surface but are rarely exposed or taken up explicitly in the text. Finally, 
the narrator receives a phone call from her husband, and Putte puts this 
potentially existential question to the protagonist: “Do you want to be 
found?” (or “Do you want to exist?”. In Danish the sentence is “Vil du 
findes?” and ‘findes’ both means to be found and to exist).
Whereas the introductory scene suggests a kind of formative journey, 
the story ends up taking place in and depicting the everyday provincial 
scenario in a peculiarly laconic and loyal tone of voice. The situation which 
we as readers are thrown into from the beginning of the novel intones a 
tension which suggests a dramatic arc, but the expectant position remains 
stationary, among other things qua the story’s tone of voice, its static plot 
and its preference for registering details.
A fair amount of direct speech is used in the novel, broken by descrip-
tive, registering and reflective passages. It is built up around a number of 
apparent contradictions, which in terms of narrative technique appear in 
the shifts between interior monologue and a plan of action consisting of 
descriptions and direct speech. In terms of context, details such as the dif-
ficulty of eating a croissant with chicken salad, and dwelling on knee- 
length socks, are in this way contrasted with a tacit existential crisis and an 
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apparent escalation of the drama: a coffin is, for example, described as 
well-suited both for storing board games and for trying out how it must 
feel to be dead. The concluding remark about whether she wants to be 
found or not suggests a short-circuiting of meaning or an existential 
doubt, which lurks in the wings of the novel, but which is seldom 
articulated.
6.5  technologIcal FrameWork
Ned til hundene is a relatively short novel of 157 pages, and as an audio-
book it only lasts 3 hours and 39 minutes, which is short for an audio-
book. If you buy the audiobook as download from one of the major 
Danish Internet bookshops such as Saxo, you pay half the price of the 
printed edition. Once the audiobook is bought and the e-commerce con-
firmed, it is sent to the buyer’s email address as a compressed ZIP-file. Ned 
til hundene can now be downloaded and unpacked in order to gain access 
to the 53 MP3 files which make up the audiobook itself, which takes a few 
minutes. It is now up to the consumer to name the file folder, which in this 
case comes with a visual book cover, which is important in giving the pur-
chase a recognisable aesthetic representation and ‘materiality’. The audio-
book can thereafter be transferred to the consumer’s other devices, such 
as a smartphone, but cannot be legally shared with others, unlike the 
printed book which can be lent to friends and family.
The audiobook can also be accessed via a streaming service, for exam-
ple, Mofibo, which is the North European counterpart to Audible where 
you pay a monthly subscription in order to be able to stream or download 
audiobooks. When streaming, you can only read audiobooks when you 
have an Internet connection and therefore do not have the same feeling of 
owning the audiobook as you do with a download. Recently, the Internet 
bookshop Saxo also introduced a streaming service. From their webpage, 
you can now decide whether you want to buy Ned til hundene as down-
load or subscribe to ‘Saxo Premium’ and get access to the book from an 
app downloaded to your smartphone or tablet.
On eReolen, a service offered by the Danish libraries, it is possible to 
both download and stream electronic e-books and audiobooks for 30 days 
at a time. The lending of audiobooks via eReolen has been such a great 
success that in 2015 some authors and several large publishing houses, 
among them Gyldendal, chose to recall all publications from eReolen for 
the sake of their own turnover and the authors’ honorariums. Ned til 
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hundene is therefore no longer to be found on eReolen. The unlimited 
digital copies of books on eReolen have of course caused debate, since the 
free access of Danish citizens to literature stands in opposition to the abil-
ity of the producers to earn money. Attempts have been made to limit the 
lending by limiting the number of audiobooks a person can lend at any 
one time to three and by limiting the number of digital copies of new 
releases that are available for lending.
Once Ned til hundene has been transferred to the telephone, it is saved 
with the other sound files in the phone’s music library. In iTunes in mani-
fests itself as 53 ‘songs’ on the ‘album’ Ned til hundene. In contrast to 
both downloads from eReolen and streaming services, the book is not 
saved as a long sequence but as 53 separate files, nor does iTunes remem-
ber where you got to if you listen to other sound files in between the 
audiobook. As the technology stands at the time of writing, a form of 
virtual bookmark is lacking, which works a lot better with regard to 
streaming. Apart from this, the interface looks like a traditional playback 
device, with icons for ‘play’, ‘stop’, ‘rewind’ and ‘fast forward’, as well as 
an indication of the volume and the ability to mix the order of the files 
during playback, which is hardly desirable with regard to a linear narrative. 
Audiobooks are often listened to through headphones, which also allow 
other audio signals from the telephone to break into the reading. In this 
way, the story stops or briefly fades out when someone calls or texts. 
Audiobooks are usually not recorded in stereo, so the same signal comes 
out of both sides of the headphones. It is obvious that small earbuds allow 
in more ambient sound than large headphones, and they may therefore be 
better suited to situations in which, for example, you want to be able to 
orient yourself in the traffic at the same time as listening to the audiobook.
In an analysis of the audiobook (both a particular audiobook and the 
audiobook as a technical medium), it is initially important to take into 
account the actual technologies and forms of distribution which frame 
listening, by interrogating the following aspects:
• Storage technologies (as sound files on a PC or in the cloud)
• Medium of distribution (the Internet)
• Providers (libraries, bookshops, streaming services)
• Playback media (computer, tablet, smartphone, loudspeakers, 
headphones)
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Each of these also includes some visual representations and functional 
structures which can be further described: book covers linked to MP3 
files, interfaces, functions and organisation on the providers’ Internet sites 
or apps and icons for using the playback medium.
The technology behind the actual production of audiobooks lies out-
side the focus of this chapter and will not be treated in more depth, but in 
the following, we will give some examples of how various situations of 
consumption also have an influence on the experience of an audiobook.
6.6  readIng sItuatIons
The act of reading an audiobook can occur in a relatively large number of 
ways. When reading a paper book, we may find ourselves in all sorts of 
different locations, but the activity of reading always holds the attention of 
our sight as long as the activity is taking place. We can read at the beach, 
on the train, in bed, in a comfortable chair or on the bus. When reading a 
digital audiobook, we can furthermore read in a car, and when using a 
mobile technology, we can read on the way to work, in the fitness centre, 
while knitting, gardening, running, biking or while at work (if doing pri-
marily manual labour).
These differences in possible reading situations at the same time point 
to great differences in modal spaces of experience. For example, does 
something happen to our experience of Helle Helle’s novel if the reading 
takes place on a long walk through a town, in comparison to if we read the 
book in bed in the dark before going to sleep? If we walk through an 
urban area and then along a beach and the edge of the woods while listen-
ing, the everyday spaces we find ourselves in will of course have an influ-
ence on the space of reading. The internal images of the woman waiting 
for the bus, of the chicken salad on her sleeve, of dwelling on the knee- 
length socks, of the lottery ticket in her hand, will evoke a different 
response when they are experienced in a bodily and mobile relation to a 
lifeworld. There is a transfer of impressions from the real to the literary 
universe, and at the same time, we can imagine that the characters and the 
locations in the book potentially also influence our experience of the phys-
ical surroundings. The character of the landscape in the actually sensed 
world can evoke a response in the literary space of imagination, or the 
book can add an atmosphere to what we are in the process of doing. The 
body in motion can also be experienced as a factor in the whole 
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experience. It lends rhythm and respiration to the reading, which can 
speak either with or against Helle Helle’s diction, pauses and vocal 
qualities.
When reading in the dark while falling asleep, other image-forming 
processes may arise. We can in this case imagine that the detailed nature of 
the language, and the potentially absurd situations described, will stand 
out more clearly, possibly in interplay with an increased emphasis on the 
diction of the voice and changes in tone from description and reflection to 
direct speech. Potentially, the atmosphere may here be more strongly tied 
to a stylistic sensibility, both with regard to the character of the language 
and—perhaps in particular—to an increased feeling for the voice of the 
performing narrator.
The use of the terms listening, reading and experience are related to 
ideas about concentration in the reader. There may be differences in the 
degree of identification with and immersion in an audiobook when driving 
a 12-hour route in a lorry, compared to walking around the house doing 
housework, activities that require differing degrees of concentration. The 
audiobook has suffered under the idea that listening is a more distracted 
form of reading than reading a paper book, among other things, because 
we can do other things at the same time (Kozloff 1995; Have and Pedersen 
2016). We would like to argue, however, that the attentiveness to the 
world and bodily participation has a potential for leading to more ‘deep’, 
‘immersed’ readings. In the article “Reading on the Move”, Lutz Koepnick 
suggests that:
To read between an audiobook’s lines—to read an audiobook deeply—
means to open your minds and senses to the productive interplay of ears, 
eyes, and bodily motions during the act of attending to the movements of a 
text. (Koepnick 2013: 236)
Things which may be perceived as disturbing or distracting elements in 
the listening experience—the landscape which passes by, an overtaking 
bike—may actually contribute to reinforcing rather than impairing the 
feeling of identification and immersion in a story. At the same time, we 
wish to reject the idea that listening to an audiobook is a more passive 
form of reading than reading a paper book—it can be just as captivating 
and gripping, but it is different and therefore requires different method-
ological approaches than the analysis of a traditional reading experience. 
Analysing sensorial aspects of the reading situation are here taken beyond 
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the relationship with the text as implied positions to also include the real 
reader as well as the specific context for use.
6.7  the voIce
The voice is the technical medium of display (Elleström 2020: 33–40), 
which most clearly points to the difference between the paper book and 
the audiobook, and an analysis of the audiobook ought therefore to 
include the role of the voice. The voice delivers an interpretation of the 
text and in so doing becomes a new medium for literature. In implement-
ing such an analysis, it is relevant to include the five points listed below, 
which can flow into one another and be combined as needed (Have and 
Pedersen 2016: 87).
• Technological processing of the voice
• The materiality of the voice, rhythm and diction
• The voice as a rhetorical situation, addressing the reader
• The enunciation of the voice, for example, author/narrator relation
• The voice in context: the age, gender and ethnicity of the person 
reading aloud
The recording of Ned til hundene is experienced as a very soundproof 
production. Only a few cuts are heard in the recording, which we notice 
when the intonation of the voice changes. A few sounds of the performing 
narrator’s mouth opening and closing can be perceived, as well as a few 
words which are spoken with a quiet whistling or lisp.
Helle Helle’s voice has a pleasant sound, which resonates in the mid-
tones. Her voice is neither particularly compressed nor especially airy, but 
functions well sonorously, is calm and pleasant to listen to, in the sense 
that it is a voice which does not draw attention to itself in a disturbing way. 
The reading is delivered with a fine and balanced diction, slightly drama-
tised through direct speech, during which the voice is raised to a slightly 
higher tone. When descriptive passages are read, the voice becomes more 
monotone. Generally speaking, Helle Helle has chosen to emphasise the 
ends of words, creating a pleasant sense of rhythm. Her feeling for dra-
matic pauses works in support of the narrative without demanding too 
much attention. Generally, a relatively transparent reading has been aimed 
at, in which the attempt has been made to stay loyal to the written word 
by not drawing too much attention to the mediation of the reading.
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Rhetorically, the reading style seems relatively monotone with con-
trolled fluctuations, which supports the minimalist, soft-voiced style of the 
book’s narrative. Stylistically, it seems almost deliberate that the contradic-
tions in the text are not marked by pauses and/or changes in the intensity 
of the reading voice: the sentences “Osteoporosis—hell on earth”, “It’s 
Bente”, “Do you want liver?—There’s a fine smell of onions here”, for 
example, are delivered in a flow without any particular expressivity or 
dynamic fluctuation. The existential difficulties are not elaborated on or 
interpreted in the text but revealed in the cracks of, for example, everyday 
observations, whether they be about lottery tickets or foodstuffs. This 
quality is supported here by the use of the voice, the intentional pauses of 
which typically seek to indicate changes in the register of the text.
The enunciation of the text is primarily about who is speaking. In a text 
there may be several narrators, who may be reliable or unreliable. These 
narrators are as we know not identical with the author, but when the 
author herself records her audiobooks, something happens with the voice’s 
relation to the text (see, e.g., Have and Pedersen 2016: 116). The text’s 
narrator and the author are physically tied closely together, and the text’s 
positions are thus negotiated in new ways, which in Helle Helle’s case has 
several interesting implications. Partly there is the metafictional layer of 
the novel, the narrator of which is an author with writer’s block and who 
writes about ‘ordinary people who drink coffee and chat and that sort of 
thing’. This metafictional quality is reinforced in the audiobook version. 
Partly there is the relationship between the author who reads aloud and 
the figures the author describes. Is the performing narrator and author 
Helle Helle operating with an ironic stance towards the figures depicted, 
or is the voice in the novel loyal to John and Putte’s relatively humble 
everyday universe? This is in a way undecided, but the ambivalence—that 
we both laugh at and with John and Putte—seems perhaps less ambivalent 
in the audiobook version, since the reading actually comes across as rela-
tively loyal to the novel’s cast of characters.
When looking at the voice in context, it could in this case be a question 
of gender and social class. The aforementioned discussion of ambivalence 
could be continued, since Helle Helle’s novels to a certain degree speak to 
a world of high culture, while the environment she describes lies far from 
the literary world’s ideas about itself. Even though the audiobook’s 
recording thus demonstrates a loyalty to or love for the figures it describes, 
exposes and lives with, it still encompasses an explicit collision between 
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what is described and the literary world of which Helle Helle’s novels 
are part.
Above, we highlighted three important parameters in the analysis of a 
specific audiobook experience. The combination of the specific technol-
ogy, the reading situation and the reading voice contributes to defining 
the reading experience in the meeting with the individual listener’s per-
sonal disposition and experience, which we, in parenthesis, have not con-
sidered methodologically in this analysis.
By including technology, situation and the voice in the analysis, a read-
ing experience is sketched out which is significantly different from reading 
the book as a printed book or e-book. According to how the three param-
eters combine in the individual reading experience, it can be further anal-
ysed in relation to two general aspects of experience, which focus on how 
the use of audiobooks negotiates the relationship of the experience to time 
and on the experience’s degree of immersion—or with metaphorical des-
ignations: a horizontal and a vertical aspect of the appropriation.
6.8  the aspects oF experIence In readIng 
an audIobook: tIme and depth
Empirical studies have shown that the reading of audiobooks has an effect 
on our experience of time (Dalsgård et  al. 2015; Have and Pedersen 
2016). Although this is also the case with visual reading, the popularity of 
the audiobook in the last few years perhaps has something to do with the 
modern person’s relationship to time. Reading audiobooks gives waiting 
and wasted time a positive aspect by adding an extra mental layer of expe-
rience to the bike ride, walk or waiting time on the platform, so that we 
feel we are making the best possible use of time.
An American questionnaire from 2012 showed that 62% of those asked 
mentioned that they chose audiobooks rather than printed books because 
they could be read while they drove their car, 46% highlighted the mobil-
ity of the audiobook and 31% ticked the box “it helps me multitask”. Only 
11% answered that they chose audiobooks because they had difficulty 
reading printed books (Have and Pedersen 2016: 101). This was con-
firmed by a qualitative study we ourselves undertook, in which reading 
audiobooks qualified the time our informants otherwise felt was wasted 
on, for example, transport or cleaning and was seen as a choice that added 
value to everyday activities (Have and Pedersen 2016: Chapter 6). Our 
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informants also confirmed a point from an earlier American survey (Audio 
Publishers Association 2006: 1) that audiobook readers typically also read 
many printed books and therefore do not replace the printed books with 
audiobooks but rather create new routines for reading in situations in 
which they cannot read with their eyes (Have and Pedersen 2016). As the 
report Når Danmark læser (When Denmark Reads) also confirms, the 
audiobook offers new possibilities for reading in a time when many people 
do not feel that they have time to read printed literature (Dalsgård et al. 
2015). People with routine jobs or commuters also have additional time 
or attention with which to listen to literature (Dalsgård et al. 2015: 33).
There has been a tendency to view listening to audiobooks as a dis-
tracted and superficial form of reading and getting to know literature, but 
when audiobook readers say that they make wasted time pass faster by 
reading audiobooks, it is also a question of compressing time through 
immersion. We can therefore differentiate between two forms of listening 
to audiobooks, each with their qualities. It is an analytical differentiation, 
since the two forms in practice enrich one another: atmosphere-oriented 
audiobook listening, which is reminiscent of listening to music and which 
emphasises the aesthetic aspects of the voice and a ‘thickening’ of the lin-
guistic in a sonorous-stylistic sense, and content-oriented audiobook listen-
ing. Immersion may occur in both cases, depending on whether we 
immerse ourselves in the audiobook’s narrative or in the atmosphere cre-
ated by the sonorous qualities of the language and by the narrator’s voice, 
which in, for example, Helle Helle’s case can create presence and mental 
calm. It is, then, a question of two different ways of reading ‘deeply’, and 
the audiobook can be said to increase sensibility to the connection between 
the sonorously atmosphere-oriented and the narrative-oriented levels. 
Sound is experienced in real time, but audiobook reading can either make 
time pass more quickly or give time an atmospheric and content-based 
wealth. The temporal dimension is therefore closely connected to the ver-
tical dimension, which is about immersion and concentration. Depending 
on which reading situation we find ourselves in, reading an audiobook 
‘deeply’ may mean that we are absorbed in a story driven by a hermeneutic 
desire but can also mean that the audiobook’s tone creates a, in part, sen-
sorially based atmosphere for the experience, which affects the reader’s 
relation to his or her surroundings.
Like the printed book, the audiobook can be read with varying degrees 
of attention, and like traditional reading, it demands practice to read an 
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audiobook concentratedly, to understand and immerse oneself in the 
stream of words that meets the ear at a high tempo. One of the points we 
wish to draw out in this chapter is that it is possible to speak of different 
ways of reading an audiobook and that habituation and discipline may be 
required to approach audiobooks in different ways, in the same way that 
the reading of writing presupposes practice and discipline. In this sense, 
the audiobook reading practice negotiates the relation between spatiotem-
poral aspects of reading on new terms, not at least questioning the hierar-
chies of cultural values when it comes to conceptions of close- and deep 
reading.
6.9  conclusIon
In this chapter, we have tried to give the digital audiobook a voice in the 
analysis of the reading of literature. We define the audiobook as an audio 
recording of a printed book (the technical medium of display), which is 
read aloud, but do not see it as a by-product of the book; it is not only a 
remediation but also an independent medium, which offers other and 
expanded forms of reading literature. The large circulation of the digital 
audiobook calls for new methods, and by presenting some different 
parameters of analysis which can supplement the traditional literary analy-
sis, we have sketched an analytical method which is sensitive to the medium 
and points out the importance of the technology, reading situation and 
voice for the reading experience. Together with the narrative content of a 
fiction-based audiobook, the various combinations of these parameters 
make possible a broad range of audiobook analyses, which can be further 
qualified by discussing them in relation to two types of reading, the 
atmosphere- oriented and the content-oriented reading, respectively, 
which in different ways build upon the audiobook’s particular potentials 
within time and depth as aspects of experience. By insisting on the fact 
that we read audiobooks, we also hope that we can contribute to challeng-
ing the preconceptions that may still exist about the reading of audio-
books as superficial and compensatory.
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7.1  IntroductIon
The context with which this chapter grapples is mobile language learning. 
Recent research (Lotherington 2018) indicates that top commercial 
mobile (m-)learning apps tend to rely heavily on outmoded structural 
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models of language and tap dated behaviouristic pedagogies in their les-
sons, typically applying gamification veneers to attract and maintain users. 
Popular m-learning apps predominantly feature levelled vocabulary study, 
and to a lesser extent, language structure, aka grammar. Linguistic com-
munication, however, has moved from simple alphabetic encoding to mul-
timedia design in digital environments; this challenges the fit of structural 
theories of language to digital language learning contexts. In language 
teaching and learning literature, multimodality describes communication 
employing diverse semiotic resources in texts not limited to alphabetically 
(or logographically or syllabically) encoded language. In reality, all com-
munication is multimodal; however, professional awareness of multimodal 
communication in language teaching emanates particularly from digital 
texts and discourses, which are created using a broader palette of meaning- 
making resources than static print texts, ergo, multimedia texts. The pre-
dominating trend has been to approach digital multimodal communication 
from a social semiotics paradigm (e.g., Bezemer and Kress 2008, 2016; 
Jewitt 2008; Kress 2000, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2011).
Shortly after the turn of the century, Kress (2003: 1) predicted: “the 
combined effects on writing of the dominance of the mode of image and 
of the medium of the screen will produce deep changes in the forms and 
functions of writing.” Mode, though, is not defined. Jewitt (2004: 84), 
clarifies the concept of mode as indexing “technologies of representation 
(the modes of ‘multimodality’),” and contrasts mode with media, which 
indexes “technologies of dissemination (the media of multimedia).” As 
social semiotic conceptualizations of multisemiotic composition have 
grown in concert with increasingly sophisticated, grammatically differenti-
ated digital communication, the terrain of multimodal communication 
can be seen to overlap considerably with that of intermediality theorizing. 
The fundamental building blocks of mode and media, which, in a social 
semiotics reading based in linguistics, rely largely on cultural interpreta-
tion and exemplification, gain precision from an intermediality analysis 
based in interart studies.
Elleström’s landmark intermediality model (2010, 2020) delineates the 
concept of a mode from a semiotic perspective, illuminating how modality 
characterizes media, a generally nebulous and capacious concept. 
Elleström’s model offers a valuable resource for examining multimodality 
in digital communication from an innovative theoretical stance grounded 
in art, rather than linguistics.
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Taking an intermediality lens, this chapter parses two selected features 
of mobile digital communication that are only vicariously captured in lin-
guistic analysis. The analysis draws on Elleström’s (2020) intermediality 
paradigm to help delineate how diverse meaning-making resources could 
be conceptualized from a perspective decentred from linguistics and lever-
aged in reconceptualizing the m-learning of language as it is used in con-
temporary interactive, multimedia texts and discourses.
7.2  Language and LIteracy
Language has traditionally been described as a medium: of communica-
tion, and of learning. Language is, in fact, an abstract until it is material-
ized: mediated physically, in speech and signed conversations, and 
technologically, in printed documents, social media sites, roadside signs, 
movies, games, and suchlike. Gershon and Manning (2014: 539) point 
out that curiously “the mediality of language is rarely explored in media 
studies.”
Language is often complexly remediated. Ong (1982) theorized sec-
ondary orality as the remediation of speech into writing with subsequent 
re-voicing, as in scripted televised newsreading (also see Eide and Schubert 
2020). Have and Pedersen (2020) describe contemporary remediation in 
books: traditional media products that can be remediated as audiobooks 
and read aurally. In this chapter, remediation of the human voice is 
described as material in artificial intelligence (AI) programs that create 
conversational digital agents.
Language is innate to human beings, hardwired as individual cognitive 
capacity, though the developmental trajectory of the child learning to 
speak (or to sign in the case of deaf children) requires appropriate social-
ization to activate. Languages, thus, live in society as well as in the minds 
of individuals, social use constituting their lifeblood.
Speech is dynamic in character, spoken language evolving in tune with 
the social community/ies in which it has currency. Different accents sig-
nify regional location in spoken language populations, for example, 
English as spoken in Toronto, Canada, as compared to English as spoken 
in Edinburgh, Scotland, or in Cape Town, South Africa. Literate norms, 
though, tend to be much more fixed, coded into a body of literature rely-
ing on common conventions that developed for the social expectations 
and the mediating technologies of the time of publication.
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The technological interface encoding language into literate forms for 
most of the history of mass literacy was the printing press, which, through 
pioneering use, forced the conventionalizing of spelling and sentence 
mechanics to make printed literature easily readable. Times have changed, 
however, and the predominant canvas for communication is now the 
screen, and increasingly, a screen that is individualized, mobile, and ubiq-
uitously wifi-connected. Communication is now ineluctably and indelibly 
multimodal.
7.2.1  The Literate Bias of Education
In education, there is a distinct bias towards literate learning. At the grade 
school level, literacy is seen as the keyhole through which school learning 
progresses. In the province of Ontario (Canada) which is the policy juris-
diction for children in Toronto, language is conflated in curriculum docu-
ments with literacy. As such, literacy references language written down. 
This makes for a messy transition to digital multimodal communication.
In the case of sequential language learning (language learning follow-
ing initial child language development), sometimes referred to as second 
(or foreign) language learning, the characterization of language compe-
tence in terms of four skills: speaking–listening–reading–writing, ostensi-
bly mirroring child language development (as theorized in pre-digital, 
majority language, middle-class contexts) has tenaciously persisted for 
decades. Though the validity of discrete language skills (reading as sepa-
rable from writing, and so forth) has been in contention for decades, for-
mal language testing in gate-keeping tests, such as the TOEFL has been 
complicit in cementing a four-skills model into social and economic 
benchmarks, so this limited twentieth-century thinking about what lan-
guage comprises and entails for learners continues to be reinforced in 
many teaching contexts.
7.2.2  Mobile Language Learning
Mobile language learning is geared to second and foreign language learn-
ers. Despite myriad possibilities in using mobile devices for language 
learning, the evolution of m-learning tilted towards app-based learning 
following the release of the iPhone in 2007. Apps are third-party software 
packages that are directly downloadable to mobile devices on a trial cost- 
free or low- cost basis. Apps for language learning take a variety of generic 
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approaches from language courses to games to vocabulary resources to 
memorization drills (Lotherington 2018), but each offers a proprietary 
package, marketed by a software developer. The digital marketplace for 
language teaching apps is a veritable wild west of unregulated products, 
educationally speaking, in which learners are treated as users. The user is, 
in fact, the product in app design, their learning behaviours, collected and 
sold as data, though there may also be a more direct profit motive in paid 
course upgrades, unlocked learning resources, and so forth.
Mobility in the context of digitally mediated communication references 
capacity for ubiquitous interactive communication untethered to physical 
location. Contemporary m-learning uses smart mobile devices that embed 
powerful multifunction toolkits for digital text making. Because of this, 
mobile connection has the potential to invite dynamic pedagogical 
approaches that put agency in the hands of the learner for collecting and 
creating resources towards directed language learning, contextualized in 
space. Mobile devices, however, frequently meet with disapproval in for-
mal education sites, if traditional curricular agendas of language and lit-
eracy learning dominate. Worse, smartphones are banned in some schools, 
precluding creative classroom m-learning.
Top-selling apps for language learners, recently surveyed and road- 
tested (Lotherington 2018), revealed a tendency to import dated struc-
tural models of language and behaviourist pedagogies into the fluid 
mobility and complex functionality of a smart device. Features of current 
interactive multimedia communication are used here and there; most apps 
apply a gamification engine to mask the tedium of vocabulary drills. Some 
apps also utilize a social media feature to connect random chat partners 
selected on the basis of the home country, which is an unreliable indicator 
of language proficiency in any case. However, generally speaking, social 
media affordances were poorly utilized and digital discourse forms largely 
avoided.
This chapter presents data from an extended review of the research lit-
erature on how language has morphed in form and function in co- 
evolution with technological change. This literature review forms the basis 
of an active exploratory pedagogical design study to build mobile produc-
tion pedagogies (Thumlert et al. 2015) for language learning that utilize 
the powerful resources of smart devices and activate a contemporary pal-
ette of semiotic resources. Our research team’s aim is to invite interactive 
multimedia textual composing in ways that work agentively for language 
learners. To do this, we need to understand the kinds of changes language 
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has undergone and how we can document these changes from a theoreti-
cally rigorous standpoint. Elleström’s (2020) intermediality paradigm 
offers analytical specificity and categorization that is helpful in understand-
ing contemporary communication from a perspective not grounded in 
linguistics that can be intelligently merged with what we understand about 
how language works to create meaning.
7.3  the expandIng Borders of Language 
In dIgItaL communIcatIon
Ignoring the paralinguistic information embroidering the borders of spo-
ken language (e.g., body language, facial expressions, and tone of voice) 
was pedagogically reinforced in both school and second language learn-
ing. A related principle was held in books where nonlinguistic material, 
such as illustrations and charts, was acknowledged but looked at as sup-
portive of rather than integral to overall meaning contribution. This was 
particularly the case in second language learning, where the focus was 
traditionally on the structural elements of language. In grade schools, 
where language is more holistically approached, books were nonetheless 
assessed as to content and nature according to the density of language car-
rying, as it were, the message; image-centred genres, such as comic books, 
were derided as insufficiently serious. Nowadays, the graphic novel has 
taken on a new life, imparting content taught in grade school and univer-
sity classes, for example, Persepolis (Satrapi 2003).
Digital mobile connection has redrawn the literate borders of language, 
challenging the print-centred skills of second language teaching and learn-
ing, and the linear linguistic encoding of text. With Web 2.0 technological 
upgrades, enabling interactivity, literacy has morphed from discrete read-
ing and writing of the static page into a multimedia read/write (R/W) 
capacity underpinning social media posting, collaborative authorship 
(wikis); tweeting (microblogging), texting, and so forth. Furthermore, 
the shift from page to screen entailed radically new encoding capabilities 
that have dislodged the stuff of literacy from the letter to the pixel, which 
indifferently encodes still and moving images, sound files, and spoken lan-
guage (Cope and Kalantzis 2004). The limits of theories focused on writ-
ten instantiations of language: linguistic structuralism and literacy theories, 
focused on linear encoding and decoding of the static page, have become 
 H. LOTHERINGTON
223
inadequate to imagining the task of understanding and creating multime-
dia textual products.
Though the evolution of page to screen has taken place over decades, 
the period of most rapid change in language form and function has taken 
place over the past 15 years, consistent with Web 2.0 and 3.0 technologi-
cal advancements. The initial iteration of the public World Wide Web in 
1991, retroactively referred to as WWW 1.0., was essentially a digital bul-
letin board where content could be publicly posted. It was Web 2.0 circa 
2004 that opened the flood gates to rapid co-evolution in social practices, 
economic opportunities, cultural life, and associatively, language form and 
function. Web 2.0, or the semantic web, gave birth to social media forums, 
for example, Facebook, LinkedIn; collaborative authoring tools or wikis; 
video-streaming services, such as YouTube; and novel sites for information 
sharing and social networking, such as blogging, podcasting, and microb-
logging, for example, Twitter. The evolving capacity for integrated artifi-
cial intelligence in Web 3.0 enabled smart technologies that yield new 
functionalities. These include conversational digital agents, AI programs 
that use natural human language in spoken form to respond to user voice 
or text inquiries in environments such as mobile phones, business call cen-
tres, and GPS systems in cars.
7.3.1  DIY Language Norms and Conventions
Historically, lexical and grammar conventions were based on literature, 
which, having met publication standards, provided the guide rails for lan-
guage standards. Dictionaries and grammar books encapsulated accepted 
spelling, grammar, punctuation, and lexis. Figure 7.1 provides an amusing 
excerpt from an eighteenth-century grammar of English, which would be 
met with general hilarity by even the most tolerant of language teach-
ers today.
Fig. 7.1 An excerpt 
from Henson’s 
grammar (1744)
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The established quality controls (and built-in biases) of commercial 
publication, however, are far less influential in an interactive digital envi-
ronment enabling self and open publication, collaborative authoring and 
editing, and user-developed generic conventions, co-evolving with tech-
nological affordances, yielding novel spelling norms in texting (txting), 
for example, brb, omg; tweet grammars (280 characters, incorporating 
semantic punctuation such as # and @ as well as other digital media), and 
suchlike. These new forms challenging the standard spelling, punctuation, 
and grammar relied on in schooling, however, are user-driven, emerging, 
ironically, from the same historical basis as literary and grammatical stan-
dards: publication. This creates a conundrum for formal education, which 
educates learners for tomorrow, not yesterday, because the stuff of literate 
learning that underwrites formal education continues to draw, in the main, 
from yesterday’s norms and standards.
7.3.2  Language in Mobile Digital Context
How exactly is language outgrowing print era borders? In an ongoing 
study of evolutionary changes in language form and use co-evolving with 
digital technologies,1 our team is documenting a number of key linguistic 
evolutions permeating everyday communication, including but not 
limited to:
• interactive R/W functionality,
• multisemiotic resource encoding using haptic strokes or voice com-
mands on a keyboard or touch screen,
• modular design as the principle in composition rather than linear 
word choice and positioning in edited writing,
• immediate global publication and sharing of ideas and documents 
enabling crowd-sourcing, and real-world audience feedback,
• textual products created in a permanently editable state (with some 
exceptions in commercially published digital books and journals) 
rather than print-fixed publication (gone are errata sheets inserted in 
printed books), and
• chatting with AI.
These and other evolutions in communication have co-developed with 
technological advancement, generating new genres (e.g., fanfic, unbox-
ing), discourses (e.g., #photooftheday, comments sections in social media), 
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and cultural practices (e.g., massive multiplayer online role-playing games 
[MMORPG]; blogging; podcasting), each of which grows corresponding 
conventions (e.g., #, lol, ). These become norms within the generating 
genres, though given the speed of technological change, the norms, too, 
are in a state of change, for example, the microblogging site, Twitter, has 
gone from 140 characters to 280 characters per tweet. Interestingly, some 
conventions have jumped generic borders, such as hashtags. For instance, 
#MeToo as a topic heading has migrated across microblogging and social 
media forums to protest signs and newspaper headlines, and even into 
speech, pronounced: “hashtag me too.”
Given the plethora of novel language forms being generated in digital 
fora, appropriate theorizing of what constitutes language and literacy for 
learners in this day and age is urgently needed.
7.4  theorIzIng muLtImodaL communIcatIon: 
two VIews
“‘Multimodality’ names the field in which semiotic work takes place, a 
domain for enquiry, a description of the space and of the resources that 
enter into meaning in some way or another,” states Kress (2011: 38). He 
further asserts that analysing multimodal discourse “needs to encompass 
all modes used in any text or text-like entity, with each described both in 
terms specific to its material and historical affordances and in terms shared 
by all modes” (2011: 38). This description signals the underlying com-
plexity of multimodality as theorized in social semiotics and indicates sig-
nificant overlap with Elleström’s intermediality theory. There is 
commonality in conceptual range, including the modalities of basic media 
(material, spatiotemporal, and semiotic modalities though less of senso-
rial), as well as qualified (historical, social, cultural) aspects of media. 
Epistemologically, however, the approaches vary considerably.
Social semiotics is a theoretical perspective derived from Michael 
Halliday’s (1978) systemic functional linguistics (SFL), which theorized 
language in social use. Halliday’s SFL departed from prior structuralist 
theories of language form, which explained language as abstract structure, 
detached from social use. The concept of social semiotics was further 
developed by Hodge and Kress (1988), predating the evolution of digital 
communication. Kress’ (2000, 2003, 2009, 2011) continued work on 
social semiotics, multimodality, and literacy provides a dominant 
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theoretical lens for understanding the innovative multimedia texts that 
have evolved over the digital era.
In a social semiotics paradigm of multimodality, mode is the basic con-
cept, indexing the means of semiotic representation. Media refers to tech-
nologies of dissemination (Bezemer and Kress 2008; Jewitt 2004; Kress 
2005). Multimodal texts are designed and “composed of different modes, 
resting on the agentive semiotic work of the maker of such texts” (Kress 
2011: 36). Modes are typically exemplified rather than analytically 
explained, for example:
If, going one step further, we compare a contemporary textbook with 
‘pages’ on the Web dealing with the ‘same’ issues, we see that modes of 
representation other than image and writing—moving image and speech for 
instance—have found their way into learning resources, with significant 
effect. (Bezemer and Kress 2008: 167)
The affordances of modality can become exceedingly complex:
It varies in line with the affordances of each mode: here in a contrast of 
speech and image—of lexis vs depiction; of possession vs proximity or dis-
tance, of centrality or marginality; as a verb-form vs spatial co-location; 
sequence (as temporal succession in speech or linearity in writing) vs simul-
taneity (of appearance and arrangement) of the entities. (Kress 2011: 45)
In Elleström’s (2020) conceptualization, multimodality is a feature that 
helps to define intermediality. His theorizing follows Mikko Lehtonen’s 
explanation that “multimodality always characterises one medium at a 
time. Intermediality, again, is about the relationships between multimodal 
media” (cited in Elleström 2020: 41). Elleström explains, “intermediality 
is about the relationship between media having a multitude of vital traits, 
or modes” (2020: 41). Four modalities, that is, types of modes, form 
indispensable cornerstones of all media: material, spatiotemporal, senso-
rial, and semiotic. Together they build in physicality, perception, and 
cognition.
Media in a social semiotics paradigm may index what Elleström catego-
rizes as technical media of display (2020: 33–40). However, a discussion of 
technical media invites an ontological lens on what constitutes technology, 
which exceeds the purview of this article, calling into question the rela-
tionship of qualified (socio-historical aspects of media) and technical 
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media of display. My reluctance to do this, in brief, follows Lawson’s 
(2008: 48) argument that technology is “irreducibly social.” Bijker 
(2010), speaking from a social construction of technology theory, elabo-
rates on how detached views of technology are impossible. In his words, 
“technology is socially (and politically) constructed; society (including 
politics) is technically built; technological culture consists of sociotechni-
cal ensembles” (Bijker 2010: 72). Disconnecting technical media from 
their contextualizing socio-history is, thus, specious.
7.5  modaLIty, mode, and medIa 
In dIgItaL communIcatIon
Digital text creation is a process of multimedia design, not simply alpha-
betic encoding, and it cannot be taught as if it were. This is not a new 
realization, as can be seen in Kress’ (2000: 339) prediction two decades ago:
The semiotic modes of writing and of image are distinct in what they permit, 
that is, in their affordances. Image is founded on the logic of display in 
space; writing (and speech even more so) is founded on the logic of succes-
sion in time. Image is spatial and nonsequential; writing and speech are 
temporal and sequential. That is a profound difference, and its consequences 
for representation and communication are now beginning to emerge in this 
semiotic revolution.
Multimedia design, however, is far more complex now than indicated 
then. Worth commentary is that Kress is on record (Kress and van Leeuwen 
1996) describing the evolution of alphabetic writing from images—the 
linkage being very much still evident in logographic systems, such as 
Mandarin Chinese. So how can the logic of writing be so polarized from 
the logic of image, either in process—which in both cases requires tempo-
ral logic: you have to write or create the product—or in product—which, 
depending on the kind of image and kind of writing, may be spatial in 
orientation but is likely to be more complexly intertwined with temporal 
and perhaps even tactile perception? In terms of writing, consider subtitles 
at an opera, electronic highway signs, moving advertising on rotating 
e-bulletin boards. These require timed spatial perception. In terms of 
image, consider sculpture, which requires spatial perception but also 
requires movement around the sculpture, and thus is temporal in 
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perception, too. Also sculpture may invite tactile perception as part of the 
sensory experience.
Text composition today engages and remixes graphic resources, sound 
files, and moving images from gifs to videos into alphabetic text in a key-
stroke. Elemental semiotic resources, such as pictures and letters, are 
essentially mashable by virtue of their shared materiality: the pixel. Mobile 
smart devices embed a portable digital toolkit for designing, producing, 
and sharing multimedia texts. Making sophisticated multimedia texts on a 
smartphone is easy-as-pie.
Language education requires principled conceptualization of the semi-
otic elements being functionally captured and remixed in contemporary 
digital communication so they are included pedagogically. Given the 
immense changes occurring in digital language form and function, gain-
ing a full understanding of how multimedia textual production varies from 
linear alphabetic writing is a vast project. In the following section, two 
radically novel digital twists to language today are examined through 
Elleström’s intermediality lens: the inclusion of emoji, for example, , , 
, in digital writing and the incorporation of AI interlocutors, or conver-
sational digital agents, in spoken communication in digital environments 
such as mobile phones.
7.5.1  Emoji
Language learners routinely expect vocabulary and grammar to constitute 
basic language learning. However, the question “What is a word?” must 
be asked in an environment where novel word-like formations that have 
no pre-digital era precedent, including hashtags (e.g., #BlackLivesMatter), 
and emoji (e.g., ), have taken on a life of their own. This section exam-
ines emoji as a novel element in digital R/W vocabulary.
Pardes (2018) describes emoji as, “tiny, emotive characters—from  
to to —[which] represent the first language born of the digital 
world, designed to add emotional nuance to otherwise flat text.” Emoji 
developed in Japan following early digital chat play with emoticons using 
the ASCII keyboard, for example, :-). Japanese emoji were seen as a valu-
able contribution to digital platforms and adopted by tech giants in the 
early 2000s, who then petitioned for their inclusion in the Unicode 
Consortium (Pardes 2018). This stabilized emoji for universal keyboard 
use in terms of the binary code computers use.
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Emoji are pictograms, as are many public signs, for example, , index-
ing “recyclable.” Pictograms differ slightly from logograms, which are 
words encoded in a script; for example, 你好 in traditional Chinese, pro-
nounced nı ̌ hǎo (literally “you good”), encodes the greeting “hello,” 
which in English requires five letters. You can speak a logogram but not a 
pictogram. As such, emoji exist only in literate form; they do not directly 
encode a spoken form, though they can be translated, for example,  is a 
smiley face, though just one variant of smileys, also including , .
Emoji utilize an elemental iconic keyboard, which makes an emoji as 
easy to insert into written text as a letter (e.g., a or b or c). The emoji 
keyboard is analogous to the qwerty keyboard as technical interface (used 
with a screen as technical medium of display). The qwerty keyboard has 
been a primary technical interface between writer and text since its 
mechanically driven design in the nineteenth-century manual typewriter 
(Noyes 1983), used with paper. There are parallel keyboards for languages, 
for example, accented Roman (French, Swedish); non-alphabetic scripts 
(Chinese, in traditional or simplified logograms); and emoji, which can be 
imported into text-making at the touch of a button on a smartphone (see, 
e.g., Fig. 7.2).
Given that all basic media are characterized by four modalities—mate-
rial, spatiotemporal, sensorial, and semiotic—and that a medium may 
demonstrate multimodal characteristics within a single modality, how 
might emoji be modally described? As emoji exist only in literate form, 
they are visually perceived, spatially interpretable symbols that are encoded 
materially in pixels, using a keyboard as technical interface and screen as 
technical medium of display. Consider the attempt to parse these comple-
mentary modalities in Table 7.1. It is critical to state up front that this 
untangling of the modalities of emoji is intended to illustrate the complex-
ity and relative complementarity of media, not to deconstruct emoji into 
isolatable component parts that do not blend into each other. Parsing is 
intended to highlight more and less prominent modalities in 
interpretation.
Media and mediation are exceedingly complex in today’s communica-
tion landscape. A media product or medium exists in historical-social- 
cultural space as well as physical-sensorial-cognitive space. According to 
Elleström, “qualified media” are “media types, which depend on history, 
culture and communicative purposes” (2020: 57). A more delineated 
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understanding of emoji in contemporary communication comes to light in 
the qualified aspects of the medium.
Emoji are media products; they are also a media type that is endemic to 
informal texting and digital chat environments. Despite their immense 
cross-cultural popularity and widespread use, they have not migrated to 
more formal writing environments. The qualified aspects of emoji help to 
Fig. 7.2 Parallel 
keyboards available on 
smartphone
Table 7.1 Basic and technical media of emoji
Medium product Emoji
Basic modalities Material Pixel
Spatiotemporal Spatial
Sensorial Visual
Semiotic Textual emotional nuance
Informal register: texting, IM chat
Technical media Digital screen as display Mobile phone, computer, etc.
Emoji keyboard Alternate parallel emoji keyboard
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flesh out a broader understanding of emoji as semiotic resource, going 
some distance in explaining the reluctance of formal educational infra-
structures to absorb this element of contemporary communication into 
language study (see Table 7.2).
Intermediality is, of course, not neatly packaged in a grid, as the prefix 
inter- suggests: each aspect of media seeps into and colours complemen-
tary aspects. Hence, the unreality of separating technical media of display 
from social and historical context despite the practicality of knowing the 
intended or most suitable device. Nonetheless, creating a constituent 
media analysis of emoji is a valuable exercise for understanding how and 
where this literate innovation works in digital composition. Let us now 
turn to a more nebulous digital phenomenon: the surreptitious perme-
ation of AI into digital conversation.
7.5.2  Conversational AI
A keen interest in understanding communication in mobile digital context 
is the emergence of the conversational digital agent. The expansion of 
voice recognition software into the sophisticated conversational digital 
agent historically coincides with the release of smart mobile devices, 
which, because of their limited screen size, benefitted from a voice to pro-
vide assistance rather than relying on tiny written instructions (Pinola 
2011). The integration of global positioning system (GPS) receptors in 
smart devices enabled digitally voiced navigation. AI voices are also incor-
porated incognito in language teaching apps.
Table 7.2 Basic, qualified, and technical media of emoji
Medium product/type Emoji
Basic modalities Material Pixel
Spatiotemporal Spatial
Sensorial Visual
Semiotic Textual emotional nuance
Informal: texting, IM chat
Qualified media Social acceptability Established quotidian
Social availability In-built in smart devices
Educational approval Not recognized in academic learning
Historical evolution Japanese texts to global big tech
Cultural uptake Unknown degree of universality
Technical media Digital screen as display Mobile phone, computer, etc.
Emoji keyboard Alternate parallel emoji keyboard
7 LANGUAGE IN DIGITAL MOTION: FROM ABCS TO INTERMEDIALITY… 
232
How might a disembodied digitized computer voice be described in 
terms of the four modalities of basic media? To hear a voiced message from 
a disembodied computer-activated conversational agent, switch on the 
voiceover accessibility feature on a computer; ask a question to your in- 
phone conversational digital assistant, e.g., Siri, or plug in a destination on 
a GPS device and enable voiceover directions. This will result in a media 
product that could be basically parsed as in Table 7.3.
Digital voices are, of course, a vehicle for a linguistic message, which 
would require elegant semantic and structural delineation within the semi-
otic category. This analysis can rely on the extensive attention paid to how 
language conveys meaning to whom, when, where, why, how, and so on 
that is entailed in linguistic theories. However, the basic media product of 
the voice of the conversational digital agent (as well as less complex AI 
chatbots) is also a media type. The digital conversational agent has perme-
ated not simply auditory media but also robotic shapes. In the spoof 
Amazon advertisement about the integration of the Amazon conversa-
tional agent into the Internet of things, as shown during the 2019 Super 
Bowl (American football), Alexa, the voice-activated digital agent, is capa-
ble of, among other things, interpreting dog bark commands ordering 
dogfood.2 Though very silly, the advertisement showcases the voices of 
male and female humans (speaking English), a dog, and a digital agent 
with attendant media properties, semantic comprehensibility, and so forth.
Quite apart from the exceedingly complex technical embedding of AI 
in media products that are more multifaceted—a smart mobile device, a 
refrigerator, a thermostat, and so forth—the emergence of the 
Table 7.3 Basic media modalities of conversational digital agent voice
Medium product Digitized voice















conversational digital agent in language learning is a qualified media ques-
tion mark. In the messy and dispute-ridden world of education, formal 
and nonformal, the contextualizing aspects of media may be a total deal- 
breaker. Whereas novel digital genres and discourses have reshaped com-
munication practices, normalizing activities such as social media posting 
(Facebook, Instagram), blogging, videologging (YouTube), microblog-
ging (Twitter), and texting (instant messaging), to mention just a few, the 
uptake of such discourses and their conventions in formal language and 
literacy teaching contexts has been spotty. Some schools encourage a 
bring-your-own-device (BYOD) approach to students’ using their per-
sonal mobile phones for learning; others expressly forbid mobile devices in 
class. In some classroom contexts, designing new media texts is encour-
aged, whether using institutional or personal devices; in others, curricula 
default to the conventions of static print media, stuck in speaking–listen-
ing–reading–writing skills. An analysis of the digital conversational agent 
in terms of qualified media in addition to the complex morass of the tech-
nical display in our parsing exercise might look as in Table 7.4.
Table 7.4 Basic, qualified, and technical media of conversational digital 
agent voice
Medium product Digitized voice











  Regional location
  Social information
Qualified media Social acceptability Limited social awareness
Social availability Unregulated digital marketplace
Educational approval Unregulated; unrecognized
Historical evolution AI development
Cultural uptake Dependent on users
Technical display Mobile digital devices Button or voice command
GPS device Button or voice command
Appliances
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This simplified grid is intended to spotlight modalities of media in 
terms of their prominence in the media product, not to cleanly disambigu-
ate modalities from each other, as previously disclaimed. Qualified aspects 
of digitized voices re: legitimation for an educational activity, for instance, 
may colour acceptability of modalities such as voice quality as well as semi-
otic aspects of accent programmed into the digitized voice, and vice versa. 
The following discussion on materiality indicates the mammoth complex-
ity of a disembodied digitized voice.
Language from Whose [sic] Perspective: The Complex Materiality 
of AI Communication
Given the infusion of conversational digital agents in daily communication 
practices, from following voiced GPS navigation in the car to asking Siri 
for help on the iPhone to including the robotic Amazon digital assistant, 
Alexa, in family conversations at home, we are justified in asking: Is lan-
guage still human?
Interestingly, humans using voice-activated digital assistants often 
assign human genders to them (e.g., “Thank you, lady in the computer!”; 
“She’ll tell you when to turn”). These voices, though, are programs: cir-
cuits, not people, despite the fact that the original mediating material was 
produced by humans prior to being subjected to complex technological 
remediation. Peña and James (2016, 2018), writing about glitch art and 
pedagogy, problematize materiality in digital transmediation across sen-
sory domains, making the case that computers can interpret and create 
sounds that are only partially interpretable to humans.
Human talk and text do not travel through computer circuits in 
humanly recognizable form. Computers function on a binary 0-1 code. 
The materiality of human–computer–human communication loops with 
digital conversational agents, such as Siri or Alexa, has complex techno-
logical layers, tapping a material modality that is a veritable iceberg reach-
ing into depths that are only partially interpretable to human 
interlocutors.
So the answer to “Is language still human?” is convoluted: computer 
programs were originally programmed by humans—though whether this 
continues to be true in Web 3.0 environments is another question.
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7.6  concLusIon: from aBcs to IntermedIaLIty
The speed of development in literate conventions, genres, texts, and dis-
courses as they mutually develop with socio-technical advancement has 
not been matched in formal language and literacy instruction, which still 
tends to prioritize socio-historically and politically sedimented literate 
forms. One problem in moving conceptions of writing into multimedia 
composition is that rapid changes in previously understood constancies, 
such as spelling, are user-driven in the digital age.
At the beginning of the school year, children go off to school to learn 
their ABCs. At least that is what used to happen and indeed is still the idea 
parents have in their heads. It is not so different with adult (and school) 
learners of second languages. But times have changed. Everyday digital 
communication practices—social media posting (e.g., Facebook, 
LinkedIn), microblogging (Twitter), videologging (e.g., YouTube), and 
photography-centred posting (e.g., Instagram, Pinterest), for example—
are co-encoded with emojis (e.g., ), and other graphic and sound 
media, such as photography, film, music, random sounds, gifs, and on and 
on. These forms are co-encoded with alphabetic symbols that can also be 
voiced—by software programs.
Conventions evolving in digital forums have revolutionized concepts as 
basic as the word: novel word-like forms, such as the hashtag, for example, 
#TimesUp; #foodporn that do not follow historical semantic or structural 
word formation patterns have crossed from digital environments into 
print media. Similarly, AI, which is commonly used for narrating GPS 
directions or giving help instructions on mobile device screens, is also 
being programmed into language learning apps.
Given this reality, language professionals and educational policy makers 
need to be aware of how media resources work to create texts and textual 
meaning from an arts-based as well as a language-based perspective. 
Elleström’s (2020) intermediality paradigm offers a much-needed vector 
for analysing multimedia communication from an arts perspective that can 
be integrated with linguistic theories to understand truly digital language 
as it is evolving.
This chapter undertook a comparative look at modality, mode, and 
media through a social semiotic and an intermediality lens to clarify the 
complex task of understanding the contribution of different semiotic 
resources in multimedia textual products. The raw data on new conven-
tions in digital language use are from an extensive literature review of how 
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mobile digital access has affected linguistic communication. This review 
informs current exploratory research to build appropriate mobile produc-
tion pedagogies for language learners, using, rather than ignoring, today’s 
communicative potential.
Two innovative communicative features that evolved with communica-
tions technologies advancements were selected for analysis using an inter-
mediality lens: the use of emoji in textual products and spoken 
communication with conversational digital agents. Though it must be said 
that emoji are unlikely to make a breakthrough into academic writing any 
time soon, other visual-spatial lexical innovations in digital communica-
tion have already begun to cross from specific digital forums into print 
manifestations, such as #hashtag topics: forms that do not cohere with 
lexical borders or alphabetic principles. The AI voice anonymously joins us 
in everyday communication. Many questions ensue.
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